

**SURF 2:****Ivo Coelho's Challenge, with a Preliminary Context.**

My interest is in replying to Ivo Coelho's challenging effort to relate functional specialization to interpretations of Sankara. The effort is available on the Montreal Website of Paul Allen, who is duplicating this on that website, and I in turn, with Ivo's permission, add his challenge at the end here as it appeared on the Montreal Website: a matter of convenience for you.

But I have a larger project in mind that I wish to mention. It is listed in the December 2008 Lonergan Newsletter in the final section on Projects:

**Project: Global Functional Collaboration**, and the project is connected with the upcoming conference on functional collaboration (St.Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia), also mentioned in that Newsletter. It seems useful, before venturing on my comments on Ivo Coelho's work, to give the description of the Project that is in the Newsletter of December 2008.

**Project: Global Functional Collaboration**

The term *Global* indicates both omnidisciplinary and geohistorical intent. The collaboration is that discovered by Lonergan in 1966, and published first in 1969: *Gregorianum* 50, 485-505. The fortieth anniversary of its appearance seems an appropriate time to take seriously the task of implementing that discovery of *Cosmopolis*, an effective move against decline. It is to be a cyclic global antifoundational collaboration that lifts both Richard Branston's popular *Elders and Wikinomics'* aspirations into a effective operative context. The effectiveness will take several generations to emerge but a beginning has to be made on developing the new differentiations of consciousness and language involved. A first meeting of interested parties was held at Concordia University in November 2009, and a first

Conference was arranged for July 6<sup>th</sup> - 10<sup>th</sup> at St.Mary's University, Halifax (on this, see elsewhere in the Newsletter). Further gatherings round the globe are contemplated, but attendance at such gatherings is peripheral: what is essential is a community committed to this massive shift of Lonergan studies. The first Project director is Russell Baker of Concordia University,(e-mail: [rsslbkr@citenet.net](mailto:rsslbkr@citenet.net) ) with secretary Philip McShane. Expressions of interest should be sent to McShane at [pmcshane@shaw.ca](mailto:pmcshane@shaw.ca) . Website Collaborations will emerge gradually and be identified.

My part in that challenge, as noted, is secretarial at present. But I have a unique position in being the senior failure in the business of global collaboration. I have known about the functional possibility since 1966, and indeed spelled out its significance in Musicology in 1969, (see *The Shaping of the Foundations*, chapter 2, a website book: [www.philipmcshane.ca](http://www.philipmcshane.ca) ) but have actually done almost nothing about it yet. Almost? Well, I had a stab at interpreting Lonergan functionally on the meaning of *Completeness* in the *Journal of Macrodynamical Analysis*, volume 4, but it really was not sufficiently orientated towards function. So, as Joan Robinson wrote about economics in her brilliant little half-way house text, "it is time to go back to the beginning and start again" (Joan Robinson and John Eatwell, *An Introduction to Modern Economics*, McGraw Hill, London and New York, 1973, 52).

I hope to contribute to such beginnings by conversations and what might be called "secretarial linkings". Linkages, in that I have tuned into the problem in various ways over the past fifty years, and may be able to bridge some gaps, open some doors.

So this is a beginning of a writing contribution to the new beginning, and it begins, as it were, in the middle of our searchings, with Ivo Coelho's effort "Applying Lonergan's Method", particularly page 250 of *Method*, to interpretations of Sankara. I don't think one needs to know the area to benefit from our exchanges: I certainly don't know it!!! I recall my old slogan that Fred Crowe enjoyed in the late 1970s: "If a thing is

worth doing, then it is worth doing badly". I note that I hope to contribute now to contribute in some serial fashion, and for this reason I would identify the present effort as *Surf 2*. *Surf 1*, to be made available on my own and other websites, will enlarge on the nature of the serial contributions, and on the various meanings of the title *Surf*.

My reflections on Ivo's efforts are not ordered systematically. I leave them as they emerged. We are in conversation, rambling within a scientific problem of huge proportions. I parallel it with the smaller emergence of properly grounded physics in the 20<sup>th</sup> century brilliantly described by Lochlainn O'Raiheartaigh in his *The Dawning of Gauge Theory*, and that reference allows me to make a final introductory point. The story O'Raiheartaigh tells is one of blunt and sometimes silly criticism. For example, Herman Weil is a key initiator of the needed lift of physics, but colleagues wrote to him in such terms as "go learn a little physics". The same is true of other areas: I might talk of the blunt exchanges in the story of the Fermat's Last Theorem. The point and pointing is that the core of *Method* - the working of page 250 - is a self-exposure, a bluntness, a genuine heated meeting. Lonergan writes " .... the more the historian has been at pains not to conceal his tracks, but to lay his cards on the table ...." (*Method*, 193) We cannot afford to conceal our tracks when *Method-ology* is precisely an effort to reach a cosmopolis of self-luminosity in a luminous community of global care.

So here goes with Ivo. I label sections alphabetically for convenience, and I add a final preliminary comment. I mentioned linkage etc. Elementary leads are needed, and I think - from teaching young ladies about themselves for twenty years - that I can supply some. But my first effort here, I realize on re-reading, is obscure, "fantastic" in the meaning related to fantasy. But we need that to get out of present conventional ruts .... that is the issue, after all, of Lonergan grim reflections on the need for cosmopolis. Anyway, I leave this obscure reflection as is: but I am easily reached regarding any part of it, at the end of the e-mail pmcshane@shaw.ca

## Ivo Coelho's Challenge

### A. Fantasy-Context from Foundational Persons

Suppose that by 2400 A.D. the Cyclic System is up and running in larger Europe, so that there is respectable geohistorical content to the meaning of  $UV + GS + F_i$ .

{useful to check back [website: [www.philipmcshane.ca](http://www.philipmcshane.ca)] to chapter five of *The Redress of Poise*, "Systematics: a Language of the Heart", where I included a dictionary entry on Systematics of A.D.3000, translated from Hindi! This involves a larger imagining of a global community with pressure-influence on World Bank, UNO, Corporations, etc)

$UV$  : O.K. from *Insight*, but clearly seen on the analogy of science, like zoology but with a touch of physics: but there is a sublated inclusion of merging, overlapping, etc contexts. The universal viewpoint needs to weave in global dates [s,t] and key holders of views [Lonergan makes this point in unpublished notes] E.g.Alexandria and Antioch, Luther and Lainez, in "leaky tunnels" within a global dynamic etc etc.

$GS$ : not in *Insight*, but got from  $UV$  at each stage by reversal of counterpositional stuff. [related to contra-factual perspective]

$FS_i$  : it weaves within  $UV + GS$ , but best keep it explicit for analytic clarity.  $FS_i$  is the heuristics of procedures within each specialty, and we could also break off a section for each  $i$ , since the procedures are more developed within each  $i$ .

Needless to say, functionality is adequately conceived and operational in the control of e.g. sentence formats and contents: the baton-exchange metaphor becomes an existential reality, a control of meaning as obvious as the theory of invariants in particle physics.

Up and Running? A Standard Model operating and theoretically grasped, e.g. the sloping of disciplines towards common dialectic and foundational components. Including a full genetic heuristic of ontogenetics of orientations [conversions etc, but a full set of genera, species, and genetics.... I would suggest - I suggested it already in *Process* chapter 4 - that there is need for a neutral terminology ....e.g. *displacements for conversions*]. Furthermore, dominated by explanatory heuristics of the Metagrams:  $W_i$ . So, for example, "seeing hearing etc " of page 6 of *Method in Theology* in is conceived

then properly within contemporary neuropsychology. [the push of the *Field Nocturnes*]

Further the community is “decently” positional and positional [see *Cantower 9*] ... and dialogue is well established by the norms of **personal relating** [*Method*, 48] the central pressure towards which is the creative pressure from the end of MIT 250, + that of “Fantasy and Forwarding” [the two key functions of foundations, these norms being an existential reality of the 64 types of conversations,  $C_{ij}$  .(  $i, j$  going from 1 to 8, but there are sets of extra-tower conversations [see W3 metagram]. I add that the perspective of foundational prayer is dominant, ‘resting and question in the real’, {see *Prehumous 4-8*, five essays on foundational prayer, including the problem of the mystical] and the real is heuristically appreciated as in W3.

## B. Existential Context of Reader

The above context is not at present shared. It needs to be communicated by analogies of science, analogies that are intussuscepted slowly , within the efforts to get the cycling moving. Illustrations of such efforts come from the beginning both of *Insight* and of *Method*. The Archimedean thing has to be intussuscepted in the style dictated [doctrinized] by the first paragraph of the first chapter of *Insight*. The analogy of successful science prescribed at the beginning of *Method* has to be faced existentially. The Helen Keller insight, made luminous, has to be a group reality eventually of the reading of both books..

