

Cantower XXII**Redoubt Lonergan: The Ministry of Mayhem****January 1st 2004****22.1 “The Inception of a Far Larger Work”**

“It is important to note that the great movement of the eighteenth century was a literary one - it was not the new discoveries of science in that epoch but, rather, the French *philosophe* movement that decided the next turn in the story and determined the course Western civilization was to take Fontanelle, as well as later writers of the *philosophe* movement, adopted the policy of making intellectual work palatable and easy Whereas ‘reason’ had once been a thing that required to be disciplined by a long and intensive training, the very meaning of the word began to change - now any man could say that he had it ‘Reason’, in fact, came to signify much more what we today should call ‘common sense’”.¹

‘Mayhem’, a cousin of ‘maim’, has the general sense, in my title, of a causing of loss of function. That part of the title came to me from a film of a few years ago, Michael Collins: the rebel government had been arrested. Collins and his friend concluded that the primary portfolio left to them was the ministry of mayhem.

It seems strange to associate Lonergan with such doings. Immediately, then, I must state that I consider his ministry to be, not physical assassination but character assassination. Butterfield describes the character of an emergent civilization in the quotation with which I began. I do not wish to begin refined debate about its meaning or its truth. There is, indeed, a sense in which it is recognizably true of our times, and one must note that the character of the recognition cannot but have, for the general reader, the warp of the civilization. You, a particular reader, have to discern your own breeding and breathing in that civilization. My hope is that these next five ***Cantowers***

¹Herbert Butterfield, *The Origin of Modern Science*, Clarke, Irwin and Co., 1968, Toronto, 166-70.

might bring a personal focus to the challenge of your discernment.

So, the focus of my attention and yours is to be, not on the character of the civilization but the characters that we have become, are becoming. Positively, my focus is on the meaning of ‘character’ that Lonergan points towards in the beginning of chapter 14 of *Method in Theology*, to which I add the beginning of the *Magna Moralia*. The word concludes the rising and resounding third sentence of part one on constitutive meaning in *Method*. “In so far as it is constitutive, it constitutes part of the reality of the one that means: his horizon, his assimilative powers, his knowledge, his values, his character”.² Some readers will recall my referring to this passage previously in these **Cantowers** and elsewhere, and of suggesting a reading of the first two sections that relates the two as what I could now describe as Tower-search and its lift of common meaning.

But would all of my readers pick up on my meaning? That meaning of course, and your pick-up on it, change as we struggle forward in these Cantowers, and perhaps even share the struggle of the book that gave rise to them, *Lack in The Beingstalk: A Giants Causeway*. But what if you are just plunging in now, a beginner in that sense?

So I must pause in this fresh start - and it is a fresh start. If we are culturally alive it is indeed always a fresh start, as Marcel and von Karajan would have it.³ So, if you have been with me for some time, you can bring von Karajan’s view, just recalled in the note, to bear on what we are doing here, and in particular on itself. You recognize it as a favorite story of mine, as is that from Gabriel Marcel. You recognize it

²Method in Theology, 356.

³These are two familiar adult-growth character-references of mine, representative of the psychology of expectation, “not-yet” seen, heard, tasted. Gabriel Marcel writes of such an expectation of shift within the human viewpoint. My oft-repeated story of von Karajan is of his going to conduct the 3rd and 4th of Beethoven’s symphonies after a summer of recording the seven: “for me, they are new symphonies’.

as another version of the Proust business of re-tasting, and so you are not surprised when you find me re-minding you now of the lift towards re-cognition in which we all might live, an adult growth dominated by vertical finality. So, you and I as “old hands at this” can reach up, sentence by sentence - especially if the sentences become Proustian - in a paradoxical luminous darkness of character, towards an increase of the urgent darkness that is, with increasing luminosity, the ongoing actual context of our core capacity-for-performance.

But what if you are not an old hand, but a beginner? Perhaps someone has recently led you to this “weird website stuff “ for whatever reason: precisely because it is weird, or even entertaining, or quite mistaken about Lonergan’s achievement; perhaps because it seems to capture something of present needs, possibilities, probabilities. Then I am pleased, and would hope to address this to you as a beginner, and so for you who are not a beginner I would remark that neither am I a beginner, yet this effort, even when it repeats favorite quotations, or phrases, or words, even when it seems to merely repeat familiar slogans - be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be adventuresome, be responding - it is for me, and so I would hope for you in your reach for elderhood, a fresh neuromolecular stretching that echos loudly the slighter stretching of you, the beginner that is now my primary concern.

We are having another go at beginning. In the first page of ***Cantower II*** I quoted Eric Voegelin’s last short work, “Where does the beginning begin?”, and I returned to that question in the first pages of ***Cantower XVI***. It, and the next ***Cantower***, shared a common title, “Hodics as Science”, but numbered in inverse order, as II and I. They also shared a common concern: about beginnings and the mood of beginnings. For the beginner now this “II and I’ can be taken simply as pointing to two approaches to science, the synthetic and the analytic, and the manner in which good teaching avails of elements of both approaches.

