

*Cantower XXXIII***Lonergan and Axial Bridges**December 1st 2004**33.1 Instrumental Acts of Meaning**

This morning, out of the mess of trying to find a way of handling this topic and this final “gestation” *Cantower*, the very young Clara Weich - later Clara Schuman - came to mind. I recalled her claim that she was in the world of music before she learned how to read.¹ But, said I to myself, was she not then reading music?

So, I recalled my own learning how to read, in particular two transition periods. There was the first teen period when I learned how to read music, to read Chopin, or rather I learned how difficult it was to read Chopin. I was a very poor pianist, but remain strangely addicted to this Polish piano-master.

Then there was that year of learning how to read, 1955-6, when I worked with Lochlainn O’Raifeartaig towards the M.Sc. in mathematics and mathematical physics. In particular, as I have recalled more that once, there was that classic book on Complex Analysis that the three of us - Professor Timoney and Lochlainn and I - worked through.² At some meetings one but not the others would have solved a classic problem out of the collections at the end of the chapters. I still recall my initial ‘reading’, early that year, of chapter one, a short chapter that ‘made sense’ to me through a slow energetic reading. Then I read the first of the many problems listed as exercises at the end. It astonished me into checking back to see was I reading the right chapter! So, I began to learn how to read those chapters properly by doing the listed problems at

¹See the beginning of Joan Chissel, *Clara Schumann. A Dedicated Spirit*, Hannish Hamilton, London, 1983.

²Lochlainn O Raifeartaigh (1933-2000) went on to a distinguished career in physics. See the article on him by Siddhartha Sen, *Physicists of Ireland. Passion and Precision*, edited by Mark McCartney and Andrew Whitaker, Institute of Physics Publishing Bristol and Philadelphia, 2003., 282-292.

their conclusion.

No point in going on about this, except to recall two discontinuities: going from that study to the study of philosophy - but luckily being led to Lonergan in the autumn of 1957 - and later going from lecturing mathematical physics 1959-60 to 'reading theology', a massive cultural shock. I restrict myself to one helpful hint towards the central point of this *Cantower*. My university teaching required me to present both first year courses and graduate courses in mathematics and mathematical physics. There was no question of students straying into a higher level class and making sense of the stuff: the graduate class itself had a hard time making sense of each new piece of the climb. But in theology, commonsense eclecticism ruled, and the highest level classes - fourth year theology - were attended by the second and third year theologians. Does this not raise a question of growth, its symbolization, its encouragement?

That first year of theology I wrote "The Contemporary Thomism of Bernard Lonergan,"³ knowing that it would annoy the professors required to read anything heading for publication. It survived the readings and indeed prompted Fr. Courtney Murray S.J., editor of *Theological Studies* (who, I suspect, thought I was a professor) to ask me to give him a presentation of the Verbum articles for the journal, which I did:⁴ the publication was a good reason to be moved to another theologate for my fourth year, since the professor teaching the course on the Trinity would not have been comfortable. But enough: I only add an anecdote that again helps to get my main point. In that first year of theology I offered the professor in question a copy of "Finality, Love, Marriage" to read. His comment on returning it to me was "That was a very difficult article: I had to read it twice".

Which reminds me of a key shift in my writing this essay. I am presenting, in section 33.2, 'twice' or 'again', as it were, what I wrote in 1984 in honour of Lonergan.

³Published in *Philosophical Studies* (Maynooth, Ireland), 1962.

⁴*Theological Studies*, 1962.

The 'again' comes from Lonergan. At a lunch we shared in the late 1970s I remarked to him that Matt Lamb had invited me to contribute an essay on mathematics for the work *Creativity and Method*. I said that I had already done that. "Give it to him again" was Lonergan's cheerful suggestion. So, during my musings over the problem of handling this essay it came to me that my previous essay might form a piece of this *Cantower*. I recall it being requested by Frs. Crowe and Doran over the phone late in 1984: 2000 words as the centrepiece of their celebration of Lonergan's 80th birthday, and in fact I finished the writing the week that Lonergan died.

But again what is relevant is a central problem of reading which I wish to share with you through the strategy of this centennial essay. I read through, for the first time in 19 years, what I wrote then. My, how differently it **read**, yet how "the same". I agreed with myself of age 52, of course, but I had left myself very far 'behind'. How far.... and how to speak of 'how far'? We are getting closer in that last phrase to the heart, the cordcore, of my problem, our problem. In the past week, as I laboured on certain topics relating to the metalanguages of logic, I made a significant leap towards a partial solution: but we shall come to that in the third section.

First I should recall for you the problem as it hung around my psyche all those decades. It is perhaps neatly caught in the title of the second chapter of *Process: Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minds*, "Instrumental Acts of Meaning". It was a title I had used before in a paper for a Boston Workshop in the mid-seventies, "Instrumental Acts of Meaning and Fourth-Level Functional Specialization".⁵ The paper twists and turns around Proust and Joyce, reaching round and about the problem of remembering what we read. It lead my colleague Fred Lawrence to raise the 64 dollar question, What are you at in the paper?

What had I been at in most of those papers of the Boston Workshop? I was on a double course; trying to understand what Lonergan was at; trying to avoid, and help

⁵It appears as chapter 4 of *Shaping of the Foundations*.

others avoid, the trivialization of what he was at. I was twisting into my presentations Lonergan's simple pointing in his Epilogue to the *Verbum* articles. And I was continually twisting into my presentations what I might call the *pre-Method* Lonergan, yet at the same time trying to bring people's attention to the heart of the achievement of *Method*, the delineation of the tasks of functional specialization. Neither of these twistings were popular, nor is there much sign of a shift of focus in Lonergan studies towards an implementation of either drive. In this criticism I include myself, though I suppose that at least I could claim a sort of rambling dialectic that keeps pushing for a foundational lift, but my writings, weird and twisted as they are, are not much more than popularizations or may seem so. And again, we come back to the problem of reading. Or, if you like, the problem of interpretation as Lonergan first sketches it in *Insight*.

The problem is a massive fundamental axial problem, but here I home in on just one facet of it: adult growth and its expression. Home in? All the problems of the meaning of "home"⁶ bubble up here between us. I have been "at home" in this problem for decades. I checked through that second chapter of *Process* just now, especially its odd first section that begins with a key question of Voegelin's last work "Where does the beginning begin?"⁷ On that first page I reminisced about reading, for the first time in thirty years, an article by Thomas on growth of meaning that I had read in the late 1950s.⁸ What is the reality and the dynamics of such growth? Do you share my

⁶See *Method in Theology*, 14, 350-1. A context in the present work is *Cantower XXI* : "Epilodge".