## C. Further Fantasy

One must then envisage a massive transposition of talk and writing within the Tower community.... lines of this in the boldfaced stuff of *Field Nocturnes*. The community lives in the metatheoretic existentialism of HOW expression. [**HOW**: expression becomes increasingly the “**Home Of Wonder**” ].This adds, by fantasy, to a further remoteness from present global care. But its later addition will be neuromolecular fact.

The climb is not impractical. *Insight 17* has to be studied in the pointing towards the transition to *Method*, as mentioned in note 1 of page 153 of *Method*. Further, *Method* has to be existentially lifted, chapter by chapter, into the context that Lonergan had in mind when he thought, in 1952, of a second volume, *Faith and Insight*. But now both *Insight* and that second volume have to be conceived and existentially appreciated as dominated by the heuristics of  $UV + GS + FS_i$ , supported by the metagrams,  $W_i$ . How, **HOW**, we are to get there, that is a matter for later sections and the fantasy-driven labour of later generations.

D. Next, we envisage a good colonization process, in Ivo's case to the Indian subcontinent. A context for this is the solution to the problem of general history, "the real catch" (*Topics in Education*, 236) by the emergence of the region (topologically complex) called the *Tower of Able*. This revision of chapter 10 of *Topics in Education* has to be worked out in detail: a take-off pointing is *Field Nocturnes CanTower 50: "Insight Within a New Global Culture"*

. In energetic fantasy, it seems useful to imagine, with Lonergan, every village having its own professional Tower Pair, one in research and one in communications, each "as familiar a professional figure as the doctor" (*For A New Political Economy*, 37) and then think of the commercial enterprize "Ten Thousand Villages". Then the Tower community is imagined as a community of 22,220 members [10,000 reseachers, 1,000 interpreters, 100 historians, 10 dialecticians, etc .....10, 100, 1000, 10,000 ]

But now we think of the extending of the Tower influence [analogy of empires and colonizations - including the empires of Christianity and Muslimism, but 'cleaned up' to be better than they were - ] .... we can think realistically but fantastically of the preparation of the community by training at various levels.

Fantastically? Let us imagine that researchers are tuned into the analogy of science so that they know what they are at and after. Stay first within the larger Europe of our imagined 2400 A.D. But now let us enlarge on the pointers regarding the

Standard Model. Perhaps this is best done by thinking of the component that is a training in meta-economics. That economic “science” ... a new pragmatics ... has the characteristics sketched e.g. in *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism*, supplemented by the perspective in implementation of *Prehumous 1* and of *FNC 46*, both essays attentive to the shift required in school economics. The training, whatever the specialty, is in a *Praxisweltanschauung* that is omnidisciplinary and with an eye on the effectiveness of implementation that belongs to it as beautifully efficient (*Topics in Education*, 160, line 16). Useful here, too, to think, fantasize forward, in a sublation of both Richard Branson Elders project (2007) and the book on *Wikinomics* such that the Tower is an effective pressure on World Bank, UNO, etc etc. By 2400 the two-layer economic analysis should have replace the present phlogiston economics with its gambling casino and its false notions both of money and of credit (the key here is the notion of **Concomitance**: see the index to *For A New Political Economy*, under *Concomitance*). One also has here new strategies of meso-economics and microeconomics, and these are relevant to the education e.g. of Tower exportable-researchers. Think of researchers in the new cyclic 27 kilometer set-up under the Swiss-French border: searching for positive and negative anomalies. But now our researchers are in the cultural cyclic set-up overground and over the border of India ( symbolic of Indian culture, a more complex topology).

E. We get closer to Ivo’s effort. Ivo’s village - now we are back to 2000 A.D. - in viewing the training college in the old tradition: even taken at its best it is bent towards the flawed Lonerganism that has no creative glimpse of the global collaboration for which mother history groans with the help of foster-father Lonergan. Ivo’s grip on the Standard Model enables him to detect vaguely [here one would need a long ramble about such detection in particle physics.... e.g. the emergence of the neutrino in the twentieth century, or the reach for a Higgs particle in the present scene) anomalies, good and bad; So, he notices interpretations of Sankara that are operative, or potentially

operative (this would include the  $C_9$  of W3) in the “larger village”. Note here that interpretation is taken in the sense of *Insight* chapter 17, passing on to another audience: but now the passing on, or round, is within the Round [Recall the hidden title of the Cantower Series: *Roun Doll, Home James*] of cyclic withdrawal. Here we have to point to effective considerations of the next four centuries regarding disorientations of scholarship, so that we turn around in the Academy rather than in the “merely academic”. So, one has to ask whether the list of chaps mentioned by Ivo are effective interpretations, operative in the smaller or larger Indian village. An issue of functional history, as we shall see.

We could get lost in details here, e.g. we might suppose that there are sub-groups in the village - large or small - that are allied in practice with one or other of the interpreters. What, then, is the Tower task? I would note here, that we are doing something that goes beyond Ivo’s venture .... we are asking a general question about the village duo, researcher and communicator, representative of  $FS_1$  and  $FS_8$ , in dialogue [always luminously within the Matrix  $C_{ij}$ ],  $C_{18}$  and  $C_{81}$ . In so far as the Standard Model is effectively in place, these conversations can include certain sub-structures that bypass the full cycle. But anomalies are sometimes discovered [like the neutrino data or Higgs data] that are novel, complexifications of previous simpler patterns, whatever.

F. Getting still closer. Let us suppose that there is a sort-of fresh advertence here. A venture of colonization yields data on other life-styles ... of Hindu contemplation, of Zen comestation, whatever. Then, in such a case as praxis of Sankara, there may be seen and seized the need to get to the roots of the traditions so as to get a grip on progressive anomalies. More realistically, the researcher sees at least the need to pass on the anomaly to an interpreter, who has a richer context of genetic systematics. Suppose, for example, that the group of interpretations is relatively isomorphic to a group around Tertullian, an earlier slice of genetic dynamics. Then one can envisage communication structures of the type  $C_{27}$ , which feed forward through  $C_{78}$ . It would be too

complicated to envisage such substructures here, since there is a general lack of a common meaning for Standard Model operations, indeed even of a meaning of the Matrix conversations  $C_{ij}$ . So, it would mean even less to talk of the substructure that would in a judgment of the worth of “going further round and up” to the functional historical context. Recall that **effective meaning** is an ongoing historical thing.

Judgments about whether to move my interpretation on to the historical community depend on the luminousness of individuals in the cycling process regarding their own and others levels of competence. At all events, one could have relevant conversations of the type  $C_{36}$ , sufficient to handle the anomalies. I would go on re this but perhaps a single noting of the place of lines 12 and 14 of *Method* 250. Some anomalies are culture-linked ,,,, affinities that are not foundational..... “dismissed” (line 14) but only temporarily: such affinities are carried across e.g. to doctrines or system .... but enough re that for the moment.

G. Can we home in now on Ivo’s venture? He wished to lift the set of interpretations into the context of dialectic. Would his judgment be modified by what was said above? In the long-term the full cycling seems appropriate, but then it would have to be a denser cycling, in a cultural and linguist mesh that might show forth elements “dismissed” (line 14, 250) but to be cultivated within, or even beyond, the Indian culture [borderline of tentative patterns of global progress .e.g think of the beneficial variation of neuropatterns of language forms]. That denser cycling, however, does not seem on the cards at present, when there is no explanatory heuristic in place in any of the relevant groups. But what then of the “slimer” positional analysis that is attempted by Ivo? It is slimmer in a variety of ways, contextualized by a lack of an explanatory thematic of position such as is to emerge in these next centuries, perhaps in this century: the needed spectrum of position-complexes, with e.g. basic axioms of intentionality and infinity and incompleteness added to an explanatory account of the described position of *Insight* 388[413].

H. What emerges in Ivo's sketching is an effort to do interpretations of interpretations without an explicit context of UV. GS is not in sight, nor would one expect it to be. So, we have a descriptive beginning of some aspects of the six tasks italicized on page 250 of *Method*, based on descriptive interpretations, and on selections of limited data.

I. A context could emerge in this generation for what I called a colonization attempt that would do a better functional job: the emergence of a Western-based UV + GS + FS<sub>i</sub> that would make possible analogies of dialectic and genetic development e.g. a fuller UV treatment of *The Way to Nicea* would give a core component of such a context. Think of the various struggling shabby realisms around the Tertullian period, but also up through and beyond Augustine.

J. Perhaps at this stage a more detailed working through Ivo's venture is appropriate. So we have to consider some of pp. 1-12, with the notes added on the later pages. Ivo is meeting Paul Allen's request, and providing great stuff for lifting us forward : the effort above is witness to that. So: he stumbles for us all.