A good chemistry teacher will begin with ‘stuff’ on a lab counter, especially stuff

with which she or he can do tricks, stuff like sodium or mercury. But the good teacher will also hand out some version of the periodic table on a page, and the beginning students do not mistake it for knowledge of chemistry. Furthermore, I should make the optimistic remark that, as our culture moves slowly towards self-appreciation as a core product of education, that “not mistaking” will be an operative presence in the hearts of students and teachers: there will be a growing appreciation of the difference between memorization and appreciation, between the memory that catalogues and the memory that lives and re-lives, to recall a distinction that Proust got from his cousin-by-marriage Bergson.

The idea of operative presence is best glimpsed initially by adverting to ordinary patterns of behavior, like playing cards or doing crosswords: depending on your habits and talents, there is spontaneously operative a refined selectivity that puts you, literally, at the top of your game. In the present case we are looking towards a refined operative presence that is to be eventually supported by an ethos and especially a new luminous honesty in cultural interpersonal relating. But to see the difficulty of the emergence of this support we need to go back to the initial quotation from Butterfield: what present culture supports is a commonsense eclecticism that, whatever its borrowings from sciences and arts, remains common sense. This operative presence is, of course, to be generalized empirical method operative as a culture from kindergarten to graduate school : it has already been a topic here, especially in the first section of *Cantower XVII*, which parallels the first section of the corresponding chapter in *Insight*. Obviously, I am pointing my beginners back to that for further leads. But we can move forward here in elementary fashion by picking up on Lonergan’s description of the ethos of *haute vulgarization*, an ethos which leaves its practitioners out of touch not only with theory but also with sound common sense: the three pages that I refer to in the note⁴ need digestion in the context of the Butterfield quotation.

⁴Lonergan’s *Collected Works*, pages 121, 151 of Vol.6, page 145 of vol. 10.

But back to the beginning, or you may well ask where indeed does the beginning begin here! And my apparently simple answer is that the beginning begins with the first word of metaphysics, or of hodics, or of generalized empirical method. Once more, let us have it up-front:

$$\mathbf{H S f(p_i ; c_j ; b_k ; z_l ; u_m ; q_n)^5}$$

I first introduced this word, W1, in a brief talk of 1971, “Being and Loneliness”, but it was only in *A Brief History of Tongue* that I named it the first word of metaphysics, and in that same chapter I added W2 and W3, without naming them as such, as the second and third words. But let us not bother with them for the moment. Let us not even bother with details about this first word. Think now, especially as a beginner, of the early stages of studying chemistry: “here is a table of elements we are not going into detail... but just notice that it orders some familiar names and so suggests an order of the corresponding things”. It is somewhat like a small-scale map of a town like Oxford: you recognize a few names even if you have never been there.

Here we have, in symbolic language, a statement about history, H. S means Sequence and/or Structures and/or Schemes etc etc etc. f? That is the usual symbol for function, in mathematics, biology, whatever. Take it that we are talking about a functioning thing. If all the components are in the thing, then we are talking about a human thing functioning on the six (five if the division represented by q [or sometimes I have used r instead of q, quest] troubles you). You have physical, botanical, etc properties or activities. So far, surely, no problem. It seems to be the old chain of being

⁵A central benefit of the focus on Proust in *Cantowers XX* and *XXI* could be the enlargement of your sensAbility with regard to the meaning of this Word of Metaphysics. What symbols in it become fleshed out by intimations of larger dimensions of interpersonal meaning: for example, a distant third-stage history of Lonergan’s lonely *Don Quixote* ride through the 20th century - or a hearty luminosity in you regarding your own adventure in the 21st?

thing except talked about in a novel way. The novel way is fundamentally Lonergan's way, whatever about the symbolization: surely not in dispute among his followers?

I am not thinking here about dispute in the full sense, to be later healthily operative in the fourth specialty. I am thinking of elementary and interpersonal dispute, such as surrounded the Copenhagen interpretation in the 1930s. Or perhaps I should recall the context of Trent and the heat of Luther's "Here I stand". But I think now of even smaller signs of life in dispute. I recall now reading - and, as a young Jesuit student being shocked - about Fr. Diego Laynez at Trent, in the heat of an argument with a colleague, pacing to the door and on his way out expressing his agitation at his colleagues' opinion in the single word "shit". Did he use his native Spanish, "mierda", or did he hang in with Latin, "merda", "stercus"?

We are at the inception of a far larger work, a global task of hodic collaboration and hope. In that task there should be little room for pettinesses, hidden resentments, cliques, a clutching to *haute vulgarization*, to philosophy as never seriously "philosophy of", to a desperation for a Fontanelle continuity of meaning that destroys both meaning and mystery.