⁷E. Voegelin, *In Search of Order*, Vol. 5,, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1987, 13. My present cultural and group answer to his question is, of course, a minimalist beginning in using hodic recycling.

⁸*Quaestio Disputata, De Virtutibus in Communi, a.11. Quaeritur quomodo virtus infusa augeatur:*

question, my curiosity, at whatever age you are now? It is still with me as a fundamental human question, and now a quotation from Bachelard that I have cherished for decades, and indeed repeat more than once in these *Cantowers*, is a very lively molecular cranial reality: "Late in life, with indomitable courage, we continue to say that we are going to do what we have not yet done: we are going to build a house."⁹

Moving into my seventies has been for me an extraordinary acceleration. I left behind and moved on, luckily, accidentally. The *Cantower* project emerged from the seed of a sunflower essay-title, "Sunflowers Speak to Us of Growing"¹⁰ and only in these last days of September 2003 do I begin to see the centrality of the genetic marvel for our problem of expressing growth, so that the later cousin-*Cantower LVIII*, at the very middle of the million word enterprise, "Tadpole, Tell us Talling Tales", will give a new focus of rescue out of the Middle Kingdom, the Axial Muddle.

But I should cut short these reflections so that you might move into the experiment in reading to which I invite you. Some of you have certainly not been with me through the climb to here, through 32 essays, so I do not wish to pull in that prior context. I obviously read the text myself nineteen years ago, for its first publication. It means 'more' now to me in my recent reading. How much more and how to tell you of that 'more'? So we are back at that earlier question, and we will ponder over an answer to the question in the third and final section of this *Cantower*.

Meantime, there is my recommended reading strategy: I invite you to read the text as it was written in 1984, then to re-read it with the inclusion of the notes, to be written in November 2003. I do not wish to elaborate overmuch on this strategy. You might simply think of it as listening to a melody produced by a younger man that is then tuned into with orchestration done by him twenty years later, though that does

⁹Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1969, 61.

¹⁰The title came to me as I worked on chapter 3 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*. Later it became the title of *Cantower II*.

not get you to the heart of the matter. Still, the musical parallel can help. Perhaps you might think of the first reading as listening to *Frere Jacques*, then listening to Mahler's symphonic transformation of it: or humming the simple phrase doh (two beats), me, fa, soh, soh (an octave down), then exposing oneself to Bruckner's eighth Symphony.

What I would like you to sense, or at least to envisage sensing, is the possibility of a change of your reading of the text. The change is evident to you, in that the second reading adds a type of commentary. How do you read the commentary? Perhaps I should not say "commentary" but rather use such a designation as "anecdotal conversation", ramblings that are a guide to a larger reading, a living of a climb, a *Tao*, a **commentary**, then, that is a **come in to read** in a similarly life-length. But are you up to reading it thus? Is there some Zen-like bent in your molecules that can read it as an invitation to a twenty-year ascent to older and elder self-taste? Is there a Proustian bent in you that can begin to cherish the fact, or the prospect, of the change in the intussuscepting of tea-taste over two decades? Might you read Joyce at a fresh start to "riverrun, past Eve and Adam"¹¹ to arrive at the end that is the beginning, "First. We pass through grass behush the bush to. Whish! A gull. Gulls. Far calls. Coming, far! End here. Us then. Finn, again! Bussoftlhee, mememormee! Till thousandthee. Lps. The keys to. Given! A way a lone a last a loved a long the riverrun, past Eve and Adam"¹²

But I should shut up and let you begin: or perhaps you need a break after this

¹¹The first words of *Finnegans Wake*: a mile or so from the sea, the River Liffey passes, on the right bank, an old Church called Adam and Eve's. On the opposite side of the river there is Ormund's Quay, where the 'golden mouth' hotel housed the Sirens singing in *Ulysses*.

¹²The end of *Finnegans Wake*, turning back to the first words. I should perhaps recall here the title of this entire project, with which I concluded *Cantower XXXI: Roun Doll, Home James*. See the explanatory footnote there, note 75. In that note I indicate the meaning of run (pronounces roon) in Irish: principally 'secret'. I am not in touch with the Joycean experts but I like to think that Joyce did not miss that point when he began with "riverrun" moving towards the final run of ocean-entry. A central problem of axiality is the cutting off of humanity from the run, the secret, the mystery of the flow.

odd beginning of my effort to have the word made fresh. Begin to gain, wait.

33.2 Text: 1984; Notes: 2004

"More than any other modern man he shared the fresh and fearless vitality of medieval inquisitiveness. His questions go to the roots of things. The answers he demands must be right on the nail. He combined a whole-hearted contempt for the irrelevant with an ability to appreciate enormously, one might say inordinately, what really was relevant."

The author is Lonergan in a short article on "Chesterton the Theologian" published in the *Canadian Register* in 1943, but what Lonergan says of Chesterton is surely more profoundly true of Lonergan himself. Furthermore, the degree of the profundity is precisely the key issue in seeking to specify the historical reach of Lonergan's meaning.¹³ I have on occasion compared Lonergan's achievement to the achievements of Galileo, Mendeleev, Joyce, Rembrandt, Beethoven. But in fact such comparisons fall radically short of the point of profundity.¹⁴ For the profundity of

¹³I pause now, on All Saints Day of November 2003, over the phrase historical reach, helpless to communicate its shockingly larger meaning. My recent struggle with *Cantower XXX* increased that shock. In that *Cantower* I wrote of my answering, after 45 years, with some contentment, the question Lonergan handled so neatly, doctrinally, suggestively, in a couple of pages of *Insight*: "What is Energy?". To shift the book from the moving pedagogical viewpoint, as I have regularly suggested, gives a shocking new incomprehensibility to the worldview of chapter 4, a piece of Lonergan's view of 1949. What a massive lift it gives towards a new eschatology, a fuller human answer to the question of chapter nineteen, "What, then, is being?" (*Insight*, 642[665]).

