

*Cantower XXVI***Refined Woman and Feynman**May 1st 2004

“I don’t care what anybody says itd be much better for the world to be governed by the women in it you wouldnt see women going and killing one another....”¹

26.1 Again, the Invitation

The invitation, of course, is not only to women. Still, part of the axial sickness has been a male dominance.² Is it not time, reaching for post-axial times, to give a dominion to the other psyche? But I do not wish to stir up controversy here. Perhaps you might just take the title as a recalling of the fourth *Cantower*, where I focused on the work of Candace Pert, on her feminist perspective, and on the possibilities of refinement and integral growth. Or you might just recall the frustrated brilliance of people like Emmy Noether and Joan Robinson: Nobel prize material, but the wrong sex. And you might hope, like I do, for a Ms Marx of the 21st century. In the title I have Richard Feynman because I would wish us to use his talent as a teacher in these next *Cantowers*, these next years. But I think now of my best graduate teacher, Sheila Tinney, who, as it happens, lectured in Feynman’s home-zone, quantum electrodynamics. And, I fondly remember her diagraming, not on the board, but in the air between her and her two

¹James Joyce, *Ulysses*, from Molly Bloom’s final soliloquy.

²A context for this issue is Sandy Gillis-Drage, *?Woman What Gives*, Axial Press, Halifax, 2004. Within the *Cantowers* there is a context in *Cantower IV*, where I focus on the work of Candace Pert. Perhaps there is no harm in repeating a quotation from that context: “The heart of science is feminine. In its essence science has very little do to with competition, control, separation - all qualities that have become associated with science in its male-dominated twentieth -century form. The science that I have come to know and love is unifying, spontaneous, intuitive, caring - a process more akin to surrender than to domination”(Candace Pert, *Molecules of Emotion*, Touchstone, New York, 313.

students!³ Luckily, a lot of the stuff was mirror-invariant.

My writing here is part of the renewed invitation. I have already rambled enough in these *Cantowers* about my own luck, and I would encourage you to assess your own luck in life, and your own making of luck. Might you follow up the mad search for the Dark Tower that I wrote of in July of 2002?⁴ But what is important is that you find your best self, leaning forward in history, perhaps modestly serene in finite obscurity.

Apart from the interchanges that I have had with a few of you, the last two *Cantowers* have been a very strange one-sided conversation.⁵ I have been trying to hold a focus on readers' lives, biographies - that, after all, is the dynamic of good metaphysics - as I puzzle over the fate of Lonergan's work during this coming century. We turned into this new millennium without much sign either of the emergence of a drive for a community adequate in foundations or of the emergence of a modest stab at functional work. Might we do something about that, shift the statistics? How to have a stab at functional work will occupy us from *Cantower XXXIV* on. But the next push here is towards improving the foundational effort, with Feynman's help.

But I really do have to halt myself here - as I mentioned at the beginning of the previous *Cantower*! Already you have had my invitation to write to yourself about your view on my diagrams, or your own version of such sketchings of viewpoint. Perhaps you took time off, this past month, to do just that? What we are at here is a modest realism about the move down page 250 of *Method in Theology*, a skipping of the

³The other class-member was Lochlainn O'Raiuertaigh (1932-2000) who later worked in the Institute of Theoretical Physics, Dublin, where Schrödinger worked before him. At various stages I have quoted him on issues of physics and method and recommend highly his two most recent books as pointing towards the need for functional specialization in physics: *The Dawning of Gauge Theory*, Princeton University Press, 1997; *Group Structure of Gauge Theory*, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

⁴*Cantower IV*.

⁵You may, of course, join the conversation, especially if you feel called to the strange climb: my most direct contact is pmcshane@ns.sympatico.ca.

complex of tasks of the top of the page to reach some autobiographic light.

One bright suggestion to myself was to simply end this *Cantower* here; or at least to leave a symbolic ten blank pages for you. Should we not both halt here? Over to you. A few blank lines to start: add your own paper!!