22.2 An Apology for *Mein Ding*

So I come back to the question I left dangling, "surely not in dispute among his followers". And - perhaps a surprise for you here? - sadly this is true. There is solid disagreement, but it is regularly hidden and petty. However, I am not venturing here into a history of Lonergan studies: I am interested in anecdotal ramblings on the doing of my own thing and your doing of your own thing. Already here and there I have brought to your attention that your thing may well be a modest use of Lonergan in your walk of life, perhaps even after you have worked through the pretenses involved in getting degrees. In the concluding section, however, I will express the hope that the

“perhaps not numerous center”⁶ that Lonergan spoke of so passionately would be our common efficient concern.

I have been deliberately biographic and autobiographic in these essays: a matter of biography conversing with biography. So, I continue with some further ramblings about my luck that my help you to assess and even make your own luck. I was, for instance, lucky enough to be able to take my own advice long before I wrote it the Florida paper of 1970 “Image and Emergence: Towards and Adequate *Weltanschauung*”: if you could do the equivalent of ten 3-year degrees in thirty years, you might have something to say in your last decade!

It is far from easy to create such luck at present, but part of my hope is that a shift in the statistics of adult growth related to what I call the **Tomoga Principle** would shift the patterns of future luck. Frankly, I find the accepted culture of specialization both sad and funny: I have seen too many academics settling down surrounded, confined, in their doctorate work. But I already wrote enough about that: serious persons like Candace Pert need a fuller vision, and that vision should be on the level of sophistication of the earlier specialization.⁷

But back to the Lonergan schools and semi-schools: does it remind you of the correctors of the correctors etc of Thomas? A large difficulty here is that there is a general consensus about the correctness of Lonergan which is primarily a commonsense consensus, reminiscent of Joey’s view, “Lonergan had a few clear things to say”.⁸ This is a dangerous consensus: it tends to alienate people who are not interested in “Lonergan” and to be mutually self-mediating in its avoidance of the shift to what Lonergan was really pushing for: but more about that in section 3.

⁶Lonergan, *Collection*, final paragraph.

⁷I discuss both the work of Candace Pert and the **Tomoga Principle** in *Cantower IV*.

⁸I am quoting the anonymous publisher’s reader of *Phenomenology and Logic*. See *Lack in the Beingstalk*, p.138.

Meantime there is the present task of apologizing for doing my own thing, and my first apology - a matter of tricky discernment - is the thing I am about doing in this **Cantower**. Perhaps a pause with Proust may help. One has only to venture a little distance into the first volume of his work, *Swann's Way*, to find the Ruskin-Proust - of course we could wander back to Cervantes, to Augustine, to Plato - focus on the personal and the interpersonal, on the twists and turns of differentiated relating, on existential gaps in zones of meaning. You may well think of Socrates and *Gorgias* here, but in the present context I prefer to think of Laynez - or "Lonergan and Lou".

An evening in the mid-1960s in the recreation room of the Old Bayview Regis College. Lonergan and self and Lou Gibbons putting away some scotch or whatever. Lou, the professor of Ecclesiology as far as I remember, goes on the attack. When was Bernie going to make sense, to speak plainly, etc? I was no longer a young naive Jesuit, so my reaction to Lonergan's response was not shock but just surprise. He stood up, glass in hand, and before heading out of the room turned to Lou: "You're problem, Lou, is that you hold the philosophy of the dog. 'If you cant screw it, or chew it, you piss on it'".

I'm sure that Proust or Joyce could have lifted that piece of autobiography to a level of detailed and significant fiction. My problem, however, is to envisage (foundational fantasy!) the lifting of memories of the interpersonal among Lonergan students to a level of effective beauty. My immediate problem is that - if you are like Lou Gibbons - you presume to know what that envisagement means. Yet both the envisagement and the execution are massive differentiated challenges, quite beyond the culture of Proust, Joyce, postmodernism. "Was not the re-creation by the memory of impressions which had to be deepened, illumined, transformed into equivalents of understanding, was not this process one of the conditions, almost the very essence of

the work of art as I had just now in the library conceived it?”⁹

But, as you have glimpsed from the previous **Cantower**, this is not my chosen task for these last years: it is a task, yes, envisaged by me in my solitary Proustian library, a task for the novel future of fiction and fact, interpretation, history, dialectic and thus gradually onto the streets, into a new *Ulysses*.¹⁰ My simpler task, recently made precise as the center of these 117 **Cantowers**, is to stir up the lower ground of loneliness in its present and its eschatological reality so as to shift the schedules of probability of this larger task’s sloping forth into a “transformation of sensitivity and intersubjectivity that penetrates to the physiological level”.¹¹

But it seems to me that there is, at the physiological level, in some younger people interested in Lonergan’s work, a bent and a discontent “telling them” that there is larger vision to be sought and had than is on offer in current Lonerganism. For these the risk of a much simpler task seems worthwhile: voicing my own bent and discontent, despite expected annoyance.¹² If there are even a few - and to that we turn in the final section - then “the parable of the lost sheep would retain its significance

⁹Proust, VI, 525. The quotation is from the concluding pages of the final book, *Time Regained*.