¹⁴Perhaps I can now bring out better - if you are up to slowly following my strange climb - the failure of comparison by drawing your contemplative attention to my odd triplet of *Cantower XXVII*, that echoes through the essays since, "about about about". Let me quote from note 20 there: This is a triplet that I have used more frequently in recent essays. It refers to an important set of distinctions that Lonergan made in unpublished writings. Roughly, we are curiously about things. But we can be curious about that about. And history bears witness to a series of such curiosities, about which we may be curious. So, if you think it out, you find that there are studies that are studies of method; but there is also the study of that study, which is the refined meaning of **methodology**." Galileo, Joyce were 'about' their business in a primarily first

Lonergan's life preoccupation was that of the "root or key from which results intelligibility in the ordinary sense" (*Insight* p.647) and meaning in the ordinary sense, and "the intelligible in the profounder sense... cannot be understood without understanding what understanding is" (*ibid.*).¹⁵

So, one must reach towards larger comparisons to touch the sense of the man's reach into meaning towards the generative principle of genetic and dialectic sequences of meanings. One thinks then, for example, not just of the genius of Beethoven, but of a plumbing of sonata-meanings from before Bach, through Beethoven, to Bruckner and beyond.¹⁶

Or one might think of the massive transposition of the history of logic made possible, it at present improbable, by Lonergan's location of the foundations of all logics in the self-illuminating incarnate spirit. That history may be suitably symbolized by Kneale and Kneale's classic *The Development of Logic*, where the authors conclude by noting the necessity in our time "to strive for greater precision in the characterization of logic."¹⁷ That characterization can only come through a subjective vortex-spinning into

order manner: Lonergan invented existentially the third order field of inquiry that is to method what zoology is to the study of particular animals.

¹⁵But I locate this challenge now in the context hinted at in the previous note, lifted into the vortex enterprise that is his fundamental historical reach. The profounder sense is a triple luminosity about human history's climb towards the profounder sense.

¹⁶In the conclusion of that paragraph there is a clue to the structure of the new genetic systematics desperately needed in theology. I had already broken through (I still recall the occasion, in the Toronto Lonergan Centre, struggling in the early 1980s with *De Intellectu et Methodo*) to the genetic structuring that would fundamentally solve the problem of the relation of history to system. I have tried unsuccessfully to communicate the shift: it seems that the mentality of static system has a massive grip on present brain-molecules.

¹⁷I had struggled with Mathematical Logic and in particular with Goedel in the early 1960s but obvious the effort to edit properly *Phenomenology and Logic* pushed me on, contextualized by the pointers noted in the previous notes. So, one may envisage a

an elucidation of sequences of limited coherencies sparked by Lonergan's generalized empirical method.¹⁸

Or one may move from such seeding of new meanings in music and logic to the larger canvas of total history that concerned men like Arnold Toynbee and Eric Voegelin in their later years. Then one can take note of a broader shift in history that may be named the self-discovery of mind, a ferment in a few Greek minds that faded with Aristotle's death, reborn in the Christian medieval drive that briefly blossomed in Aquinas' searches into the mind of Aquinas and God, rescued in this century from Scotist Thomism by the medieval inquisitiveness of a man who could take the revelations of the scientific revolution of these past centuries as serious data on the meaning of history.¹⁹

later systematics precisely of the *Development* of Logic quite beyond anything envisaged by the Kneales. Might someone take up the challenge and lighten the burden of *Cantowers LXVIII - LXXXI*?

¹⁸I was writing there of the full communal characterization to be realized through the cyclic collaboration of functional specialization, but I had only a vague heuristic at the time. My fullest analogue for that cycling came from my work on Husserl's thesis under Weierstrass, where he structure the refinements of the Calculus of Variations up to his time. That Calculus has moved on to its contemporary power - it is, for instance, the home of The Principle of Least Action that is dominant in contemporary physics. The "calculus of variation" invented by Lonergan has yet to be tried. On the analogy see chapter 4 of *Lack in the Beingstalk. A Giants Causeway: "The Calculus of Variation"*.

¹⁹This note follows the last quite sweetly. Husserl left refining heights of the scientific revolution for the lower lands, or marshlands, that eventually gave rise to phenomenology. He thus missed the clues in his own mind to a serious phenomenology of mathematics etc, and so he became part of *The Crisis of European Sciences*. The serious data for our feeble inquiry into the meaning of history includes all our struggles towards understanding. And we must enmesh ourselves in that struggle: I recall now, in relevant eccentricity, my week of wandering in Manhattan, Queens, etc struggling with the full metaphysics of its money and melodies and miseries. The sands and amusement-stands of Coney Island need to be embraced by medieval inquisitiveness. (See the concluding section of *Cantower XIV* regarding the

But while Toynbee, Voegelin, Jaspers, Butterfield or Snell can point here to some axial shift and there to a relevant differentiation of consciousness, Lonergan over decades delved into the hiddenness of the hierarchically dynamic subject in history to distinguish genera and species of differentiations of meaning possible and probable in the adventure of history into the noosphere. So, for example, the vague description of a movement of consciousness in these recent centuries contained under the blanket name “historical consciousness” becomes from the root perspective an explanatory heuristic of varieties of scholarly consciousness correlated with cultures through space and time.²⁰ Again, Christian issues pivoting on unclear meanings of “development of doctrines” brings forth from Lonergan a discontinuity of heuristics that draws on precisions regarding plant and animal development to provide a natural analogue that, as Chesterton might multiply mean, goes to the root of the issues.²¹

Perhaps such far-reaching heuristic shifts might be somewhat elucidated by

metaphysics of New York)

²⁰The sweep of these few sentences has now multiply enriched meanings for me. Might I get you to pause over the seventh last word, “correlated”? The correlating calls in the words of metaphysics that have slowly grown into my molecules. W3, perhaps, is an anchor. The blanket name “historical consciousness” is now a blanket weave of hodic meaning. What is adequate historical consciousness at present? It is Lonergan’s Vorticist-view, that puts at the heart of history’s reach a methodology that is unified, efficient, beautiful.

²¹In note 16 I brought your attention towards the problem of genetic system. I recall now, in the mid-1960s, having that problem as one of my options for a doctorate thesis in “Oxford. I recall especially wanting to see could I lift the biological logic of someone like Woodger into a full genetic logic. I recall that because it seemed appropriate to talk of theses at some stage in this present ramble. There are very relevant theses crying out for the doing, and one group of them would bring generalized empirical method - in its later definition of *A Third Collection*, p. 143 - to bear on the growth of different animals and plants. The cry is symbolized in my *Cantower LVI* title: “Tadpoles, Tell us Talling Tales”. Might there be someone interested in pushing forward with me? Indeed, I have a list of theses, and am still up to secret collaboration!

recalling a basic strategy of science associated with Galileo. Modern physics is called, not Galilean, but experimental. Stillman Drake notes that before Galileo there was no dearth of mathematical reasoning, but “the systematic appeal to experience in support of mathematical laws seems to have been lacking ... the design of experiments to discover new mathematical laws comes after Galileo’s time” (*Galileo Studies*, University of Michigan Press, 1970, p.44). Drake notes the difficulty of believing this, and so goes on to describe the inadequate strategies of Tartaglia(1546), Cardano (1570) and Ubaldo (1577) in seeming out laws of force for bodies on inclined planes.