26.2 Mayday, Mayday.

Did you halt? Have you spelled out to yourself a narrative, a positioning, a concrete hope for a journey, be it Aristotle's excellent way or not?

I recall now a publisher who told me that I just should not write like this, discomfoting the reader by expressing the suspicion that there had been no halt to do a relevant exercise. Have I caught you just reading on? That may well be the right move: if you are an old hand at self-positioning, you certainly don't need much pausing here. But whether you are an old hand or a relative beginner you may have a common discomfort generated by my diagrams and my list. There is, for example - you might say - an unholy emphasis on physics.

Now I have already, in various places, pointed out the needs of my own present drive for an adequate eschatological cosmology. But has this venture into physics any other, wider, significance? You will, I hope, find an answer emerging within your own view as you undertake the adventure of the next five *Cantowers*. But what I would

suggest here, as a help towards your positional reflections, is that, even without ever venturing into physics, some venture into serious thinking of that type is massively important if you are to become luminous about your own humanity, your own feeble *ratio*, reasoning.⁶ The feebleness is an a priori reality: but it is not a luminous reality without the labour of scratching around, pretty helplessly, for insights. Recall the reflections on description in *Cantower XXIII*: I would say that the serious reach beyond description is long overdue in human studies, and, sadly, it would seem to be dependent on the forces of reductionism to lift it forward. But let's not go that route. Rather, I appeal to one small exercise, and in that appeal I recall the message of the first paragraph of *Insight*: Descartes' advice about tackling small problems.

The relevant small exercise is spelled out in an article of the first volume of the *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis*. It involves an apparently simple problem of figuring out how many ways one can seat ten married couples round a round table in such a way that there is always one man between two women and none of the men is ever next to his own wife. Now the key difficulty here is that you may have no inkling about just how difficult this problem is; like the medieval Aristoteleans or alchemists, you are ready for a quick fix. Are you up to such an exercise? It is powerfully revealing. You find out, in existential discomfort, the need for symbols and diagrams. In so far as you push on seriously, you may reveal to yourself a great deal about yourself as human. Elsewhere⁷ I wrote of the effort needed to get control of a sonnet of Hopkins, and of the psychic and molecular enrichment that went with that effort. Similarly here: you might well work towards such a control as would permit you to present the problem to others, to nurse them through to the final magnificently integrative insight and the hearty molecular "Yes!" Then you and they can read the formula that goes with the answer with a new exuberance about reading that you may then lift to the stars in the night sky or to the lines in the face of a friend.

⁶The exercises of *Cantowers XXVII* and *XXXI* draw attention to that feebleness.

⁷In the Epilogue of *Music That Is Soundless. A Fine Way for the Lonely Bud A*, Axial Press, 2003.

So I pose another positional statement: a major component of the present crisis of meaning in religion and philosophy is the grip general bias - with its underpinning of descriptive, and often pious, enrichments - has on the psyches of those involved.

Perhaps this leads you back, or forward, to further positional reflection? You need another ten blank pages?

26.3 Feynman and Function

I continue my aid to your positional reflection, with a definite pragmatic bent. I reach out to you now whether you are a student of Lonergan's works or not, whether you are an old hand at such studies or not. My section-title refers to Feynman⁸ and to the function of the next *Cantowers*, but there is also the reference forward to my considerations of function: the meaning of function, the function of the *Cantowers* in general, the meaning of functional.⁹ And that reference forward may have more to do with your particular bent, your positioning, in that you frankly do not wish to take the difficult road of theory: either through luck or temperament, you are just not in that ballpark. Then I would appeal to you to at least envisage taking up the functional bent, to try it out in your own special interest, to encourage students in any area to begin to think in that direction.