### **P.1**

"the topics of dialectic comparison are theology, metaphysics, and cognitional theory" but what is meant by this?. By 2400 A.D. there will be e.g. a genetic account of these emergences, at least in the tradition of the West. The "topics" then will be Standard Model contexts, that are rich geohistorical structures and the question will be Where do what has been a data-identified and interpreted and historically structured [and we are to be dealing with history dominated by explanatory heuristics, at present quite unknown] core component of the Indian tradition. This is an important piece of the recognition of the two first canons of hermeneutics. Further, question of conversions has to be placed in the same full context, fleshing out implicit, problematic and explicit perspectives.

So, we are to tackle the “well-know conflict of interpretation” of Sankara’ Advaita, focusing on the relation of Brahman and the world.

**p. 2**

I skip to the paragraph re “my effort”. The effort, and that of the “3 or 4” (I prefer to think of ten or so) has to be lifted into at least a nominal acknowledgment of the canons of hermeneutics as they structure the Standard Model. Otherwise we are really only disguising old methods of descriptive comparison [comparison is a zone of entry into functional specialization that needs to be exploited and cultivated ... a great deal of present Lonerganesque work is old-style comparison .... but this is another topic, perhaps for our next Guideline effort together]. Yes, there are two levels of dialectic, but it seems to me that if the second is done properly, there is no need to add dialogue.... the second level of dialectic is very discomfoting dialogue of colleagues who share the Standard Model. This latter point is very important to absorb: the cycling is not done with adversaries, but with colleagues within the Standard Model. And do I have to insist that the work and its results are to be quite beyond common sense? This emerges most clearly when one considers doctrines as they are thematized in the sixth specialty, which carry forward in meaning through the standard model control round the circuit, to doctrines as they are promoted to common sense [see C<sub>9</sub> in W3]. This “leap of meaning” is a critical zone of method, a question raised at the end of chapter 3 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*. It is the question of ex-plane- ing. One has to avoid the imaging that would have meaning thinning out as one “descends” through the specialties to communication. A better, more helpful image of the specialties for this, perhaps, is the image of eight stairs up: then the problem is clear: How, HOW, does one get from the metagrasp of doctrinal meaning to a meaning that meshes with the common sense of the particular culture, such as, in our case, the village culture both of ordinary common sense and of the undergraduate level of such common sense that is the normal state of the beginning-students in a college-village?

But I would note here that the common sense of the 25<sup>th</sup> century will have reached sophistications of luminosity that give it an edge on appreciating the “distance’ between commonsense grasp and metatheoretic grasp: there will be in place the shifts indicated by *Insight* chapter seventeen, section 1. But I have digressed.

Back to page 2. Moving into assembly and completion. It is important, even when beginning such efforts as this, to hang on even nominally to the full heuristic, such as is expressed in *Method in Theology: Revisions and Implementations*. Otherwise one is pulled back to the equivalent of pre-Newtonian physics when in fact Einstein reigns. Lonergan does not reign of course, but scientific belief [see chapter 20 of *Insight*] brings him into the picturing of up-to-date process. So, the dialectician is an omnidisciplinary person, taking in the most recent results of “the usual” process of sloping of disciplines. It is important to think out this ‘usual” in a developed science. One may think of Kuhn’s point. There has been, in the previous centuries of this science, cumulative and progressive results. But some of these are named in *Insight* and much more briefly named {see e.g. pp.286ff in *Method*) in Lonergan’s later works: key pointers are *A Third Collection*, 141 top lines, on the mature operation of generalized empirical method and *Topics in Education*, p. 160, line 16, on the effective [and beautiful] maturity of functional cycling.

So, there is a pre-assembled context and achievement into which the assembly of Sankara work has to go. This, at least, has to be explicitly acknowledged in some heuristic intimations such as are suggested by developments in the metawords, **Wi**: I think of the Markov Matrix of meanings suggested in *Randomness , Statistics and Emergence*. We are back here at points I made in the *Method Journal* article of 2005 {published in 2008} , “Obstacles to the Control of Meaning.” The combining of assembly and completion is a messy thing. Assembly is the last non-dialogue stage of the 250 process. Completion puts the bones and nerves of the dialectician into “play”, pushing what Lonergan talked about at the end of *Phenomenology and Logic*, the subject-as-subject. Again we must hold to the idea that the subject is sophisticated, with fully

differentiated consciousness - including the differentiations that have to emerge by specializations, but that is a wider topic. What is one doing, if one is doing this in 2400 A.D.? .... one is sifting more recent cycling effort to detect gut-wise, existentially, what .... “Yes, Yes, this adds to our progress!!!” What Ivo goes on to detect is absences of the elementary positional sophistications presupposed by and in *Insight* chapter 16 in these interpreters and their source. But at that later date, or in anticipating it through a good heuristic diagramming, this is not the issue: the issue would be more refined cultural elements that might be relevant to progress: stuff I talked of earlier as borderline, borderline global invariants: think of Indian aesthetics and prayer stances.

Our consideration get more complicated here as we move, in imagination, down page 250 of *Method*. I would note, e.g. that the quotation, given by Ivo, about legitimate development is from MT 302, but the other one from page 312 [given in the note] is closer to our mood here: the grip on the concrete historical process within a full geohistorical heuristic. [This heuristic is to sublimate and integrate all that Lonergan says of merging, overlapping, etc etc contexts].

### P.3

So, I jump to the top of page 3, and home in on the fifth word “explains”, recalling the Appendix of *The Triune God: Systematics*, where Lonergan talks of the inappropriateness of descriptive categories, even at the beginning of a science. Sankara simply does not “explain”. THAT is the big challenge of the meaning of the second canon of hermeneutics in *Insight* 17.3.8. Getting a grip on this canon is a tough job: hints about it are in *Cantower 14*.

But now we are in deepening trouble as we move on. What is needed is the movements of sophisticated interpretation ( the second specialty, operating within the full standard model) that would pin down - in the genetic sequencing and dialectic optioning of inner and outer words suggested by the canon - “ an explanatory interpretation of non-

explanatory meaning" (*Insight*, 587[610]) . So, e.g. we need an explanatory account of appearance and illusion such as is to emerge from contemporary neuropsychology (on this, various essays in the 41 *Field Nocturnes*, stuff which I hinted about applying to the present phenomenological analyses of Renaud Barbaras in his two-book effort to rescue Merleau-Ponty, especially M-P's last 1964 work, *The Visible and the Invisible*: Barbaras's books are *The Phenomenology of Perception* (around 200) and *Desire and Distance* (2006). Nor is this pointer a distraction: Phenomenology is revamping the problems being dealt with by the interpreters that Ivo is considering. In the mature global metascience this would be noted and exploited. Even the book title, *Desire and Distance*, tells the Vedantic tale ).

I hold myself to just two further comments on this page:

(a) Radhakrishnan clearly admits, therefore, the relative and dependent reality of the world". This statement needs complex re-consideration. How clear is he? He certainly is has not the perspective on relations that Lonergan has [*Insight* 16 or appendix to *The Triune God: Systematics*] .... Lonergan's disciples, even, don't have that. Are we trapped here in description? .... yes, the controlling factor is his understanding and expression - and implicit metaphysics - of what is true I would note that we are here, psychologically, and perhaps communally, at the beginning of section 2 of *Insight* chapter 17, "the real issue, then, is truth", and I would suggest that Barbaras and Radhakrishnan are probably in the same boat. The Lonergan people? Mark Morelli's work on Hegel would suggest that we are mostly messing with Kant around the half-way house. [His Hegel thing is to appear in the Lonergan workshop volume for 2008]

The second sentence for comment is the last of the page: "The distinction between the illusory and the empirical can, in my opinion, be sustained." Again, this sentence warrants lengthy consideration. There is needed a heuristic context of "my opinion" .... is the community, to which Ivo is talking, with him in his digested acceptance of e.g. Lonergan's analysis of the given in chapter 13 of *Insight*? The "my opinion" is what is to emerge further down the page, the stand taken within the context

of the “further objectification of horizon” (line 24). The context then has to be appreciated as including a position on “distinction” such as emerges from chapter 16 of *Insight*. The illusory and the empirical have to have meanings that emerge from the effort describe in the middle of page 287 of *Method*, “from such a broadened basis”. This is not being attempted by the Lonergan school... so they are trapped in the descriptive stuff that Lonergan was forced to use in the first half of *Method*.

Now it would seem worthwhile to pause over my interest in particular sentences. In a developed tradition of functional specialization - in all disciplines - there is to be a control of meaning that reaches to each sentence. One is running a leg of the 8-person relay, one runs in a defined way toward passing the baton. These notions are descriptive of refinements quite beyond the compactness of present discourse. Again, a huge distraction here.