Returning now to Lonergan we may note that his lasting achievement is the identification of generalized empirical method and its basic strategy: “I does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject: it does not treat of the subject’s operations without taking into account the corresponding objects” (The Donald Mathers Memorial Lecture at Queen’s University, 1976).²² The strategy of precise, empirical, and profoundly novel, and I would suggest that the successful implementation of that strategy in the next centuries pivots on an honest admission into consciousness of the tandemness of its demands. The central data of the new science are insights: for philosophers and theologians the discomfort is that the relevant insight include those of centuries of advancing science and aesthetics; for those

²²My text here goes on to speak of the honest admission of the tandemness of the demands of this version of generalized empirical method, which refines the earlier definition of *Insight*, though one can argue that the method was operative in Lonergan’s own efforts from very early in his career. I have been slow in appreciating how deeply this honestly would cut into, or down on, present traditions of Lonergan studies. So, like most of my colleagues, I was for a long time content with a relatively untutored heuristic of both *phantasm* and *feelings*. But now I move in a new clarity of mystery, and you might share it by asking about the metaphysical equivalents of **phantasm**. Do they not include molecularities of neurodynamics? And the same surely may be said of feelings or emotions, so trivially talked of by so many Lonergan camp-followers. Go read a recent *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 53(2002): Dylan Evans, “The Search Hypothesis of Emotions,” 497-509; Louis C.Charland,, “The Natural Kinds States of Emotions,” 511-537.

involved in the arts and sciences there is the painful challenge of reaching towards a luminous authentic subjectivity.

In that light the verdict of history on Tartaglia, Cardano and Ubaldo of the sixteenth century will be paralleled by a like verdict on some of the best efforts of the twentieth century. So, the sold drive towards a more sophisticated and empirical methodology of science associated with men like Bertalanffy, Kuhn and Lakatos will eventually be revealed as having a central opaqueness in regard to subjectivity.²³ Again, there are occasional brilliant aesthetic insight such as that of Henry Moore when he remarked that the sculptor “gets the solid shape, as it were, inside his head - he thinks it, whatever its size, as if he were holding in completely enclosed in the hollow of his hand ... he identifies himself with its centre of gravity, its mass, its weight.” Yet such insights cry out for a later stage of meaning where lucidity regarding the art object will deliver aesthetics from descriptively synaesthetic and metaphorical obscurity. And in

²³The opaqueness reveals itself only through the steady effort to eliminate it in the details of one’s own view and in the detailed patient struggle towards that view. Only this year have I tried to spell out the effort, especially the pedagogical effort, involved here. Summary certainly is out of the question: but you might venture into *Cantower XXVII* to find my best effort, relating to the reading of *the principle of displacement* on the first page of chapter 1 of *Insight*. Or a parallel effort in *Cantower XXXI* to read adequately the word *measurement*. There I point concretely towards a shockingly delightful sophistication of subjectivity’s investigation of its simplest scientific ventures. Only such elementary and elemental sophistication can carry us out of present standard muddled philosophy of science. I would note that the five essays spanning these two - 27 to 31 - paralleled both *Insight*’s first five chapters and the first five chapters of Feynman’s famous *Lectures in Physics*. That effort of this year was for me an astonishment about just what is hidden in those five chapters of *Insight*. Peculiarly, the effort also enabled me to develop a novel introduction to the philosophy of chemistry. Central to the effort and the achievement was reaching towards Lonergan’s suppressed meaning - in chapter one - for *empirical residue*. Lonergan places the prime matter of Aristotle and Aquinas in a quite new contemporary world, and places our contemporary world in a quite new dynamic of creation’s finality. And - recalling my appeal regarding theses in note 21 above - there is surely some venturesome person in this new century that would risk doing a thesis on the general heuristics of energy?

the broad field of Christian theology, there will slowly emerge the profundity that will bring to light the deep cultural exclusion of the illuminating realities of both subject and object that frustrated the courageous searching for a post-medieval theology of such a thinker as Karl Rahner.²⁴

Less remote is Lonergan's own transposition of previous achievements in areas of aesthetics, science and theology. His brief foray into Suzanne Langer's aesthetics, during lectures on education in 1959, shifts that field massively into a context foreign to present debate: the lucid context of confinement to subjectivity's position in being (*Insight*, pp. 484, 521, 571).²⁵ Later we will note the deeper strategy of functional specialization needed to lift such fields as musicology and poetics out of their present

²⁴Shortly after I wrote the above Rahner gave his last address, recently presented in English (Karl Rahner, "Experiences of a Catholic Theologian", *Theological Studies*, 61(2000), 3-15). He spoke with humble realism about the state of theology, its relation to the sciences and to questions of eschatology. The points he raised have preoccupied me in the two decades since, and I would hope to bring the questions of science and eschatology into a fuller focus gradually - it is a central aim of these *Cantowers*. I return to issues of Rahner's eschatological reflections briefly in *Cantower XXXIX*, but I would draw attention here to this area as a clear instance of the failure of theology to take up the challenge of fundamental Christian questions in the context of modern astronomy. "It needs to be said why and how this Jesus is the only One to whom we can entrust ourselves in life and in death. What kind of answer can we give to this question?" (*Ibid.*, 7).

²⁵I continue to grow in the shock of just how foreign Lonergan's context is. His entrapment in a type of popularization did not allow him to bring that strangeness into focus in the years after *Insight*. He did not carry forward explicitly into *Method* the challenge of that work, but it is discomfortingly present e.g. in his plea on p. 287 of the book for a rewriting of it in terms of his categorial achievements. I don't think I had even noticed that plea when I wrote the above. I would note, further, that I was lifted forward here by the integral feminist searchings. In tackling the challenge of "one can go on" (*Method*, 287) it is no small help to venture along with Candace Pert (*Molecules of Emotion*, Touchstone, New York, 1999) and Rita Carter (*Mapping the Mind*, Phoenix, 2000). For a perspective on the feminist challenge see Sandy Drage-Gillis, *The Transformation of Feminism.?Woman What Gives*, Axial Press, Halifax, 2004.

cumulous confusion of specialties.²⁶ In the sciences, Lonergan's innovative contributions are not only methodological as in his structuring of canons of empirical procedure - but at times proximate to content. Present theorizing in relativistic quantum physics and chemistry is subtly bedeviled by the extroversion of a Euclidean imagination: what is lacking is Lonergan's leap to the abstract and concrete intelligibility of space and time.²⁷ The middle sciences are bogged down in reductionist imaginings and Darwinian obscurities regarding units and patterns of evolution: Lonergan's relevant focus in on a thematic of schemes of recurrence at all levels, within an explanatory perspective on emergent probability, underpinned by a precise heuristic analysis of genera and species, grounding uniquely a needed clarity.