But most immediately I am thinking of the various refinements that could come from working with me through these next five essays that mesh the first five chapters of *Insight* with the first five chapters of Feynman's classic lectures.¹⁰

⁸Richard Feynman (1918-1988), considered by many the leading physicist of the mid-20th century, and a magnificent teacher. A handy biography is John and Mary Gribben, *Richard Feynman. A Life in Science*, A Plume paperback, 1998.

⁹*Cantower XXXIV* focuses on this.

¹⁰*The Feynman Lectures on Physics*, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, many printings in paperback. I refer to this three volume work through as Feynman I, II, III.

A first refinement is for those burdened with the teaching of the book *Insight*, or some aspect of it. It is very tough work, even if you have a background in the lower sciences. Much of the teaching of the book in the past forty five years has been summative, doctrinal. Indeed, most of the theses-writing around it in the same period has been of the same bent. I would hope that my efforts in the next five or eight *Cantowers* would be a help in this matter. A first help is the admission of difficulty: if I find chapter one of *Insight* hard going after forty six years - and I started with a graduate degree in mathematical physics - then you should surely be less discouraged. But there is the further help of hints as to how to lead oneself and others forward in this strange culture of self-discovery.

There is, then, the possible help that I bring to teachers. It can be a very realistic help in that a teacher may discover that teacher and students are in the same boat, pretty lost in this business, reaching a fresh and joyous humility. I think of myself in the late fifties, pacing round thinking about the hilarious fact that I really had no respectable concepts. Later, especially in the early seventies, I began to appreciate that I had little inkling about what I meant by the word “concept” itself: that is a very refreshing experience, admission, “admission into consciousness”.¹¹ Here humour can call out street-grins that make people look twice: do we really have any grip on the procession that Augustine, that “convert from nature to spirit”¹², wrote about, the “*verbum intus prolatum*”,¹³ the in-mind uttered word? In *Lack in the Beingstalk* I occasionally threw doubt on the meaning that we have for the word *spirit*: we may well throw the same doubt on all the words that refer to the conjugates referred to by ‘m’ and ‘n’ in the subscripts of the First Word of metaphysics, $u_m ; r_n$. The second stage

¹¹If you attempt something like my experiment with the Hopkins’s sonnet, or with the problem of the couples, you will have the basis, the data, for pushing for a rich perspective on that phrase, “admission into consciousness”. But I would emphasize the need for prolonged **Walkabout**, the need to pace streets bemused by words we use so freely, like “concept”.

¹²B. Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, 8.

¹³*Ibid.*

of meaning is more at homes with sticks and stones, and even though it names spirit-zones, the naming is feeble and, alas, battered by truncated subjectivity and its cousin reductionism. All this can be a help both to teachers and students.

And there is the forward-looking aspect that is part of foundational fantasy: how generalized empirical method might gradually mesh with physics and any other field of inquiry. If you think of generalized empirical method as described by Lonergan in his later work you find that physics and metaphysics are - normatively - inseparable.¹⁴ It is the way of the future, of the third stage of meaning. Revealing the inquiring subject is essential to the dynamics of complex inquiry. We have been round this territory before, but perhaps with more emphasis on teenage-classes: so you may be familiar with the slogan, which I have called the Childout Principle, “when teaching children geometry one is teaching children children”. Every teaching is to be a double teaching, aiming at being luminously double. This is the hope lurking in the first paragraph of the book *Lonergan’s Challenge to the University and the Economy*. “If there is to be a massive shift in public minding and kindness and discourse in the next century, there must be a proportionate shift in the mind and heart of the academy and the arts at the end of this century, with consequent changes in operating schemes of recurrence from government to kindergarten.”

You will, I hope, begin to appreciate the need for this in physics through the struggle with Feynman’s presentations, and you will glimpse the power of the “turn to the subject” as it might operate sentence by sentence, illustration by illustration, in any teaching, at any level. There will gradually emerge the supportive linguistic feedback leisure-norms that would make subjectivity’s gentle surges of expectation and ecstasy a palpable presence in learning situations. But meantime we must putter forward.