#### P. 4

We carry on from the last sentence, and the same problem of non-explanatory meaning prevails, “very damaging, even at the beginning of science” (I quote the *The Triune God: Systematics* appendix). As I move through these pages the gap between performance and the norms that Lonergan set up gets larger (see *Phenomenology and Logic*, index, *Existential Gap*), there is the sad fact that none of us took up his challenge of *Insight* chapter 17 in any serious way (See the dismal failure of the Concordia Conference published as *Lonergan’s Hermeneutics*, edited by Ben Meyer and Sean McEvenue :we never got near the canons, or indeed chapter 17). Add to that the challenge of transposition to functionality expressed in *Method*, 153, note 1.

But the reach needed is a massive foundational reach of fantasy (foundation’s task is two-fold: fantasy, and circulation). Here the difficulty is the needed dominance of the standard model, a genetic and dialectic sequencing of meanings. This sequencing takes up the story of any meaning when we move to history. What is the meaning of an interpretation? One ask in history (and again I note the absence in our minds of an

explanatory pragmatic heuristic) about the on-going meaning .... and that just is not the mood or the topic on page 4 or later pages. There is a sort of isolated descriptiveness that has its parallel in a descriptive physics that gives an account of red without taking up the explanatory relating that is spectrum analysis. Thinking with the functional specialty history is a thinking which is quite explicit about being "in" the standard, and it is worthwhile to note that the history of ideas is central to the second component of that model, the GS of the UV + GS + FS<sub>1</sub>

The ahistorical perspective is prevalent right on through the effort, and it seems as well to halt my rambles at this stage. I will take up the question of history in the next Guidelines, where I find a handy parallel with Ivo's work in taking, instead of Radhakrisnan (1952) and Mahadevan (1968) etc, Lonergan (1952)(1968) etc. In 1952 Lonergan was heading towards those final chapters of *Insight*; in 1968 he was writing the article for *Gregorianum* (1969) etc. We can ask the short-term history question, what is/was the ongoing meaning of Lonergan's meaning? What we find, I think, is another way into the functional specialties, by focusing on Lonergan instead of - but also as well as - on Shankara.

## Ivo Coelho's Original Contribution

[he would have it noted that it is preliminary, incomplete].

### APPLYING LONERGAN'S METHOD

#### 1. A Dialectic of Some Interpretations of Sankara

Draft 2: for blog, 15 November 2007 Ivo Coelho, SDB

Note: This attempt at dialectic arose as the tail end of an article entitled "Lonergan and Indian Thought" due to appear in the *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*. Because the article was becoming too long, and chiefly because I could not see my way through, I cut it off, hoping to work it out into an independent article. The attempt remains radically incomplete, but I present it here at the request of Paul Allen, hoping to elicit discussion, contributions, and even dialectic.

I note that I need to study better Radhakrishnan, Hiriyanna, Mahadevan, Chatterjee and Datta, and De Smet, and that I should keep Mayeda only if I can get more substantial matter by him. The topics for dialectical comparison could be theology, metaphysics and cognitional theory. I will also have to do evaluation history better, asking already there whether the process was under the guidance of intellectual, moral and religious conversion.

I am also toying with the idea of recasting the whole attempt in terms of Interpretation and History (tracing the genetic links between Radhakrishnan, Mahadevan, Chatterjee and Datta, and the dialectic between De Smet and Mayeda). Dialectic could then go immediately to (assembly and) completion.

This is a lone and lame attempt at dialectic.<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[1]<!--[endif]-->

It is obviously a lone attempt. It is also lame, because, as is well known, Lonergan designed his functional specialty dialectic to be carried out in a team. However, ever the realist, he also spoke about interim attempts: let everyone do what he can, and indicate

what more ought to be done to complement his efforts.<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[2]<!--[endif]--> So here I am, doing what I can.

The matter of dialectic is conflicts, so I thought I would attempt to do dialectic on a rather well-known conflict of interpretation in the field of Indian thought: the interpretation of Sankara's Advaita, or Sankara on the relation between Brahman and the world. Now I must admit at the outset that my Sanskrit does not extend beyond a nodding familiarity with terms that are commonly used in courses and texts of Indian philosophy. however, it seems to me that Lonergan's distinction of functional specialties might allow for a critique that does not presuppose knowledge of the original languages, for the good reason that dialectical differences are rooted in differing fundamental options rather than in data. At any rate, this is my justification for undertaking the present exploratory survey with conflicting interpretations of Sankara as the subject matter.

A complete investigation would involve research, interpretation, history, dialectic and foundations. Research would involve the drawing up of a complete bibliography at the very least, beginning from the writings of Sankara, down through the various historical commentaries and polemical writings, to contemporary interpretations. Interpretation would call for a study of each of these. History would put these interpretations together to discover what was going forward (where 'what was going forward' is to be understood comprehensively to include not only developments but also aberrations), for over time we can expect a historical unfolding of the potentialities of positions as well as counterpositions resulting in development of the former and reversal of the latter. Dialectic, finally, would pull together the results of history to first complete them, and then compare, reduce, classify, select, distinguish positions and counterpositions, develop positions and reverse counterpositions.<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[3]<!--[endif]-->

My efforts here would have to be complemented by the same process carried out by a

group of 3 or more investigators. There should follow a second level dialectic, in which the results of the process are then themselves subjected to the process of assembly, completion, comparison, reduction, classification, selection, distinguishing positions and counterpositions, developing positions and reversing counterpositions. A third level involves a subject-to-subject encounter between the members of the team, and then dialectic becomes dialogue.

### Assembly and Completion

The first step is to assemble the various interpretations of Sankara. These are, of course, very many. But my attempt to demonstrate dialectic would not be completely vitiated if I were to limit myself to a few: Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, T.M.P. Mahadevan, Satishchandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta, Richard De Smet and Sengaku Mayeda. For the same reason, I trust I will be forgiven if I base this attempt on 'spot samplings' of these authors rather than comprehensive and scholarly interpretations as would be required even by a full and proper use of the method.

A second step would be to complete the interpretations. Completion, in Lonergan's peculiar sense, involves adding evaluative interpretation and history, picking out the good things and their opposites. This is what we usually do when we write articles and reviews, but Lonergan has a slightly technical suggestion to make: "To determine the legitimacy of any development calls for evaluational history; one has to ask whether or not the process was under the guidance of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion."<sup>4</sup>

In what follows I combine these first two steps, assembly and completion.

1. Radhakrishnan<sup>[RI1]</sup>

The problem. In his 1952 exposition of Sankara, Radhakrishnan states that we have to harmonize two sets of statements in the Upanisads, one of which affirms the identity of Brahman, the individual soul and the world, while the other distinguishes them.<sup>5</sup>

The ontological status of the world. Radhakrishnan talks very clearly about the one-sided dependence of the world on Brahman. <!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[6]<!--[endif]--> "The world does not exist of itself. It is derived from and dependent on Brahman and so is less real than Brahman." <!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[7]<!--[endif]-->

According to Radhakrishnan, Sankara explains this one-sided dependence by means of the analogies of the rope/snake and the magician. "ŚS. suggests that the world is an appearance due to ignorance and so this appearance does not affect the cause in any way, even as a magician is not affected by the illusion he creates for others." <!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[8]<!--[endif]--> Radhakrishnan hastens to clarify the word appearance: "Since the appearance is not factual, it is sometimes imagined that the world is not factual. But ŚS. himself explains that the illustrations have only a limited application and are not to be extended to all points." <!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[9]<!--[endif]-->

While using the word 'appearance,' Radhakrishnan takes issue with the word 'illusion,' making it abundantly clear that the world is not to be regarded as merely a fruit of our imagination. "ŚS. regards the world as maya which is wrongly translated as illusion. The world is unreal when viewed apart from its basis in the ultimate reality or Brahman. When viewed in its relation to Brahman, we find that all this is Brahman...." <!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[10]<!--[endif]--> Radhakrishnan makes a distinction between pratibhasika, vyavaharika and paramarthika. "The world is not of the nature of an illusion, pratibhasika, which is contradicted by later experiences. The world is not contradicted on the empirical stage. It is vyavaharika.... We cannot be sure that it will not be contradicted at some later stage. What really persists in all experience is being, sat and not its forms. This being forms the substratum of all objective forms." <!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[11]<!--[endif]--> And again: "The waking and the dream worlds are both unreal in the strict metaphysical sense in that they involve duality and are objective but this is not to reduce a waking experience to a dream state.