One may gather that the shift initiated by Lonergan is a deep cultural shift

²⁶It is a deep strategy, solving the problem of implementation found in metaphysical reaching from Plato to Lonergan (in the next edition of *Insight* surely *implementation* will get into the index!). But more and more in these past decades I see it as wonderfully shallow: an evident need in all areas of culture from mathematics to mountaineering. This is the message of chapter 3 of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A Fresh Pragmatism*. Will the children of this world catch on before the children of light? In *Cantower XXXV* I pick up on a decade of *Theological Studies* to show the relevance and power of the simple division of labour. In *Cantower XXXVI* that simple twist on culture is to be seen as, after all, the main invitation of my million words. Might we not make an elementary commonsense start?

²⁷Lonergan's leap? I suspect, from my own experience of trying to crawl after such leaping, that he too did a great deal of crawling. In this area I am still a struggling beginner. I sense the a fuller venture into the meaning of measurement would carry us out of much of the present obscurity in physics. So, I intend to venture solidly on that road in the next few years, beginning with *Cantower XLII*: "Quantum Mechanics and Measurement". It is to be a struggle beyond Copenhagen and John Bell on into the present problem of quantum thermodynamics and quantumchromodynamics. Again, theses waiting to be tackled! But the beginnings are in the simple reflections of *Cantowers XII* and *XXXI*. But here it might amuse you to note how slow I was in figuring out the meaning of *complete* in Lonergan's canon of complete explanation. Still, it has to do with the deepest problems of the nature of geometry and of physics, and I seem to have been very much on my own in even raising a question about its curious inclusion.

transformative of the mediation of meaning in human life reaching into areas as diverse as genetic chemistry, the psychology of management, the philosophy of law, the theology of play. It is a pivotal contribution to an axial²⁸ shift in history initiated primarily in the Greek and Hebrew traditions. Before turning to Lonergan's contribution to theology, however, something should be said in particular on his still unpublished advancement of foundational economic dynamics. It is, I suspect, this contribution that will primarily lead to the wider recognition of his genius in the next few decades.²⁹

²⁸I am fortunate that my long and on-going struggle towards what Lonergan meant by "the two times of the temporal subject", by "the longer cycle of decline", by "the second stage of meaning", has been spelled out recently by Sandy Gillis (see the work mentioned in note 25 above). Certainly it was a struggle with such thinkers as Jaspers, Toynbee and Voegelin, but primarily it was a struggle with the shambled cover story that was our lives in the twentieth century, that has not changed in the truncated brutality of present armies and academies. The result is diagramed so simply in W3, but its molecular genesis in me and in you and in history is a massive ontogenetic and phylogenetic achievement. Its growing luminous neural presence is a central ground of the fantasy that constitutes the specialty Foundations. In the early 1970s I had little clues of this; in the early 1980s I was edged forward by prolonged contemplative efforts to reach the meaning of such brief pointers as "the social situation deteriorates cumulatively" (*Insight*, 229[254]). The effort merged with an effort to come to grips with the Trinitarian colour of history, and so eventually axial meaning merged with the death-walk of the Galilean of the Middle Kingdom the seed a hope of a distant luminous theology of hope. But my struggle is still seedy, twisting now into a feel for the communal struggle of The Tower of Able that is to lift metaphysics into its due unity, beauty and graceful efficiency.

²⁹Nothing much happened in the two decades since, nor do I see signs of change or of a seriousness of interest and commitment among followers of Lonergan. If you believe Lonergan regarding its psychic presence in a genuine economic democracy, might you not have a shot at being such a democrat? There is, besides, the benefit of the effort to understand the stuff, which would be, for many Lonergan students, a first step into the world of serious understanding, of *theoria*. That was the main point of my odd essay, "The Value of Lonergan's Economics for Lonergan Students", which is chapter 1 of the Website volume, *The Redress of Poise*. As the next note intimates, my struggling education by economic life continues, but my failure to stir forward any seriousness of

Loneragan's economics moves more in the perspective of Cantillon and Quesnay than that of Adam Smith or Walras. But again we must note a transposed perspective that can focus on the good of a standard of living that is concrete yet contextualized by transvalued values. There is here no labour theory of value but value as specified by a good of order within an emergent universe that measures success in strange ways. Moreover, as against abstract and centralist economic dynamics, Lonergan's analysis, mediated by procedural lucidity, focuses relentlessly on concrete possibilities and fosters individual creativity.³⁰

Causing in the human group the horizon-shift necessary to reach such a dynamic economic creativity is the massive century-long task of education of which Lonergan has written in one of his economic manuscripts: "coming to grasps what serious education really is, and, nonetheless, coming to accept that challenge constitutes the greatest task of the modern economy".³¹ That grasp is the root grasp which has

economic reform helped me forward towards the present project. I was helped, too, in my decision to curtail my efforts in economics by the sad example of Lonergan's last gallant effort.

³⁰Much of the fifteen years after that writing was dedicated to enriching my perspective on the implementation of Lonergan's political economics, but also seeking ways of making the stuff available to others. No need here to list publications and collaborators in that effort. Rather, I call to mind for both of us the shocking obviousness of the need. On the level of government, there is the blind shiftings of tax policy. On the level of business there is the blinding profit motive and a massively stupid and destructive psychology of innovation. On the level of text-books there is the indoctrination into all those idiocies. I was myself slow to sniff out the sickness of texts. I recall lecturing in Texas one recent spring and seeking out text-books in local use. I found that there was no "Texas content" in the texts: pretty hairy for an empirical science! But such discovered stupidities, contrasting with micro-efforts e.g., of third - world women, push me forward now to new intimations of future mesoeconomic analyses.

³¹I have experienced startling lifts in perspective on this central problem in these last few years. "Tell me about them" your daft former self might say. But at least I can share with you two slogans, two policy-bents, two cultural benders. There is **The**

been our topic throughout, a grasp deeply beyond present educational efforts of theory and practice, ranging from kindergarten through *Harry Stottlemier's Discovery* to the cultured truncation of graduate life.