My presentations are stop-gap putterings. You recall how I dealt with the later chapters of *Insight* in previous *Cantowers*, the chapters 14-20 and the Epilogue (considered as 21) being in numerical correspondence. What is missing, what is

¹⁴This is a topic that dominates the reflections of the five *Cantowers* that relate the early chapters of *Insight* to Feynman’s Lectures.

anticipated, is a later culture, a later symbolism, a later education beyond present fantasy. Try, indeed, to imagine the product of such schooling through grades 1 to 12. So, we shall only hit the early chapters of *Insight* in spots, in paragraphs. Again, only rarely will my efforts here carry us beyond physics, but the strategies can be lifted on to any area, Shakespeare, biology, whatever. And this imaging has to be lifted forward and up to the shifted statistics of a fresh openness to leisure and subjectivity that is the ultimate intimate human exigence and destiny.

But that fresh openness as global psychic presence is a distant genetic character-shift. In the meantime we can struggle towards a slim change of perspective. One slim change of which you will notice the hints is the lift towards a cosmic perspective: we enter, in the freshened chapter one of *Insight*, not the worried world of Heidegger, but the whirls of Galactic glory which are smaller than the human heart yet an empirical residence of the divine.¹⁵

Finally, there is the simpler aspect of this revisiting *Insight*: Lonergan finished writing it just fifty years ago. Is it out of date in its secondary topics? You may be able to discern from the writings to follow that it holds its own in physics. Indeed, I would say that it is still ahead of the present efforts there, even if it was written when the table of particles was altogether smaller and more disorganized than at present, and 'quark' was still just a word in Joyce's *Finnegans Wake*. I shall try to indicate that as I try to get by - with a little help from my friends, maybe even a lot from you there - in zones of quantum mechanics, chromodynamics, whatever. To others I leave the task of checking, as I suspect, that Lonergan is still ahead of the field, regarding the *field*, in zones like genetic studies, grammarology, hermeneutics.

And now, perhaps, I have given you something to write home about, to yourself, about your own venture-capital within your own adventures? You need another ten blank pages? When you finish that writing - you are breaking off here to write, no? - we come to a type of end of this phase of view-sharing, the elimination of the

¹⁵This is the difficult topic of the final *Cantowers*.

orausetzunglos to a present pragmatic extent. It is a type of end, because it should leave you on a new plateau, a new dynamic of consciousness, a dynamic held by the freshness of a less indeterminate finality.

And there is the final exam! Not really: it simply seemed appropriate to include this exam, which I wrote in the late 1980s: it appeared first at the conclusion of *Process: Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minds*. It is appropriate certainly in that the date it was set for was Wednesday, June 16th, 2004: the centennial of Joyce's Bloomsday, the day of the events of *Ulysses*. It gives you a month of preparation-cramming! It is written in the style of examinations I was used to in my own undergraduate years: there would be ten questions on the paper, and you attempted what you could. Three good answers could get you a 'first'. So don't be discouraged if seven of the questions baffle you. Do you think that it is a pretty good future bachelor degree exam in methodology? Are we ready for this type of thing yet? How ready are you?

Over to you, then, with another ten blank pages!

26.4 A Formal Invitation

Metasystematics 300

3 hours

Wednesday, June 16th, 2004

Attempt the following questions, using overlaps and interrelations as convenient.

1. Express the foundational perspective that grounds an integrative hierarchy theory, illustrating aggreformic binding in a particular pair of neighboring sciences in such a way as to bring out the limits of disposition in coincidental aggregates.