¹⁰I wrote of a later *Ulysses* of Dublin in *Lack in the Beingstalk*, 149-51. It is enormously difficult to convey even vaguely the massive transposition of literary theory and culture seeded by Lonergan. I was contemplating a contribution in the form of a prolonged allegory, *Logic, Grammar, Lucid Existentialism: The Millennium of the Hodic Queen*, but was ‘derailed’ by the invitation to edit volume 18 of Lonergan’s *Complete Works*. See note 44 on page 32 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*.

¹¹*Insight*, 741-2[763].

¹²I committed myself previously to annoy (*Lack in the Beingstalk*, 7, 8, 42) recalling Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part One, I, ii, lines 208-9 “I’ll so offend to make offence a skill / Redeeming time when men think least I will” and Chesterton’s “A Dublin tradesman printed his name and trade in archaic Erse on his cart. He knew that hardly anybody could read it: he did it to annoy. In his position I think he was quite right” (*George Bernard Shaw*, Bodley Head, London, 1961, 16).

and its relevance".¹³

Perhaps I have said enough about my bent in autobiographical asides throughout earlier writings and throughout these **Cantowers**. And I certainly expressed my discontent here and there, especially in the satire and humour of **Cantower XI**. So I come back again to the dangling question of things "not in dispute among his disciples". There are, in fact, massive disagreements about the content and significance of Lonergan's work among two generations of followers, but these disagreements tend to be hidden in patterns of editing, conference organization, thesis topic-selections, class-presentations etc. It is high time that such patterns came into open dispute: but please, if you agree with me, do so in the quite of your room - or your rhumb, as we will find - I certainly have nothing to lose, but you may be on the edge of a thesis-defense or a job.

Perhaps one instance of disagreement and of editing-warp might get the ball rolling towards later *nomos*.¹⁴ It regards the Thomas More Institute in Montreal. First the editing matter: a small instance but, for me, significant; one, moreover, that I have aired already.

It is worth airing again here because it has to do with a key feature of the perspective on present decay, present schizothymia, the perspective of "large numbers..."¹⁵ the perspective that I would have this century, this millennium intussuscept. It is the orientation in history that bones up on axiality, on the humbling discovery that we are children of an axial period in history between the first and the

¹³*Insight*, 745[766].

¹⁴The implicit reference is to my title-slogan (Chapter 5 of *Economics for Everyone*, ch.3 of *A Brief History of Tongue*) "A Rolling Stone gathers *Nomos*."

¹⁵I takes a long-term contemplative effort to get oneself into the perspective of Lonergan's "significance of long intervals of time"(*Insight*, 123[146]). Yet it is central to locating oneself in historical being. What does four and a half billion years (the age of the Earth) mean to you?

second time of temporal subjectivity. So the third stage of meaning is to emerge, perhaps, in this millennium: it is not emerging in present Montreal.

It is best just to quote my previous presentation, part of my effort to delineate the patterns of systematics in the middle of the present millennium: I am quoting from “Systematics: A Language of the Heart”, a paper presented in Boston in the early 1990s.¹⁶

“I was pleased to find that the long-term issue was on Lonergan’s mind when he gave interviews in February 1981, an edited version of which was published under the title *Caring For Meaning*.¹⁷ The edited version does not include these comments of Lonergan, so I must add the corrections here:

Caring for Meaning, p.56.

The text reads:

C.G.: Were you returning to it (the problem of education, of teachers, of theologians) in *Method* when talking about the education, contributing to the education of theologians?

B.L.: Yes. And some change may come in a hundred years.

Lonergan’s reply in the interview reads:

B.L.: Yes. In a hundred years. Not in McShane’s second million years, but in a hundred years perhaps.

Caring for Meaning, p. 175.

The text reads:

C.T.: You do not expect that the time-range for your work to permeate the culture is about aa hundred years?

B.L.: At least. McShane speaks of the second millennium as being more plausible.

¹⁶It is chapter 5 of *The Redress of Poise*.

¹⁷*Caring for Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan*, edited by Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, Cathleen Going, Thomas More Institute Papers, 1982.

Lonergan's reply in the interview:

B.L.: Well, at least, eh? McShane speaks of the second million years as being more plausible.

Caring for Meaning, p. 203.

The text reads:

N.G.: What about the third stage of meaning? Was that a breakthrough for you.

B.L.: Yes.

Lonergan's reply in the interview:

B.L.: Yes. And for McShane, eh? He thinks it will come in the second millennium."

Obviously, my presentation of this piece of interpersonal editing is dully prosaic. Might one read it with the edge of a Flaubert, sensing a gap in orientation like that between Emma and Charles Bovary? What I am suggesting, in foundational fantasy, is a culturally-discontinuous lift of the tonality of thinking out such relating: what might Proust or Joyce make of the event, backed by a radically revamped psychotherapy? How might it lift the fourth speciality through a luminous dialectic of feelings? But these are distant issues. The point is that from the Mahabharata to modern Mime there is a search for a luminosity of interpersonal dealings: should that search not blossom into a foundational thematic, beyond the safe pseudo-objectivity of our conferences and journals? Here, certainly, I am in the zone of mayhem. And from the instance of editing one might move to a post-Proustian narrative of the interpersonal goings-on that constitute the Thomas More educational strategy: for me, a strategy orientated by and towards a bent towards popular informedness. Satire and humour here must be lifted to a new metempirical height, a rapier freshening of Plato's *Gorgias*.