Turning, finally, to theology, I may be brief: other contributors point to Lonergan's enrichment of the theology of churches and states. I am content to note two giant steps. First, there is the slow, thorough, creative recovery of Aquinas grounding a profound yet preachable coherence of Trinity and Incarnation, mind and grace and liberty. It is a recovery that, sadly, remains to be shared, as Lonergan noted occasionally in his later years.³² But the second giant step is a seeding of such a sharing. Secondly,

Childout Principle, a popularization of the later view of generalized empirical method: "when teaching children geometry one is teaching children children". And the slogan holds for theology, of course, and for the child that is the teacher. And the other slogan which I now call **The Tomega Principle**, is a sentence in *Insight* that amazingly I failed to read correctly until the late 1990s: "Theoretical understanding, then, seeks to solve problems, to erect syntheses, to embrace the universe in a single view" (*Insight*, 417[442]). This is far from the contemporary idiocy, taken for gospel, of specialization. At all events, these are central principles of post-axial institutions, roles, tasks, of education. They are to become luminously operative in our daily talk.

³²No point in writing here of Lonergan's disappointed solitude. Caricatures of his Trinitarian reach have bubble forth from disciples who have not climbed towards coming face to face with the God of *Insight* 19 that holds sway in his Latin works, which - symbolically - come forwards from the 26th place of that chapter as a 27th place that dances post-axially with Thomas' 27th question of the *Summa*. But I have more to say on this, especially on the Cosmic drive of the Jesus Thing, as I push on - surely with help - to envisage the eschatological finality of energy. More immediately there is my effort to weave forward, in *Cantower XXXV*, the Christology of the last decade of *Theological Studies*, and my reflection of Fr. Crowe's effort at a history in that area in *Cantower XXXVIII*. Perhaps the present emergence of translations of the Latin works will nudge us forward? But I am not optimistic. My last few years of puzzling have led me (see *Cantower XXI*: "Epilodge") to associate the needed transition to an unwelcome lift in Christian contemplation, a "sweeping to the love of the invisible" (Christmas Mass Preface) that can reach Jesus in his flowers and his fundamental particles (and they are genuinely His, in the fully rich theology of presence and instrumentality!). But here we are, I think, at the heart-rotting - and too often pious - centre of the present ills of philosophy and theology: sophistications of of common sense that parade as either

then, there is the startling differentiation of theological tasks that crowns Lonergan's long search for an integral empirical transposition of the methods of theologians. His discovery is equivalent to the sudden appearance of Mendeleev among pre-Lavoisier chemists.³³ No longer can theology be a broad sweep that might appear to be a latter-day contribution in continuity with the commonsense contribution of a Newman or a Pascal. Theology moves beyond public discourse and its tasks become a reaching forward within history as revelation in the enlarging confines of the differentiated empiricity of functional specialization. The beginnings of the implementation are tasks for centuries to come.³⁴

Nor is that strategic differentiation of tasks restricted to theologians: it will range into the confused fragmentations and specializations of the cultures of human meanings, to provide a cyclic reaching for an ever more adequate founding of human

piety or profundity.

³³In note 24 above I already reflected on this massive shift. Here I use a regular analogue of mine, but there I appealed for a commonsense start. The cycling will slowly lift the Tower community to the level of relevant *theoria*, battling the pretense mentioned at the conclusion of the previous note with a variety of vortex strategies that I make mention of in following notes, but certainly with what has become for me in the past three years a favorite doctrine from Lonergan. "Doctrines that are embarrassing will not be mentioned in polite company" (*Method in Theology*, 299). Oh yes they will: such conversion-topic-making constitutes a new Socratism! But, at all events, how that massive shift might "come about" (*Insight's* key text on the core of subjectivity's needed shift: p. 514[537]) has been my preoccupation in the twenty years since I wrote the text above, and the How grows in anticipating subtlety as I climb through this searching decade.

³⁴My notes throughout this section are indications of facets of the shift in my perspective on implementation in these nineteen years, shifts that are expressed throughout these essays, shifts that I expect to accelerate into strangeness as we move forward. But perhaps at this stage it would be good to note the optimism in the recent shift to minimalism expressed in the third chapter of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A Fresh Pragmatism*. In all areas of inquiry there is a messy need to make a "foundationless" beginning on an eightfold (the eight has simply emerged pragmatically) functional division of collaboration.

collaboration in the making of history. In its vortex movement it invites an ever-broadening recollection of past achievement so that, for instance, the recovery of Aquinas is not a solitary chance achievement of an eccentric but a recurrence of differentiations within generalized empirical method. Further, that vortex movement of functional specialization spins forward and upward to a crowning ever-fresh mediation of everyday meaning, opening up ministry and management to a new lucid gentleness with the mysteries and creativities of multicultural subjectivities.³⁵

Lonergan concludes his essay on Chesterton by noting that Chesterton's "medieval insistence on the relevant is to be found in anything but medieval dress. Perhaps his deepest theological intuition is to be found in the most bizarre of mystery yarns. *The Man who was Thursday* is a labyrinth of double roles, painful quests, of buffoonery and high seriousness, that lures the unsuspecting reader face to face with God and the problem of evil." For Lonergan himself there is the central bizarre yarn of *Insight* with its painful questions bred of the revelations in modernity both of science and of human inadequacy, luring the unsuspecting reader face³⁶ to face with God and

³⁵I return in this penultimate note to the text of twenty years ago with a stand on my growing appreciation in these recent years of the potential of feminism in relation to the genesis of a post-axial movement. There are subtle molecular fermentations of humanity's deepest exigence in the turn away from patriarchy. Recall the comments above, note 25.

³⁶This final note to my effort of twenty years ago has the possibility of becoming a lengthy appeal, but I can cut it off in the consolation that the lengthy appeal is the 117 Cantowers, and moreover that I am dealing herenow with a suspecting reader. I footnote the first *face* in that old *face to face* phrase. My concern is with molecular changes in the support structure of that invisible face of yours, with the infolded energy of your longing. Is what I write obscure to you? I hope so: but invitingly, cajolingly, obscure. Recall note 37 above. Very few readers of the book *Insight* have struggled towards the God of the moving viewpoint of chapter nineteen, much less the God of Lonergan's non-moving viewpoint. I had the privilege of teaching that chapter at different levels in the years around 1970, class after class devoted to contemplating the 26 places of its ninth section, reaching, as I sense it now, for the meaning of the Spirit brooding over H₂O, all the waters of finitude cherished in "God's concept and

the problem of evil. Generations of thinkers, no doubt, will dodge the post-medieval labyrinth of that yarn. But the Man who was Sunday has the patience of emergent probability.”