2. Discuss limits theorems, limitation theorems, canonicity and enumerability in the context of a general heuristics of analogy.
3. By specifying relevant nested inverse insights, locate 20th century mathematical theories of probability within a metatheoretic of empirical probability. Illustrate their limited value in particle physics and in cosmogenetic studies.
4. Sublate Joyce's and Aquinas' reflections on art into a metatheoretic of unity-thinking. Discuss the significance of this larger view of beauty in cases of incompleteness, fortuitous or intentional: fragmentary statues, collage films, etc. Reflect on the incomplete self, the incomplete drama of history, the cosmos, in this context.
5. Enlarge on the manner in which general aggreformic heuristics excludes the bases of description and predicamental relating in sciences. Illustrate its dynamic by considering the sequences of physicochemical acts that are informed by some particular organism's growth patterns.
6. Give a heuristic account of aggreformic metalinguistics, including precise introspective indications of the grounds both of linguistic meaning and of transcultural grammar. Indicate how the resulting systematics contextualizes normatively transformational grammar and general semantics.
7. Elaborate a precise synchronic metasystematics of dreams, with emphasis on relevant physical and chemical fluctuations in REM sleep. Add indications of the broader diachronic heuristics relevant to an explanatory history or biography of significant dreams. Pinpoint the role of analogy and inverse insight in dealing with the religious significance of dreams in an absolutely supernatural order.
8. Illustrate, in some particular instance of historical development, the manner in which the canon of complete explanation, supplemented by precisions on metaphysical

equivalents and grammatical invariants, locates and controls significant descriptive meanings and contributes to the emergence of relatively invariant pure formulations in that particular case. Add comments regarding the limitations on pure formulations of supernatural developments.

9. Give a precise account of the manner in which a fully contextualized heuristics of is-questioning gives rise to a thematic of the functional specialty of history. Relate this precision to the problem of borrowed content and to the distribution of what-questions in functional specialization.

10. On the hypothesis of the transposition of economic control and microcontrol to non-political meanings, categorize synchronically the normative dynamics of local and global political discourse. Locate this categorization diachronically and pragmatically within the context of the genetic geopolitical systematics of the seventh and eight functional specialties.

26.5 Exam-Shock and Now-Positioning

I suspect that the Exam does come as something of a shock, except perhaps to a few advanced colleagues who have taken the Book *Insight* and its lighter-spoken follow-up *Method* as seriously as I have. Did you have a shot at thinking out, or writing out, some answers? Did you, could you, manage a reasonable run at three of them? There is enough stuff in *Insight* and *Method* to carry you through.

That remark perhaps astonishes you, and it allows us to enter a context that is realistic as a Now-position relating to a THEN-position. It is an old point for me, made in *Process* and elsewhere since, but it had best be recalled.

The book *Insight* is like a graduate text in physics, a dense presentation that

brings to mind key parts of the entire domain. But, unlike *Insight*, such texts come in the context of the texts of the previous undergraduate years, the previous centuries of physics moving within an accepted scientific mode. If, on tackling a section of the graduate text in Physics, one finds obscurity, then back one must go to a more elementary presentation. And this probably leads to the discovery that the exercises were omitted when the elementary text was “covered” (rather than **dis**covered). This certainly is my own regular experience: I hope that you can appeal to the like experience in your own struggles.

The trouble with the book *Insight* is that there is no undergraduate tradition.¹⁶ Is that claim acceptable? By no means. *Insight*, for most, even perhaps for many in the “Lonergan School” is ‘just’ another Great Book, a stirring contribution to the philosophical struggle, to the history of philosophy.

There is a double-barreled answer to this counter-claim. First there is to be the answer of history, in particular of hodic history. This involves, indeed, the fundamental putting-together of the two books *Insight* and *Method*. It is the re-cycling that will establish my claim, eventually. But secondly, and perhaps not so “eventually,”¹⁷ there is the paradoxical rescuing of the book *Insight* from the tradition of Great Books, and its establishment as a graduate text that meshes with any zone of inquiry. The re-cycling barrel has been a focus of attention throughout most of these *Cantowers*, so let us give some attention to the second barrel.