There is nothing to support the view that the entire manifold universe is illusory in character. The tangible objects which we see around us are not the objects of our imagination. The world is distinguished from such self-contradictory entities as the son of a barren woman and dreams and illusions. S. takes pains to repudiate the view of mentalism advocated by the Vijnana-vadins. Whatever the outside world depends on, it does not depend on the human mind.... The object of consciousness is not the same as the consciousness of the object.... The object seen is independent of perception.” ≤!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[12]<!--[endif]-->

Radhakrishnan does, however, occasionally flirt with the word illusion: “Even if the world be an illusion, the maker of the illusion is not the individual subject but the divine Lord.... Commenting on II.4.20, S. clearly makes out that the individual soul is not responsible for the world of objects.... If life is an illusion it is one that lasts endlessly.... It is shared by all human beings.... It is difficult to draw a distinction between such an illusion and reality.” ≤!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[13]<!--[endif]-->

He also describes the world as anirvacaniya: “When the appearance of the world is said to be anirvacaniya, all that is meant is that it is unique. We cannot describe it as existent or non-existent. The world is said to be sad-asad-vilaksana and not non-existent.” ≤!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[14]<!--[endif]-->

Definitions of truth and reality. Radhakrishnan clearly admits, therefore, the relative and dependent reality of the world. The problem is that he does use the language of appearance, though being somewhat more careful about the word illusion. The controlling factors in his usage are his understanding of the term ‘true,’ which he seems to regard as interchangeable with the term ‘real.’ Thus he says: “A thing is said to be true only so long as it is not contradicted.” ≤!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[15]<!--[endif]--> If the true/real is what is not contradicted, then it follows that the only true/real is the Absolutely Real; all other levels are not ultimately true/real. Thus: “[s]ince the world-appearance is found to be non-existing at the rise of right knowledge, it is not true.” ≤!--

[if !supportFootnotes]-->[16]<!--[endif]--> “The world is sat because it exists for a time; it is asat for it does not exist for all time....” ≤[if !supportFootnotes]-->[17]<!--[endif]--> At best, it is, as was said above, sad-asad-vilaksana.

The distinction between the illusory and the empirical can, in my opinion, be sustained. If human knowing consists of experiencing, understanding and judging, the data pertaining to an illusion is exclusively the content of imagination and memory, while the data pertaining to the empirical world includes the data of sense. Again, an object of imagination or thought can be affirmed, but is still tied down by relativity to the subject; an object in the empirical world is free from such relativity, in the sense that its reality does not depend upon our cognitional activity.<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[18]<!--[endif]-->

Clearly, again, there is a difference between the empirical and the Absolutely Real: it is the difference between what is real as a mere matter of fact, and what is real in its own right. What is real as a mere matter of fact, has conditions which happen to be fulfilled. What is real in its own right, svartha has, instead, no conditions; it simply exists; it is svayambhu, svastika. It seems to me that Radhakrishnan does not have the sophisticated and differentiated awareness of cognitional process that would enable him to grasp the implications of this distinction. Such a distinction could have been a starting point, for example, for explaining the one-sided dependence of the world on Brahman, but Radhakrishnan does not realize this and so feels obliged to resort to the language of appearance. Radhakrishnan is no naïve realist who would regard the real as what is attained by the senses alone. Is he an idealist? Does he hold that, w.r.t. the empirical world, we know appearances but not reality? He has reserved the terms ‘real’ and ‘true’ for the Absolutely Real. By ‘true’ he understands what is not contradicted. Such a position leads logically to the conclusion that the world is unreal, and that we know only appearances but not reality. However, to his credit, he makes a distinction between different levels of reality and different usages of ‘real.’ Thus he can maintain

that the world is relative and dependent reality, or that it is both real and unreal, falling somewhere between utter unreality and the supreme reality of Brahman. Where some Western idealists are unable to affirm that we attain reality because of their implicit acceptance of the naïve realist criterion of reality, Radhakrishnan calls the world 'appearance' because of his definition of truth. His distinction between different usages of 'real' and 'true' could well have allowed him to avoid the word 'appearance' altogether, and he does in fact register his unwillingness to use the word 'illusion,' but he fails in the end to make a clean break from such language, indicating a degree of unsureness in his largely acceptable position. A study of his position w.r.t. the status of the individual soul would serve to confirm or negate this hypothesis. <!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[19]<!--[endif]-->

Radhakrishnan fails to distinguish between the true affirmation which is eternally valid, and the event or fact to which it refers, which may be contingent. He is, as has been pointed out also by De Smet, rather too fascinated by Hegel, as is revealed even by his use of the word 'sublation' ... [INCW 367.] He is no naïve realist; his problem is that, like the Western idealist, he is poor on judgment, and does not have enough respect or appreciation for the judgment of fact. Thus he tends to neglect the virtually unconditioned in favour of the absolutely unconditioned. It is either his own good sense, or perhaps the text of Sankara, that enables him to recognize the relative reality of the empirical, contingent, changing world.

Radhakrishnan has plenty to say about the process of knowing in Sankara. He even compares him with Western thinkers. He says he is closest to Bradley. [S.]

Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (Bombay: Blackie & Son, 1977, first published 1923) 2:524.]

## 2. Mahadevan (1968)

The problem. Mahadevan's way of stating the problem is that the Upanisads speak of Brahman as nirguna, qualityless, as well as saguna, with qualities; how are we to

reconcile these two views?

Ontological status of the world. Sankara postulates two standpoints, the paramarthika and the vyavaharika. “The supreme truth is that Brahman is non-dual and relationless. It alone is; there is nothing real besides it.” [Ref.] From our standpoint, however, Brahman appears as God, as cause of the world.

Mahadevan has no hesitation in using the words ‘illusory appearance’ and vivarta (which he translates as phenomenal appearance): there is no real causation; the world is an illusory appearance in Brahman, as snake in the rope. “This doctrine is known as vivarta-vada (the theory of phenomenal appearance) which is to be distinguished from its rival, parinama-vada (the theory of transformation).” [\[20\]](#)

Does this mean that the world of our experience is simply false or non-existent? No, for Mahadevan assigns at least relative reality to the empirical world, and distinguishes such reality from that of dreams and delusions. “To the facts of the empirical world belong only relative reality; and empirical knowledge is but relatively true.... Less valid than empirical knowledge is the knowledge that pertains to such fanciful objects as those of dream and delusion. Thus, reality is said to be threefold: absolute (paramarthika), empirical (vyavaharika), and apparent (pratibhasika).” [\[21\]](#)

Definitions of true and real. As in Radhakrishnan, the controlling factors are Mahadevan’s definitions of true and real. “True or valid knowledge is defined as that knowledge which has for its content what is unsublated and unestablished by any other means. Unsublatability or non-contradiction and novelty are the characteristics of truth.” [\[22\]](#) Clearly here the true is not what is known in correct judgment; what is partial or sublatale is not true; only what is full or unsublatable is true. “Judged by these characteristics, nothing other than Brahman-knowledge can be true.” [\[23\]](#) Somewhat like

Radhakrishnan, Mahadevan opts for vivarta-vada because he sees it as the only alternative to parinama-vada.

### 3. Chatterjee and Datta

The problem. Chatterjee and Datta state the problem in the following way: the Upanisads tell us both that Brahman is creator and material cause of the world, and that there is no multiplicity. <sup>[24]</sup>

Ontological status of the world. A further statement of the problem already reveals an outline of the preferred solution of our authors: "These two kinds of statements about the world and God naturally present a puzzle. Is God really the creator of the world and the world also therefore real? Or, is there really no creation and is the world of objects a mere appearance?" <sup>[25]</sup> The alternatives presented here must be noted: the choice is between regarding creation/world as real or as mere appearance. Sankara makes the latter choice, according to our two authors: "Sankara holds that God does not undergo any real change, change is only apparent, not real." <sup>[26]</sup> Like Mahadevan, Chatterjee and Datta do not hesitate to attribute vivarta-vada to Sankara: "Illusory modification of any substance, as of the rope into the snake is called vivarta, and real modification, as of milk into curd, is called parinama. Sankara's theory of creation, as described above, is, therefore, known as vivarta-vada and is distinguished from the Sankhya theory of evolution (by the real modification of prakrti) which is called parinama-vada." <sup>[27]</sup> The theory of vivarta enables Sankara to defend the nature of God as conscious cause (unlike Ramanuja who admits that matter is a part of God), and also the transcendence of God (if matter is the whole of God, then the whole of God is changed into the world). "Whether God changes partly or wholly, if change be real, then God is not a permanent, unchanging reality. He then ceases to be God. These difficulties are avoided by vivarta-vada according to which change is apparent." <sup>[28]</sup>

[endif]-->

What exactly do Chatterjee and Datta understand by 'appearance,' 'illusion,' vivarta? Some light is cast on the matter by their list of Sankara's attempts to refute theories of creation opposed to the upanisadic teaching. Sankara rejects the Sankhya, Vaisesika and Buddhist theories. His rejection of the Buddhist vijnanavada theory (subjective idealism), which holds that the world is an illusory product of the imagination, like a dream, is especially noteworthy because of what it reveals about Sankara's own position about the reality of the world:

1. The existence of external objects cannot be denied because they are perceived to exist by all persons.
2. If immediate experience is disbelieved, then even the reality of mental states must be disbelieved.
3. To say that the ideas of the mind illusorily appear as external objects is meaningless unless at least something external is admitted to be real. Otherwise it would be as good as saying that a certain man looks like the child of a barren woman.
4. There is a difference between dream objects and perceived objects: the former are contradicted by waking experience, while the latter are not. <!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[29]<!--[endif]-->

According to Chatterjee and Datta, then, Sankara clearly upholds the validity of immediate experience: it cannot be denied outright. Whatever be the way our authors understand the word 'illusion,' they accept Sankara's distinction between the world of external objects and the total unreality and non-existence of 'the child of a barren woman.' However, they can also say: atheists regard the world alone as real; theists regard both world and God as real; while the Absolute monism of Sankara regards only God as real, indicating once again an unwillingness or else an inability to take fully seriously the analogical range of meanings of the term 'real.' <!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->

>[30]<!--[endif]-->

Meaning of the term 'real.' As in Radhakrishnan and Mahadevan, then, the controlling factor is the definition of 'real.' "Persistence or pervasion (anuvritti) is the criterion of the real, particularity or exclusion (vyabhicara) that of the unreal." ≤!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[31]<!--[endif]--> According to this criterion, only Brahman is real; the world of objects is unreal. Still, this world is not utterly unreal. "These objects cannot be called real in so far as they are particular and changing; but they are not surely utterly unreal like the son of a barren woman, since existence as such shines even through their appearance, and is present in them. In view of this they can be described as neither real, nor unreal. They are indescribable (anirvacaniya). The world of appearance as a whole, and the power of ignorance (maya or avidya) which conjures up such a puzzling world, are also indescribable in this sense." ≤!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[32]<!--[endif]--> More clearly, our authors present the following distinctions:

1. The utterly unreal: child of a barren mother.
2. Objects of possible and actual experience.
  - . Those that appear momentarily in illusions and dreams, but are contradicted by waking experience. Pratibhasika satta or apparent existence.
  - . Those that appear in normal waking experience – particular and changing objects which form the basis of our ordinary life and practice, but which cannot be accepted by reason as completely real, because they exhibit contradiction and are open to future contradiction. Vyavaharika satta or practical or empirical or virtual existence.
  - . Pure existence, which is neither contradicted nor contradictable. Paramarthika satta or supreme existence.<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[33]<!--[endif]-->

Chatterjee and Datta go one step further than Radhakrishnan and Mahadevan when

they give us an idea of what they understand by 'objectivity.' "Objectivity is granted by the Advaitin to both the normal world and the illusory object, by admitting creation in both cases. In this the Advaitin is more realistic than ordinary realists. He differs from them in holding that objectivity does not imply reality, nor that unreality implies subjectivity.... On the contrary, on the strength of the arguments already mentioned, every object which is particular and changeful is shown by him to have a contradictory nature, and therefore, to be not real in the sense in which pure existence is." <sup>[34]</sup> This disjunction between objectivity and reality is quite in keeping with the Chatterjee-Datta definition of the term 'real,' for once 'real' is defined in terms of the supremely real, and if the existence of external objects is upheld, it follows that one has to make a distinction between objectivity and reality. What is at stake is a properly worked out meaning for the word real, a meaning that is not univocal but analogical. While accepting with Sankara the relative reality of the empirical world, Chatterjee and Datta are forced by their desire to defend the 'unity' of Brahman, as well as their lack of a theory of analogy, to call the world 'illusion' and 'appearance.'

#### 4. Mayeda

Ontological status of the world. Like Chatterjee and Datta, Mayeda outlines Sankara's criticism of Buddhism. Sankara, he points out, regards Buddhism as a nihilist doctrine. <sup>[35]</sup> In contrast to Chatterjee and Datta, however, Mayeda holds that Sankara accepts (1) the Buddhist denial of real existence of external objects, and (2) the Buddhist acceptance of the reality of consciousness. <sup>[36]</sup> Where then does Sankara differ from the Buddhists?

The difference is that he rejects the Vijnanavada theory of the momentariness of consciousness, and insists that Ultimate Reality is non-dual. <sup>[37]</sup> Both the systems, says Mayeda, "equally assert the non-reality of the

phenomenal world” and both therefore “belong to a similar monistic standpoint.”<sup>38</sup> By ‘monism’ or ‘illusionistic monism,’ Mayeda seems to mean the non-reality of the phenomenal world and the reality of consciousness (whether eternal and permanent or momentary). Such an understanding of monism is somewhat different from that of Chatterjee and Datta: when they call Sankara a monist, they mean that he upholds the unicity of Brahman; they do speak about the illusory nature of the empirical world, but they also insist on giving it a grade of reality.

#### 5. De Smet

Ontological status of the world. De Smet maintains that Sankara was teaching wisdom, and that his language was evaluative rather than metaphysical. His key distinction was between what is primary and what is secondary. The primary is sat, which is the unchanging real or the REAL, i.e. Brahman. The secondary is asat, which is the changing real or the un-REAL, i.e. the world.<sup>39</sup> “As for a corresponding philosophy of man and the world, we should not search for one in his writings, for he explicitly considered that as secondary and did not mean to produce one. What he had to say on the subject of man and the world was merely consequential upon what he meant to say about God, and is expressed for the most part in negative or relative terms.”<sup>40</sup>

Still De Smet can say: Sankara held “that man and the world cannot be truly comprehended apart from, and independently of, God, for they depend entirely upon him as upon their total cause; that since they are totally his effects, they are nothing by themselves, ...; and that, therefore they are neither sheer non-being nor being in the highest sense of the term (sad-asad-vilaksana).”<sup>41</sup>

There are negative, essential as well as causal/relation definitions (tatastha-laksana) of Brahman. The causal/relation definitions posit Brahman as the Root of the universe, total Cause of their being. There is a risk here of anthropomorphism, and so we need to

approach them with the teaching of negativity and maximality. Since Brahman is changeless and transcendent, these relations are not ontological but only logical. They are not intrinsic attributes (*visesana*) but extrinsic denominators (*upadhi*).<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[42]<!--[endif]-->

Between creatures and Brahman there is a relation of *tadatmya*, having That as one's Atman. *Tadatmya* is not peculiar to the *jivatman* but is the founding relation which imbues all effects of Brahman. It is characterized by non-reciprocity, dependence, indwelling, non-otherness, distinction and extrinsic denominativity. Non-reciprocity, for example, means that names and forms (finite realities) have their Atman in Brahman alone, but that Brahman has not its Atman in them (on TU 2.6.1). It is their supreme Self because it is their innermost omniscient and total Cause. Extrinsic denominativity means that effects are not illusory; however, they are neither intrinsic parts nor additive adjuncts but extrinsic indicators.<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[43]<!--[endif]-->

De Smet believes that Sankara teaches the ontological reality of the effects. The mutation of Sankarism into *mayavada*, he says, took place only with *Vimuktatman*. In the largest number of instances Sankara uses *maya* in the sense of extraordinary power. When he does use it in the sense of magic, it is only by way of comparison.<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[44]<!--[endif]-->

De Smet would accept the distinctions made by Radhakrishnan, Mahadevan and Chatterjee-Datta between the *pratibhasika*, the *vyvaharika* and the *paramarthika*. Borrowing from J.F. Pessein, however, reframes them in the following more precise way:

1. Brahman is SAT, REAL. It is the only REAL, since there cannot be two or more REALS. Hence Brahman is A-sat, UN-real, i.e. totally unlike what we normally call sat, real. But it is not a-sat, un-real, in the manner of a mirage. Neither is it A-SAT, UN-REAL, like the son of a barren woman.
2. The world is sat, real, in the ordinary sense of the term. It is neither SAT nor

ASAT. It is SAT-ASAT-vilaksana, i.e. undefinable by the terms SAT or ASAT taken in their supreme or perfect sense.

3. Prior to creation, when it is not yet real in the ordinary sense, it is identical with SAT, as St Thomas clearly states. After creation, its sat is a totally caused, dependent, relative reality which cannot stand without the constant creative immanence in it of Brahman as its supreme ATMAN.