33.3 Axial Bridging

I delayed completing this final centennial essay - after all it is not due on the Website for twelve months - and moved on to other searchings, especially into the problem of functional collaboration. *Cantowers XXXIV* and *XXXVII*, both dealing with functional interpretation, were already complete. *Cantower XXXV*, now complete, is basically an effort to show the need for functional collaboration by reviewing writings on Christology in the past decade of the journal *Theological Studies*. *Cantower XXXVI*, completed yesterday, presents the function of the Cantowers in what I hope is a persuasive way. And now my preoccupation is with generating a full heuristics of measurement and with making a beginning on astronomy with an eye on the drive of this entire work towards a shot at an eschatology that would gather up modern cosmology in a way that would parallel the effort Thomas would have made had he lived to finish the *Summa*.

Such work is massively slow, a reaching out within W1, the first word of metaphysics, for the metaphysical equivalents of the measuring process and its results. The astronomy of the early cosmos is helpful because the first word of metaphysics reduces to $HSf(p_i; c_j)$ for the early universe, so one can grapple with the dynamics of

choice” (*Insight*, 726[748]). The elder meaning of that brooding and that cherishing would be massively startlingly strange to the me that was half my present age. But the obscure climb is the call of your infolded longing as well as mine, if you are called to *theoria*. “Theoretical understanding, then, seeks to solve problems, to erect syntheses, to embrace the universe in a single view” (*Insight*, 417[442]). Embrace, indeed, and be embraced, in a single song, “The Song of the Adorable” (*Process: Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minders*, chapter 5, section 4).

primary and secondary determinations as objectively emergent.³⁷ No question here of measurement or imagined folk edging round space³⁸: the issue is a heuristics of the things of physics and chemistry in the “cosmic surge” through and way beyond that famous first three minutes. What, for instance, is the metaphysical equivalent of the distinction between a radiation-dominated universe and one that is matter-dominated?

Of course, had Lonergan’s seeding of such questions taken off in the 1960s, there would be answers available within the community of his disciples. The metaphysical identity of energy would have been a common heritage, and the skimpily-sketched pointers to a metaphysics in chapters 16 and 17 of *Insight* would have blossomed into a controlling categorial. But perhaps the centennial pause will have given a nudge towards a serious start? Or at least some serious forays into explanatory metaphysics and explanatory hodings.

But, whatever those starts and forays, it seems to me that there is a fundamental need to be acknowledged, however vaguely and tentatively. It is the need for the admission into communal consciousness of the possibility of a peculiar³⁹ adult growth

³⁷The problems here belong to a push forward in integrating the early parts of chapter sixteen of *Insight* with the suggestions regarding metaphysical equivalence that occur later.

³⁸I am thinking here of the illegitimate ramblings of quite respectable physicists, ramblings regarding traveling twins or people on the edge of black holes. And then, of course, there is Schrödinger’s cat.

³⁹It is, of course, the implicit topic of this *Cantower*, but perhaps a key peculiarity, massively transformative of future interpersonal attitudes, is worth pausing over in a simple manner. Considered normatively, an older thinker shifts horizon more rapidly than a younger thinker. I could well draw parallels here between this horizon-shifting and the problem of the expansion of the universe in relation to back-coming light, but the point is that adult growth is normatively into zones of back-incommunicability. Think in terms of someone teaching physics while also thinking forward in physics. Their leaps “forward” can be giant compared to what is being “passed on” in class. Beyond this simple suggestion there lie deep problems of spirit’s intussusception of understanding that have as yet to surface in the quest for an

in meaning, especially growth into explanatory meaning.⁴⁰ I have written about bridges to meaning many times before, and it seems pointless to indulge here in some sort of survey or summary.⁴¹ It seems best, indeed, to home in on the question that I intended to bring into your consciousness by the exercise of section 33.2. Even if you did not follow my suggestion about reading the text twice, you still must have had some sense of the fact that there were nineteen years between the text and the notes. Did you notice a difference? I certainly would not have, were I reading section 33.2 twenty years ago.

I did my second-best, in writing the footnotes, to give some senses of larger reach, movement of minding into richer horizons, closer to yet paradoxically further away from *the field*.⁴² But I do not see my efforts as a success. The second-best puts me in mind of Proust's volumes, all in readable French or English: there is the tea-tasting of the first volume; there is the tea-tasting of the final volume. There is, of course, the twisting and weaving of each sentence in the volumes between, giving the impression..... Yes, there's the problem word: *impression*. What was your impression of, from, the exercise of reading section 33.2? Yes, there is a project, an impressive project. But I am interested in the more refined impression: the impression of a climb of twenty years.⁴³

understanding of human understanding in its genetic dynamics, its molecular meshing.

⁴⁰The tendency to get bogged down at some stage in descriptive meaning is discussed in an introductory fashion in *Cantower XXIII*.

⁴¹The analogy of bridges was introduced in "Features of Generalized Empirical Method", *Creativity and Method*, edited by M.Lamb, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1980. There I discussed seven bridges.

⁴²*Field* is a notion from *Phenomenology and Logic* (see the index there, and the end of my introductory note to the index). There are serious enrichments of Lonergan's perspective in these lectures of 1957.

⁴³I could deviate here into the context of Cantower IX, of position, of position, of proto-possession, and that would startle you if you were/ are not really with me. What

Simpler yet more challenging is the question that I raise now, of the climb of a single week. A week ago, the canon of complete explanation was beginning to resonate in my with fresh meaning. I have written about that odd canon before: the oddity of the word *complete* and the relation of that oddity to the massive task of the simplest of sciences, physics. But now I see it in a fuller light, the light indeed of the procession of the second person of the Trinity. That eternal Evaluative Word is surely Complete Explanation? One must, of course, have arrived at a sufficiently subtle grasp of what conception is and how it nests in performance: following such an effort as I suggested, in *Cantower XXXI*, in relation to musical conception and performance. So, there is a canon of complete explanation that reaches to both the lower ground of loneliness and the upper ground of loneliness. Does not this reaching have something to say to the question that I picked up from Rahner's last address?⁴⁴

I have made some progress, then, this week, in my understanding of the creative eternal word. Could I tell myself of last week the **what** of this progress? No more, indeed much less, than I could tell myself of last week about the cosmic background radiation dynamics with which I have been struggling these last few days. Might you begin to accept the parallel? I am back, obviously, with my reflections of the beginning of this *Cantower*. I ask you now only to entertain the problem: we will meet it and each other again in the fuller context of *Cantowers XXXIX -XLI*, which parallel those three

is impressed is a neurodynamics of print-patterns swung into spirit-resonance within your biochemistry according to a cultivated capacity. But all this could be in much worse condition, depending on your impression of *impressa*. "Knowing as confrontation reappears in the *species impressa* that is an object, and in the doctrine of intuitive, intellectual cognition of material and singular existents" (*Verbum*, 192). But even if you are with me, are you with me to the extent of a clear heuristic of *phantasm* and phantasm, luminous in the self-possession of its layered neurology and chemistry and physics? We are back in the discomfort of *Method in Theology* 287 with the vastly enriched categories from which "one can go on to a developed account" of such a carrier of meaning as an image.