This second approach is a matter of healthy demystification. Think of the exam you have just read, perhaps even attempted. I can assure you that my B.Sc. Exam Paper in general relativity of fifty years ago would have made just as little sense to me if read

¹⁶I could make the same point about Lonergan’s 1944 Economic text, or the entire volume, *For a New Political Economy*. It took me a quarter century to produce what I consider an introductory text, *Economics for Everyone*, (Axial Press, Halifax) and even then that little text needs the context of what I would call meso-economic illustration, something not available in current teaching.

¹⁷It is a question of the gradual convergence of dialectic issues and operations in different fields of inquiry, already hinted at in *Cantower VII*.

in my first year of mathematical science as this exam makes to most of my readers. But, you say, I have a degree in philosophy! Or, you say, philosophy is quite different from physics: it deals with the vital perennial questions. The answers to these hesitations belong in the zone of the previous barrel, but still I may counter in popular mode. You have a degree in philosophy: in philosophy of what? If it involved no venture into a zone of scientific inquiry, then it must have been a commonsense philosophy of science or art of history or whatever. Of course, that common sense could be artistic, or historic, or whatever. But where are we getting with this popular countering? Is it not too a type of common sense? Do we not need, perhaps, precisions that come from understanding, intussuscepting, differentiations such as have emerged precisely through scientific revolution?

But at least the commonsense countering points to the need to go beyond commonsense to, not just art of history, but some of science. And if you venture in that direction, there have to be faced - this is a fact of sciences - levels and layers of elusiveness. A graduate answer to a first year student's question is just not seriously comprehensible. This brings us to the other point: the questions in philosophy are vital and perennial. But so are the question in physics and chemistry etc: light and heat are perennial questions, and there are regularly no simple workable answers to neurotic behavior or economic discontent. But this digression mainly points us towards the need for a sounder perspective on philosophy, which was the drive of *Insight*.

So, back to the question of demystification: if philosophy is somehow scientific, then the final undergraduate exam should obviously be quite beyond an initiate. If the book *Insight* can be considered as a sort of summative text, then it deserves to be taken from the list of Great Books and just treated as a summative text.

All this may be regarded as post-axial reachings. There are Great Books that belong in that list because they are mighty, for example, in their aesthetic or their religious lift. But as we move towards post-axial times, the list will, and should, include less and less writings that claim to be philosophic, profound on 'vital questions': unless the vitality and the profundity are from another differentiation such as "the

commonsense contributions to our self-knowledge”¹⁸ of Augustine and Pascal, that edge us beyond common sense.¹⁹

So: perhaps I astonish you. I am trying to eliminate *Insight* as a candidate for the list! What then of Lonergan’s quoting with approval Friedrich Schlegel’s “A classic is a writing that is never fully understood. But those that are educated and educate themselves must always want to learn more from it”?²⁰ What then of Lonergan’s magnificent effort? Much later I shall comment on the entire 25-volume *Collected Works*, but only after we have tackled the tricky problems of popularization, pedagogy, and adequate symbolization. Here I am making only a single simple point. Reading *Insight* properly is just hard work, as is the work involved in reading any graduate text. I am trying to take the book out of a certain philosophic mentality which actually is very like old Thomism, subtly cultivating an arrogance of apparent understanding under a cloak of historical - or whatever - informedness. The Empire lurking in Lonergan’s suggestions needs no cloak.

The positive point, then, is that *Insight* presents us with peculiar difficulties of discontinuity, symbolized here by the Bloomsday examination. How might we lift the

¹⁸*Method in Theology*, 261.