4. Avidya consists

- . In viewing the world as asat, unreal, as the mayavadin Buddhists do. [The Buddhists deny even a relative reality to the world.]
- . In viewing the world as REAL, SAT, existing in its own right through the independent and underived reality of its material causes: cf. Vaisesika or Samkhya.
- . In identifying the world with the soul or with Brahman: this is the error of pantheism. [None of the authors I have studied do this.]
- . In failing to see Brahman as the Atman and Ground of every derived reality, and seeing it only as Absolute, excluding even the possibility of derived existence: this is the error of acosmism.

5. For Sankara, the characteristics of SAT are self-existence and immutability, while those of a-SAT are dependent existence and mutability. <!--[if !supportFootnotes]->[45]<!--[endif]-->

Perception. Vedantins consider the first five pramanas as secondary. Sense perception is primary in time, but not in truth value. Though superior to dream knowledge, it can err, cf. the many instances of illusory perception. Besides, it is only concerned with passing, contingent realities. <!--[if !supportFootnotes]->[46]<!--[endif]--> Perception cannot grasp the metaphysical depth in things, i.e. their total dependence on their Cause. In this sense it is Avidya, lacking the complement and finality which sruti alone

can give. Still, it is valid in its own right. Sruti will not cancel its content, but only its pretention of having reached exhaustively the yathatmya of things. <!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[47]<!--[endif]-->

Understanding. “Knowledge results from the sources of valid knowing (pramana) whose objects are the existent things as they are in reality....’ (on BS 1.1.4). This objective identity (yathatmya) is not easy to attain.” “The yatha in yathatmya suggests that knowledge must be similar to the things known. Not a few Indian thinkers held a mirror theory of knowledge. [Cf. Radhakrishnan] Sankara had surmounted this naïve realism. For him intellection is interpretation, either of sense-data or of the successive words of sentences. The intellect has the power of ‘considering them as a whole’ (... on TU 2.3.). It is dynamically synthetic. It can unify all the indications it receives and it is by the synthetic unity of the resulting knowledge that the latter is similar to the known reality.” ≤!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[48]<!--[endif]--> Of all the authors considered, De Smet may be the only one to point out to intellection / understanding in Sankara, though perhaps the others would readily concede to the activity of interpretation in Sankara. At any rate, De Smet rejects the mirror theory of knowledge in favour of human knowing as a structure that includes not only experiencing but also understanding. The similarity to the known is attained on the level of understanding rather than of experiencing, and perhaps the knowledge of that similarity is attained in judgment, about which De Smet is not so clear or abundant.

### Comparison

We move on now to the third step in dialectic, comparison. Comparison, for Lonergan, is a question of finding affinities and oppositions.

Radhakrishnan refers to the world as appearance, but hesitates to use the word illusion, and does not seem to use the word vivarta. However, he rather clearly upholds the relative reality of the empirical world. Mahadevan refers to the world as illusory appearance, and uses the word vivarta. Still he, like Radhakrishnan, upholds the

relative reality of the empirical world. Chatterjee and Datta agree with Mahadevan in referring to the world as vivarta or illusory appearance. They also agree with him in upholding the relative reality of the empirical world. However, where Mahadevan calls Sankara non-dualist, and never uses the word monist, these two authors refer to Sankara as an absolute monist ('absolute' in contrast to the 'qualified' monism of Ramanuja).

All the above authors agree on the meaning of the word 'real': the real is the unsublatable. All of them draw the conclusion that what can be sublated is in some way unreal. However, since there are degrees of such unreality, since they distinguish with Sankara between the utter unreality of the son of a barren woman and dreams and illusions on the one hand, and the empirical world on the other, they call the empirical world both real and unreal, sad-asad-vilaksana.

De Smet agrees that the word 'Real' is to be applied in its supreme sense only to Brahman. In contrast to Brahman, the world of empirical realities is only relatively real, dependent, having That as its Atman. It is therefore un-Real though not un-real. The son of a barren woman, instead, is Un-real, not even real in the sense in which the world is real.

However, De Smet steers clear of all usage of vivarta, 'illusion' or 'appearance.' Radhakrishnan, Mahadevan and Chatterjee-Datta instead uphold the relative reality of the world and still end up calling the world an appearance. Is this significant? And where does the difference lie? I think it lies in the fact that De Smet knows another way of defending the changelessness of Brahman. This way involves a doctrine of analogy, or the purification of the relational definitions of Brahman from their anthropological connotations by a process of negation and maximality. Such a doctrine enables De Smet to regard the relations as well as their terms as upadhis in the sense of extrinsic denominators. In this he finds support in St Thomas Aquinas' suggestion that the Creator-creature relationship is a non-reciprocal one, real from the side of the creature

but merely logical from the side of the Creator.

It is Mayeda who has a somewhat different interpretation of Sankara. In contrast to the authors discussed above, he says without hesitation and qualification that Sankara teaches the non-reality of the phenomenal world. Where Chatterjee and Datta teach that Sankara upholds the existence, if not the reality, of external objects against the Vijñanavadins, Mayeda maintains that both Sankara and the Vijñanavadins deny the reality of external objects.

Again Mayeda, like Chatterjee and Datta, calls Sankara an absolute monist. However, he distinguishes the realist monism<sup>[12]</sup> of Badarayana from the illusionistic absolute monism of Sankara. The difference lies in the ontological status of the external world, and Mayeda does not hesitate to align Sankara with (Vijñanavada) Buddhism in this regard. The difference between Sankara and Buddhism is regarding the nature of consciousness: Sankara insists on maintaining, with the sruti, the eternal, unchangeable and non-dual nature of the Atman.

### Reduction

Reduction is a question of grouping the many affinities and oppositions further, discovering their common roots. The common roots would be presence or absence of intellectual, moral or religious conversion.

The differences between Radhakrishnan, Mahadevan and Chatterjee and Datta seem to me to be largely terminological. All three agree in assigning a relative reality to the world. All three feel obliged to consider the world an appearance, in order to defend the unicity and nirguna (qualityless) character of Brahman.

Radhakrishnan, however, is the one who is clearest about the one-sided dependence of the world on Brahman. In this he is in agreement with De Smet.

Whether or not Sankara used the terms vivarta and maya can be settled by careful appeal to the texts.<sup>[49]</sup> However, we need to

explore (1) the first group's willingness to use the language of appearance; (2) De Smet's rejection of such language; (3) Mayeda's position that Sankara, like the Buddhist Vijnanavadins, teaches the non-reality of the phenomenal world. <!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[50]<!--[endif]-->

We are asking ourselves about the roots of the above set of statements in presence or absence of intellectual, moral or religious conversion. I propose that we take for granted the presence, unless clearly indicated, of moral and religious conversion, and concentrate on intellectual conversion alone. Is the first group's use of the language of appearance ('the world, though not utterly unreal, is an appearance') rooted in intellectual conversion? Is De Smet's refusal to use the language of appearance rooted in intellectual conversion? Is Mayeda's position that Sankara teaches the non-reality of the phenomenal world rooted in intellectual conversion?

Some members of the first group go so far as to distinguish objectivity from reality. They grant objectivity to both the external world and illusions. If they are talking in terms of what Lonergan calls experiential objectivity, this position would be perfect. However, they fail to distinguish between experiential, normative and absolute objectivity, and the principal notion of objectivity that arises, not as the term of a single judgment, but in a patterned series of judgments. Further, these members are unable to identify the objective with the real because of what they regard as a scriptural definition of the 'real' as the unsublatable. I would consider them, therefore, as being involved in what Lonergan calls the basic counterpositions. De Smet's position, instead, would be rooted in intellectual conversion: having distinguished various meanings of the word real, he sees no need to regard the world as appearance, or to distinguish the objective and factual from the real. More work would have to be done on Mayeda to determine the meanings he assigns to knowing, being and objectivity, but I would hazard the guess that he is involved in the basic counterpositions. As Hiriyanna has pointed out at length, and as Radhakrishnan mentions in passing, even if life is an illusion, it is one

that lasts endlessly, it is shared by all human beings, and it is difficult to draw a distinction between such an illusion and reality. <!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[51]<!--[endif]--> Or as Wittgenstein has pointed out somewhere, the children of idealists also go to school and sit on stools.

### Classification and Selection

Classification and selection have to be done together, for classification is a question of identifying which of the affinities and oppositions result from dialectically opposed horizons, and which have other grounds, while selection is a question of picking the former and dismissing the latter.

The terminological differences are not dialectical. They can be solved by appeal to the texts. The differences on the status of the world (whether or not to call it appearance, illusion, phenomenal) are dialectical, being rooted in presence or absence of intellectual conversion. We therefore dismiss the terminological differences between Radhakrishnan, Mahadevan and Chatterjee-Datta, and select the latter set of differences.

### Distinguishing positions and counterpositions

I have already indicated that I would regard Radhakrishnan and co. as well as Mayeda as being involved in the counterpositions, while I would regard De Smet as being free of the counterpositions.