⁴⁴See note 24 above.

central chapters - 10, 11, 12 - of *Method in Theology*. Why should theology be easier than physics? A serious year, indeed a serious week, of contemplation in physics, leaves one a stranger to oneself of last week. Why should the search for the self-energy of self or the self-energy of God be somehow easier than the search for the self-energy of the electron? And when does the strange climb to a stranger-me end? What is the character of the human climb to meaning at its Aristotelian best?

Is it possible that I could make an **impression** on you in you such that you would envisage adult growth in explanatory meaning as an accelerating process? Such impressing could put you on the road to being the odd character needed for future foundational theology.⁴⁵ But I am reaching forward to later *Cantowers*.

Again, there is the dull reality of disagreement: there are those who might say, or whisper, that sometime in life there emerges an essentially settled view, to which one adds odd bits here and there.⁴⁶ That is the axial view of elderhood, or oldness, that holds sway, an ethos that strangle-heart-holds. Against it stands the view - my view: is it yours? - that one reaches, perhaps daily, new and strange levels of dynamic equilibrium of a universe-embrace. That dynamic equilibrium includes a growing luminosity about its own darkness, its insufficiency, its pilgrim status. So it may well go on "without ever ceasing to drive towards fuller and more nuanced synthesis, without ever halting complacently in some finished mental edifice, as though the mind had

⁴⁵I like to call attention to the occurrence of the word *character* in the short section on foundational meaning, section 1 of chapter 14 of *Method in Theology*, and to tie it in with the beginning of the *Magna Moralia* on the significance of **character**.

⁴⁶We are on page 417[442] of *Insight*, where my Tomega Principle is found: "Theoretical understanding, THEN, seeks to solve problems, to erect syntheses, to embrace the universe in a single view". For the Christian thinker it is the imitation of Christ, the filling up of what was lacking in that strange full view, "the universe can bring forth its own unity in the concentrated form of a single intelligent view" (*Insight*, 520[544]), where Complete Explanation meshes with exigence (see the index of *Phenomenology and Logic*) in the human minding of a divine person.

become dull and the brain exhausted”⁴⁷

In the post-axial period there is to be expected a new culture of elderhood that is a sublation of an elderhood that seems to have been part of some zones of the pre-axial period. The transition demands a shift in the culture of **impression**, so that the Tomega Principle would be as acceptably and as required as more superficial norms of manners, and the operation of the Tomega Principle - supported by the Childout Principle of education⁴⁸ - would foster the more refined explanatory elderhood. It seems to me that there could be an aid to such a shift in the cultivation of new expression, new levels of language. Not just linguistic feedback and a subjectification of language⁴⁹, but new layers of linguistic control such as occur in mathematical logic.

In a recent plunge in to the Journal of Symbolic Logic I was **impressed** by the growing sophistication of symbolisms: sophistications trying to keep pace with new mindings.⁵⁰ Is there not a need for such a lift in theology and philosophy? And you may note that I am not saying that what is needed is a shift from Proust to Joyce: though there is obviously a need to lift the levels of anastomosis.⁵¹ Still, perhaps you can breath

⁴⁷*Insight*, 747[769].

⁴⁸See note 31 above.

⁴⁹See *Method in Theology* 88, note 34.

⁵⁰I have bold-faced the word **impression** in the text here, and in section 6 of *Cantower XXXVIII*. A reflection on the notes there, and on the following note, will give a sense of the complex need. But one must move to envisage **impression** in its full molecularity over a lifetime. That envisagement cries out for the genesis of linguistic sophistication elementarily symbolized by refinements of expressions logic.

⁵¹“Using the device of anastomosis, Joyce attempts, in the last chapter of his last work, to bridge all the great ontological chasms: between time and space, between life and death, between male and female. And he does so without sacrificing the narrative and psychological particularity that characterized his earlier works”. (Margot Norris, “The Last Chapter of Finnegans Wake: Stephen Finds his Mother”, *James Joyce Quarterly*, 25(1987-80), 11. The issue of anastomosis is not just a literary problem but the

a sigh that I did not attempt here to replace my second-best with some daft Joycean best!⁵² At all events, I have surely raised in some small way, that single key bridge issue that has haunted my life since I first brooded over Thomas writing on meaning-growth in the late 1950s. Come share with me a while this new hauntology.⁵³

problem each of us lives with. I have dealt with it in a broader manner at the conclusion of chapter 2 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*, where I ponder on the elder Shakespeare's reachings, especially in *Pericles*. The question of a deep reorientation of academic life will occupy us in *Cantowers XXXIX - XXXXI*. Functional specialization as a culture offers the prospect of a spirally towards core-growth with the spin-off, or on, of cycles of innovations in wisdom. The progressive dynamics of history is a reach for **impressions** and integrative expressions of the ontogenetic and phylogenetic exigence (see the index of *Phenomenology and Logic*, under *Exigence*).

⁵²My best so far, indeed, is the provision of the words of the five words of metaphysics that emerged slowly over the past three decades, that were conveniently collected in *Cantower XXIV*, that offer a beginning of a new control of meaning. But is there not something on offer in Joyce's genetics of expression that builds a gap - or a bridge - between *The Portrait of an Artist* and *Finnegans Wake*?

⁵³In an earlier work I wrote of a hauntology that would transpose Derrida's idea of it (see Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, translated and prefaced by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, John Hopkins University Press, 1997, 27). I wrote of the haunting of post-modern expression by hodic, grammatic and pragmatic canons. "It is a *hauntology* that is at once simpler and deeper than the hauntology of Derrida" (*Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A Fresh Pragmatism*, 65)