This section was to end with that paragraph, which seemed to me to make the point. A friendly critic suggested that it did not, that some spelling out was required.

Well, I suppose I could say that the spelling out is a matter of a Proustian essay of a later stage of meaning. But I also can say that a re-read of the previous paragraph as it stands after you read this paragraph should lift its luminosity in your molecules! So; regarding the teaching style in the Thomas More Institute: I would say that by and large it breeds *haute vulgarization*. As for the editing, I would claim that, to say the least, it gives a hint of short-term focus. The Institute, far from representing the third stage of meaning, gives a negative shift to the probabilities of its emergence. Of course, the Institute is not unique in breeding *haute vulgarization*: that is the general mood and mode of Lonerganism.

But there are tricky distinctions of cultural orientation to be made here. I raised the question of adequate popularization in chapter 3 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*, but it is tackled in these **Cantowers** only slowly. **Cantowers XXVII-XXXI**, relating Feynman I, chapters 1-5 to the first five chapters of *Insight* will provide a context, and I shall home in on the topic in **Cantower LII**, "Functional Communications", and **Cantower LIV**, "Quantum electrodynamics, Pedagogy, Popularization".

22.3 Up Close and Personal

But let me return to vulgar prose. What follows is a piece rejected by the *Method* journal, the third such piece. I recall, in the case of a previous piece - certainly eccentric in its structure; it became chapter 4 of *The Redress of Poise* - writing back to the editors that probably Thomas, with his eccentric *questiones*, would probably have difficulty in getting into the Journal.

Obviously there is here grist for metempirical thematization. But, at all events, I decided to place the piece here, a bone of contention, but as it happens the bone of contention of my entire **Cantower** series.

The short response to Fr. Crowe presented in this next section draws attention to Fr. Crowe's neglect of his own earlier perspective as the basis of anti-imperialism in

Lonergan. The editors found that it had the air of a putdown and that, furthermore, a piece on functional specialization was not desired: what was needed were illustrations of such specialization. My opinion is that I presented a fresh perspective on functional specialization, a topic not conspicuously aired in the journal in its twenty years. As to putdown: the piece is obviously critical of Fr. Crowe's handling of the problem, but, I would claim, quite gentle. The piece promised at the end, however, was not to be gentle, nor is it: I add a brief version of it here in section 32.2. Fr. Crowe, I think, would be the last to wish his view not be challenged. But even if it be disconcerting for him, I cannot let his view of feelings etc go unchallenged.

Here I venture into the zone of metaphor and allegory.¹⁸ I began these **Cantowers** on April 1st, 2002, Easter Monday: a recalling of the Irish Revolution on that Easter day of 1916, led by Patrick Pearse, with Eamon DeValera as one of his commanders. As I mentioned above, the film *Michael Collins* inspired the present title, a film which gave a reasonable account of the opposition of the younger Collins and DeValera. Am I playing Collins to Crowe's DeValera? Not at all. But there is the issue of civil war, a war out in the open. I do not think that Fr. Crowe's views are compatible with Lonergan's position on being and becoming. Grist here, as I note at the end of section 3.1, for the mill of a mature specialty called dialectic, especially in so far as it slowly slopes up to the challenge of a new foundations of the aesthetics of positional narrative.

The following, then, has two parts. The first part is the rejected article left precisely as it was submitted. The second part gives some few points that would have been part of the follow-up article that was promised in note 42, below, of the first part. One of the advantages of including this here is that it gives a new angle on fresh beginnings: the two parts together serve nicely to summarize - however much I hate that exercise - the contention of the previous 21 **Cantowers**.

¹⁸Recall the points made in *Insight* 542 -9[566-572].

22.3.1 Lonergan at the Edges of Understanding: Complementary Reflections¹⁹

My brief note complements Fr. Crowe's Essay of Volume 20 of the Journal, making a point that he does not make in that essay, but that has been a concern of his since the late sixties. I think of an old slogan of his: "What functional specialty are you in?". I think of a related slogan I invented about that task which amused him in the seventies: "if a thing is worth doing, it is worth doing badly".

The thing worth doing, of course, is venturing into these specialties pragmatically, faultily. But why is it worth doing? Because this direction represents the edges of understanding in every area of human inquiry and interest. At present, in areas of human inquiry as different as musicology and mountaineering and medicine, there is fragmentation and a growing need for the sort of functional collaboration that Lonergan recommended for theology. Furthermore, I may steal a sentence for my short essay that Crowe uses in regard to his: "A point of entry for my essay is given by the charge that the philosophic effort to dominate cognitively the world and all reality is guilty of totalitarian hubris". My entry is a grounded denial of that charge. Perhaps I might communicate the grounds of the denial best by recalling my first intimation of what I could call Lonergan's anti-foundationalism.