### Developing positions and reversing counterpositions.

The vyavaharika could be identified with the realm of proportionate being. It is the objective of experiencing, understanding and judging. It is the realm of the changing, the contingent, the paratha.

A proper interpretation of Sankara would have to first about the realm of meaning within which he writes. De Smet, for example, suggests that his writing is evaluational, and not directly metaphysical.

The counterpositions:

1. Human knowing on the level of the vyavaharika is not properly differentiated.  
However, the theory of error might give some indications.
2. Being / reality is not the objective of the pure desire to know; it is that which completely satiates the desire to know. Anything less is not being / reality in the proper sense, or else it is reality / appearance / illusion.
3. Knowing on the level of the vyavaharika (or proportionate being) is valid, but it attains reality / appearance / illusion. There is an objectivity that is attained on the level of experience alone. There is also an objectivity that is attained in correct judgment, e.g. in correct perception.

There is, in fact, no need for Radhakrishnan and co. to use the language of appearance or illusion. A better grasp of analogy, as well as of the one-sided dependence of the world on Brahman, would give them the possibility of upholding the unicity and changelessness of Brahman without appealing to such usage. The result would be an interpretation of Sankara that is more harmonious, more in line with what seems to me the basic 'realist' thrust of these authors. As for Mayeda, ... As far as De Smet is concerned, ...

[MY ATTEMPT ENDS HERE! One thing that became very clear to me in the course of this attempt was my own level of self-appropriation. Obviously there is much I have to do to really attain especially intellectual conversion...]

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<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[1]<!--[endif]--> The only attempt to apply the method as a whole may be found in T.J. Tekippe, ed. *Papal Infallibility: An Application of Lonergan's Theological Method* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1983).

For some thinking about the application, cf. I. Coelho, "Implementations of Lonergan's Method: A Critique." *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy and Education* 15/3 (2004) 379-404; "Applying Lonergan's Method: The Case of an Indian Theology." *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 22/1 (2004) 1-22; and "Lonergan's Method: A Proposal for Implementation," paper presented at the Second International Lonergan Conference, Regis College, Toronto, 2 August 2004.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[2]<!--[endif]--> MT 137-138.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[3]<!--[endif]--> MT 249.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[4]<!--[endif]--> MT 302. Cf. also MT 312: "there can be many kinds of developments... to know them, one has to study and analyze concrete historical processes while, to know their legitimacy, one has to turn to evaluational history and assign them their place in the dialectic of the presence and absence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion."

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[5]<!--[endif]--> S. Radhakrishnan, ed. *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, vol. 1 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1952) 272.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[6]<!--[endif]--> S. Radhakrishnan, tr. and intr., *The Brahma Sutra: The Philosophy of the Spiritual Life* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960) 33.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[7]<!--[endif]--> Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sutra* 32-33; cf. also 31, 139, 141.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[8]<!--[endif]--> Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sutra* 33.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[9]<!--[endif]--> Radhakrishnan *The Brahma Sutra* 141.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[10]<!--[endif]--> Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sutra* 33-34.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[11]<!--[endif]--> Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sutra* 33.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[12]<!--[endif]--> Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sutra* 137-138.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[13]<!--[endif]--> Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sutra* 138. Compare M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000) 349-351; 360-361; 361-364. There is a surprising degree of agreement between Radhakrishnan and Hiriyanna on this point.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[14]<!--[endif]--> Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sutra* 33.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[15]<!--[endif]--> Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sutra* 33.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[16]<!--[endif]--> Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sutra* 33.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[17]<!--[endif]--> Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sutra* 33.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[18]<!--[endif]--> B. Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," *Collection, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan vol. 4*, ed. F.E. Crowe and R.M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 213.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[19]<!--[endif]--> Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure" 216ff. The idealist distinguishes between reality and appearance. By appearance he does not mean any illusion or hallucination. He means the shapes and colours that we see. By reality he means what is meant by the naïve realist (= object of a single cognitional operation). He is thus able to say: I do not know reality; but I know what appears. I do not know whether or not the field is really green; but I know it appears green to me. (The idealist expects to find the real on the level of sense; he knows he does not find it there; he despairs and says he knows only appearances.)

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[20]<!--[endif]--> T.M.P. Mahadevan, *Sankaracharya* (New Delhi: National Book Trust of India, 1968) 59.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[21]<!--[endif]--> T.M.P. Mahadevan, *Invitation to Indian Philosophy* (New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann, 1982, first published 1974) 382.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[22]<!--[endif]--> Mahadevan, *Invitation to Indian Philosophy* 382.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[23]<!--[endif]--> Mahadevan, Invitation to Indian Philosophy 382.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[24]<!--[endif]--> S. Chatterjee and D. Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1984, first published 1939) 361.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[25]<!--[endif]--> Chatterjee and Datta 361.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[26]<!--[endif]--> Chatterjee and Datta 372.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[27]<!--[endif]--> Chatterjee and Datta 372.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[28]<!--[endif]--> Chatterjee and Datta 374.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[29]<!--[endif]--> Chatterjee and Datta 365. Cf. 387: “It will be quite clear now that Sankara does not deny the world even in the second or practical aspect, like a subjective idealist who reduces it to a mere idea of the perceiving individual, and who does not allow it extramental existence. This will be further evident from the way in which he refutes the subjectivism of the Vijnanavadin....”

≤<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[30]<!--[endif]--> Chatterjee and Datta 393.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[31]<!--[endif]--> Chatterjee and Datta 381.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[32]<!--[endif]--> Chatterjee and Datta 382.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[33]<!--[endif]--> Chatterjee and Datta 386-387.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[34]<!--[endif]--> Chatterjee and Datta 385.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[35]<!--[endif]--> Sengaku Mayeda, “Sankara and Buddhism,” New Perspectives on Advaita Vedanta: Essays in Commemoration of Professor Richard De Smet, SJ, ed. B.J. Malkovsky (Leiden / Boston / Köln: Brill, 2000) 20.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[36]<!--[endif]--> Mayeda 22-23. Note that Mayeda implicitly translates mayavada as the non-reality of the phenomenal world.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[37]<!--[endif]--> Mayeda 23-24.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[38]<!--[endif]--> Mayeda 25.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[39]<!--[endif]--> R. De Smet, "Sankara's Non-Dualism (Advaita-Vada)," *Religious Hinduism*, ed. R. De Smet and J. Neuner (Allahabad: St Paul Publications, 1964) 54.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[40]<!--[endif]--> De Smet, "Sankara's Non-Dualism (Advaita-Vada)" (1964) 61.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[41]<!--[endif]--> De Smet, "Sankara's Non-Dualism (Advaita-Vada)" (1964) 61.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[42]<!--[endif]--> R. De Smet, "Forward Steps in Sankara Research," *Darshana International* 26/3 (1987) 39.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[43]<!--[endif]--> R. De Smet, "Sankara's Non-Dualism (Advaita-Vada)" *Religious Hinduism*, ed. R. De Smet and J. Neuner, 4th ed. (Mumbai: St Pauls, 1996) 89-90.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[44]<!--[endif]--> De Smet, "Forward Steps in Sankara Research" 43. Cf. R. De Smet, "Maya or Ajnana," *Indian Philosophical Annual* (Madras) 2 (1966) 220-225.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[45]<!--[endif]--> R. De Smet, "Sankara Vedanta and Christian Theology." *Review of Darsana* 1/1 (1980) 37-38.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[46]<!--[endif]--> De Smet, "Sankara's Non-Dualism (Advaita-Vada)" (1964) 55.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[47]<!--[endif]--> De Smet, "Sankara's Non-Dualism (Advaita-Vada)" (1996) 86.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[48]<!--[endif]--> De Smet, "Sankara's Non-Dualism (Advaita-Vada)" (1996) 87.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[49]<!--[endif]--> Several scholars have pointed out already that Sankara did not use the term vivarta; that was a contribution of one of his followers. Again, scholars have pointed out that, while Sankara did use the term maya, it was again one of his commentators, Vimuktatman, who worked out a theory of mayavada.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[50]<!--[endif]--> Could this difference be explained away by saying that, while the former admit the existence, objectivity and factuality of the external world, they also, like Mayeda deny absolute reality to it? The point could be settled by asking whether or not the Vijnanavadins made any attempts to ascribe existence, objectivity or factuality to the external world.

<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[51]<!--[endif]--> M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000) 349-351; 360-361; 361-364. Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sutra* 138.

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<!--[if !supportAnnotations]-->[RI1]<!--[endif]-->Study better R's first exposition of Sankara, in *Indian Philosophy* vol. 2. 1923. Distinguish from his second presentation of 1952. Use DS if necessary.

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<!--[if !supportAnnotations]-->[RI2]<!--[endif]-->What would a realist monism look like?

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