¹⁹The edging beyond common sense that I propose is much more pragmatic and earthy, but also much more necessary. It is, perhaps, worth adding a little historical perspective here. The first generation of Lonergan ‘enthusiasts’, during the 1960s, were mainly male and clerical, few of whom had much serious experience of the scientific world beyond common sense. The next generation tended to be disoriented by a focus on *Method*’s kindly descriptiveness. What of the new millennium? I see a massive need for honest self-criticism if this generation is not to be a “nowhere generation”. Nowhere? “There is no real grasp of what theory means; at the same time there is no apprehension of the concrete either” (Lonergan, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, 155). “They are not familiar, strictly and accurately, with any field of theoretical objects. They have a very inadequate notion of what a theory is, yet at the same time they are not in the world of community, they do not apprehend the concrete, the individual, the particular, as they really are.... They are lost in some no man’s land between the world of theory and the world of common sense” (*Ibid.*, 121). I symbolized the central present issue in the positional question implicit in the four words of a relevant paragraph of *Method*, 287: “one can go on” to an explanatory recasting of the first half of *Method*. A Nowhere Generation cannot go on.

²⁰*Method in Theology*, 161.

next generation of reader's beyond breathlessness and descriptive arrogance? The hodic way will eventually do it, but I am talking about a now-positioning. Have you a further positional bent to think out here, to reveal to yourself? Might you take up the challenge of "philosophy of X" in some X that could shift things along? I wrote once that "changing the teaching of one subject in one grade could be a solid lifetime's achievement".²¹ The X could be grade 10 chemistry.

My own challenge here is to up-grade the reading of *Insight*. It is not the work that I envisaged in 1973, when I outlined a book called *Process: a Paediad*, to be completed in the late 1980s, which it was, but in another way. As I moved beyond the Concordia Conference on Hermeneutics I moved also, slowly, beyond the ambitious project of beginning with W1, that first word of metaphysics, and settled for a more tortuous introduction that *Wealth of Self*. Now, after another fifteen years, the project of 1974 is still too ambitious. What follows is a stab at a lesser effort that yet may be more efficient in the long haul. That depends on you and on the older students of Lonergan that share my view of the book as, not a glowing classic but a grubby grad text out of sync with its generation.

Perhaps there are a few of you interested in this five or seven month adventure, a fresh strategic approach to, or even crossing of, the "natural bridge over which we may advance from our examination of science to an examination of common sense".²²

And really, finally, I should come to the promised halt at the end of these three *Cantowers*, this random positioning of mine, this poor version of the road down page 250 of *Method*. I have, in an anecdotal and descriptive fashion, been "indicating the view that would result from developing what he regarded as positions and by reversing what he regarded as counter-positions." And so, I would have you read the following final sentence of that page as a concluding of "the foregoing process", my three-essay invitation to you to "say it like it is," like it might be. "There is the final objectification

²¹*Economics for Everyone*, note 29 of p. 173.

²²The discomfoting quotation is from the first page of chapter five of *Insight*.

of horizon when the results of the foregoing process are themselves regarded as material, when they are assembled, completed, compared, reduced, classified, selected, when positions and counter-positions are distinguished, when positions are developed and counterpositions are reversed”.

26.6 Your Narrative Positioning

So now it's your turn, with ten blank pages. And you could even risk e-mailing them to me, but only if you are serious, perhaps with the seriousness of that great lady of economics, Joan Robinson (1903-1983). You might like to brood over, and in the context of, a couple of her quips. “The purpose of studying economics is not to acquire a set of ready-made answers to economic questions, but to learn how to avoid being deceived by economists”.²³ I could go on now, against my decision to leave you space, eloquent about the history of both economics and philosophy as being in the main a massive deception. But halt I must, leaning on Robinson's favorite quotation from Keynes, (which did not seem to effect Keynes overmuch). “If someone persuades me that I am wrong I change my mind. What do you do?”²⁴ !!

²³*Collected Economic Papers*, II, 1960, 17. A nice view of Robinson as a miss-fit is Marjorie Turner, M.E.Sharpe, Armour, N.Y., 1990.

²⁴Quoted in G.C.Harcourt, “Joan Robinson 1903-1983”, *The Economic Journal*, 105(1995), 1228.