I still recall vividly the finding - thirty years ago - of Lonergan's "discovery file" of February 1965, which contains the first sketchings of the functional specialties.²⁰ An oddity of the file was the inclusion of typed extracts from the first question of the *Summa*. What were they doing there? I could venture a view on Lonergan's perspective then, but it is better to stick with my own. The new foundational perspective is, quite simply, a shocking shift from axiomatics to cyclic searching. Axiomatics had been a

¹⁹The Reflections are on Fr.F.E.Crowe's article of the Fall 2002 issue of *Method*, "Lonergan at the Edges of Understanding".

²⁰The file is reproduced as chapter 2 of Darlene O'Leary, *Lonergan's Practical View of History*, Axial Press, Halifax, 2003.

foundational bent since Aristotle, running through Aquinas and Descartes all the way up to Husserl. So I, certainly, would be inclined to check back on Thomas' first question for seeds of cracks in that closure.

Instead, then, of the arrogance of axiomatic aspirations there emerges the humble cycling of ongoing collaboration, a tiny human vortex in a galactic ocean of mystery. The principles are not held propositions but a heartheld exigence²¹ for flickering lightsomeness light years away from the nominalist rationalism that envelopes these first few little millennia of linguistic expression.

Furthermore the new humility of the dark journey has no place for the bogus detached interest of the past millennium: it is pragmatic to the details of the core and *cor* of its collaborators, thus attaining the unity and beauty due to *theoria*: "each member, each group, indeed our whole host and its great pilgrimage, a wave in the eternal strivings of the human spirit towards the East, towards Home."²²

And each effort, each essay.

So, the present essay, if it is not effectively pragmatic, does not belong in that vortex striving: for, if "it is quite legitimate to seek in the efficient cause of a science, that is, in the scientist, the reason why a science forms a unified whole,"²³ it is also quite legitimate to spin off from that vortex the ineffectual, the "effete"²⁴, the piece of writing that is not effectively functional.

How is it to be spun off or spun in? Not arrogantly, or axiomatically, but by

²¹I would draw attention to the full meaning of that exigence. See the index of *Phenomenology and Logic*, under *Exigence*. There is an implicit reference above to first principles as being sense and intellect.

²²Herman Hesse, *The Journey to the East*, London, 1970, 12.

²³B. Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, University of Toronto Press, 1993, 160.

²⁴B. LONERGAN, *Method in Theology*, 99.

humble recycling through research, re-interpretation, re-history, etc.²⁵

The issue is Lonergan's solving of his own heart-held problem of implementation left dangling in *Insight*.²⁶ The humility of his effort was there all along, longingly: "forms are to be known inasmuch as the sciences approximate"²⁷ and the sciences approximate slowly, starting historically with the simplest zones of physics and chemistry. Has the process really begun in the higher zones of biology and human studies or is there not here an arrogance of description and of axiomatic reductionism?

"When the process has not yet begun, obscurity prevails and questions abound. Is it somehow intimated? Is the intimation fleeting? Does it touch our deepest aspirations? Might it awaken such striving and groaning as would announce a new and higher birth?"²⁸ The process deeply aspired to in that simplest of areas, geometry, by Husserl's essay,²⁹ is now a flagrant intimation shared by every zone of 21st century

²⁵I note that the recycling will gradually shift consciousness to quite new differentiations, e.g. the new systematics involves differentiations into luminous genetic pragmatics: See *Cantower VII: "Systematics and Systems Theories"*. I have described this recycling progress in an analogy with Husserl's doctorate work under Weierstrass (1882) on "The Calculus of Variation" in the chapter of that title in *Lack in the Beingstalk*. See also note 16, below.

²⁶Implementation is a regular topic in *Insight*, but it found its way into neither index. This is not surprising. Fr. Crowe and I have joked each other for years about the gaps we left in indexing, respectively, *Insight* and *Method in Theology*. Recently he remarked to me, with a smile, that there was an awful lot more about *feelings* in the new index. My own random referencing of *Implementation* gives the following pages of *Insight*: 229[254], 234[259], 236[261], 238[263], 391[416], 493[517], 507[530], 521[544], 685[708], 726[748].

²⁷*Insight*, 498[521].

²⁸B. LONERGAN, "Mission and Spirit", *A Third Collection*, edited by F.E.Crowe, Paulist Press, 1984, 26.

²⁹The Essay on Geometry is an appendix of Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Northwestern University Press, 1970. I analyse Husserl's essay in terms of functional specialization in chapter three of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A Fresh Pragmatism*.

inquiry. Does it not touch our Pauline global groaning, so that we might sight and site a parting of the ways, a weighing of the parts? “There would not be a body if it were only one part! As it is there are many parts but one body”.³⁰

“As the labor of introspection proceeds, one stumbles upon Hegel’s insight that the full objectification of the human spirit is the history of the human race. It is in the sum of the products of common sense and common nonsense, of the sciences and the philosophies, or moralities and religions, of social orders and cultural achievements, that there is mediated, set before us in a mirror in which we can behold, the originating principle of human aspiration and human attainment and failure.”³¹ But now we may “draw upon a theory of history... a fullness of time.. a transfiguration of human living”³² that is intimated in the brokenness of our efforts, our journals and journeyings, our libraries and gatherings. *Uomo universale* is to be replaced by a global functionality of a concrete universal.

The pragmatic reality of that replacement is us, you and I, discerning and finding our stumbling way into efficient function in our turn to the idea and the Idea. Our categories are not the remote and magnificent categories of Lonergan but the humble shared pragmatism of trying to divide the work with 8-fold global sensibility, asking ourselves seriously Crowe’s question, “What functional specialty am I in?”, am I going to try to be in, so that my efforts of talking and writing can spin in and on in the gathering of *nomos*?³³ I have personally failed, in 45 years of Lonergan studies, in 35

³⁰*I Corinthians*, 12: 19-20.

³¹I quote from p. 14 of a Lonergan archival file labeled A697. It contains a typescript numbered pp. 8-23. Very plausibly it is a continuation of a sketch of a first chapter of *Method*, the first 9 pages of which are contained in the discovery file already mentioned.

³²*Insight*, 742[764].

³³“A Rolling Stone gathers *Nomos*“ is the title both of chapter five of *Economics for Everyone* and of chapter three of *A Brief History of Tongue*. The minimal categories of the new Pragmatism are

years of functional identification, to cultivate a functional focus. But there are a few years left and it would seem pragmatic to take up the simple, slightly successful, science of physics in its re-interpretative and re-historianic needs.³⁴ Can you spy a corner of the global garden that you might cultivate which would bring forth an axial difference “between high civilization and primitive gardening”?³⁵

The question is intrinsic to the new culture and the new ethic.³⁶ It reaches for the Praxis that belongs to the third stage of meaning not in some general interesting sense but as it is seeded in your reading heart, the seeded presence of “a new type of community ... a community one not only by God’s grace but also by a consequent union of minds and of hearts”³⁷, a community within the new form that is emergent probability’s blossoming of Christian Philosophy in our time.

It is a good form that schemingly grounds “leaps from the product of fractions to

discussed in “Inventing Pragmatics”, chapter 3 of McShane, *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A Fresh Pragmatism*, Axial Press, 2002. Briefly there are only two: (1) “divide up the work functionally”, (2) “Be sensible”, where that misspelling has a meaning acceptable to all shades of searchers after progress.

³⁴The problem involves discovering slowly and empirically the differentiations and categories called forth by functionally- specialized interpretation, history, etc. I hope to do this by focusing on the *Opera Omnia* of Richard Feynman (1918-1988), a central brilliant figure of 20th century physics. The work will span *Cantowers XXVI- XCII*, (May, 2004 - December, 2009). I would hope for collaboration both within the area and in a paralleling of the effort in other zones of inquiry. Such collaboration is greatly helped by the manner in which topic-specializations converge towards a unified dialectic and a common foundations, from which there is a non-symmetrical divergence to the eight specialty and beyond. See also note 7, above.

³⁵B. LONERGAN, *For a New Political Economy*, University of Toronto Press, 2000, 20.

³⁶I discuss this in *Cantower XVIII*, “The Possibility of Cultural Ethics” which is a sublation of, and commentary on, chapter 18 of *Insight*.

³⁷B. LONERGAN, “Theology and Praxis”, *A Third Collection*, edited by F.E.Crowe, Paulist Press, 1984, 197.

a sum of fractions”³⁸ in the production of destiny’s home. “Just as individuals, groups too may be in form or out of form, and it is evident in history that the only groups which have ever done anything are those which have achieved *form*: compact, perfectly organised groups, in which every member knows that the others will not fail him at the crucial point, so that the whole body may move swiftly in any direction without losing its balance or its head.”³⁹

Or the seeds in its individual hearts. Are you interested - in that fresh discerning sense - in that functional heart-beat, new-street of minding? Isn’t it high time that we gave Lonergan’s discovery of an anti-imperial ethics of globalization a tentative vortex whirl?

Epilogue

I have stayed, as I promised at the beginning, with a focused pointing, a focused invitation. I would wish to be availed of in so far as I could give leads to initial steps in any area, in any career. You may be finishing a tired thesis or happily, like me, released into retirement. “There are windows to be opened and fresh air to be let in.”⁴⁰ Fr. Crowe wrote at the end of another work “this book is meant to be a spadeful of earth in the moving of a mountain”⁴¹: I would say the same of my short reflection here. I have commented complementarity on the component he omitted from his present essay. It would be quite another task to comment on his present essay, and it is a task I will undertake.⁴²

³⁸*Insight*, 121[144].

³⁹J. Ortega y Gasset, *Mission of the University*, Princeton University Press, 1944, 43.

⁴⁰B. LONERGAN, “Christology Today”, *A Third Collection*, 89.

⁴¹F.E.Crowe, *Theology of the Christian Word. A Study in History*, Paulist Press, New York, 1978, 149.

⁴²It will constitute a large part of *Cantower XXII* (January 1st, 2004), “Lonergan and the Ministry of Mayhem”.

Fr. Crowe and I have disagreed fundamentally over the past forty years, in various degrees of amiability, on foundational issues, and the suggestions he makes in his essay on “Lonergan at the Edges of Understanding” are suggestions that I find deeply unacceptable: but, even when I follow up with critical reflections, they will be beside the point. The real point is the possibility and probabilities of a functional collaboration that will recycle, and so spin on or off, my views and his and yours.

22.3.2 Minding Feelings

This second part of my reflections on Fr. Crowe’s article will necessarily be brief and focused. As I noted in the conclusion of the first part, such foundational issues are to be settled by the hodic vortex. I limit my comments, then, to two paragraphs of the essay. My reflections should serve to stimulate you to a detailed dialectic and foundational reading of these paragraphs. It seems best to quote the paragraphs here:

“I suggest, then, that we abandon altogether the effort to make feelings a subdivision of knowledge and take another approach: namely, to regard feelings as a distinctly different area, isomorphic indeed with the cognitional the way the ontological is (and, as we shall suggest, the voluntary also is) but independent and self-governing. The ontological has its own independent realm of potency, form and act, isomorphic with experience, understanding, and judgment; it is known to us and so is included in the sweep of the cognitional; but it retains its independence: potency, form and act are not cognitional activities. I suggest that we regard feelings as another such realm, parallel to the cognitional, known like the ontological through experience, understanding, and judgment, and thus also included in the wide sweep of the cognitional, but like the ontological an equal partner in the human enterprise, having its full autonomy. Like the ontological elements, feelings are not cognitional activities.

This may be related to meaning. We are apt to think of meaning as correlative

with knowledge, but that view can be challenged. The realm of meaning is not reducible to the cognitional. Then, an immediate question is to find terms proper to the structural elements in the domain of feelings: proper, that is, not cognitional, not transferred from the cognitional, but its own. Above I used ‘satisfaction’ for the positive side on the first level, ‘thrill’ for the second, ‘security’ for the third, and ‘peace’ for the fourth, but they are meant only to illustrate the variety of feelings on the different levels; no doubt better terms can be found”.⁴³

Before I comment I would I would emphasize that the comments are sketchy, random: very distant from interpretation/dialectic as it is to emerge, even quite shabby when put in the context of the pre-hodic canon of successive approximations.⁴⁴ I will be content if I lead you to suspect that there is another view of all this.

First of all, feelings are not (for Lonergan, for me ... for you?) a subdivision of knowledge: so it is not a view that I need to abandon. Feelings are a distinct zone of being, indeed with an evident zoological autonomy, but an autonomy that is not one of independence and self-government: that belongs uniquely to the divinity. Cows are governed by grass; feeling hungry is correlative to that governance.⁴⁵

Attention is now switched, for paralleling, to the ontological and the voluntary. Of course, “potency, form and act are not cognitional activities” : Lonergan is brilliantly precise on just what is to be meant by these words and the corresponding affirmations.⁴⁶ Is Fr. Crowe dealing here with the suspicion that ‘knowing is being’?

Knowing is a way of being, and so is willing and eating grass. Knowing is not

⁴³The two paragraphs from the article are on pp. 185-6, *Method* 20(2002).

⁴⁴*Insight*, 588[611]. Just think in terms of the paragraph on the first principle of criticism.

⁴⁵We slip here over the tricky realm of *potentia activa*, and its relation to the full metaphysics of capacity-for-performance(*Insight*, 464[489]). See , *Verbum*, 1997, 121-8.

⁴⁶*Insight*, 497-509[521-533].

being ontologically except in the case of the divinity. But the knowing process, in its puny human empirical residence, does 'become being' in that strange way that Thomas would call *intentionaliter*.⁴⁷ So it thus can 'become feeling' by a massive effort of human inquiry, scarcely begun in the last century.⁴⁸ The effort is massively disoriented by a spectrum of philosophies ranging from radical reductionism to an almost Platonic vitalism.

So, the global effort proceeds with correctable results. New terms regularly emerge, but I do not think that Fr. Crowe's suggested terms of the next paragraph would vibrate with present searchings. Besides, I suspect that he is not thinking of these searchings, but of his own re-structuring. Certainly there are four - or five - groupings of biochemical and neurodynamic conjugational realities corresponding to the usual levels of consciousness. There is a physics of satisfaction and a chemistry of anxiety⁴⁹ and a neurology of security etc, and naming is a beginning, a descriptive recognition of the start that Lonergan writes about: "Study of the organism begins..."⁵⁰

Perhaps I have written enough to indicate the directions both of my

⁴⁷Clearer, perhaps, from Thomas' discussion of angels knowing each other: Ia, q.56, a.2, ad 3m. We are touching here on the incompleteness of the elementary presentation in *Insight* of 'The position'. A full axiomatics would include both an axiom of divine identity and an axiom of intentionality. Such an axiomatics, of course, would have an open heuristic invariance: on axiomatics and Scholasticism, see *Phenomenology and Logic*, 121-33. I raised the question of the incompleteness of *Insight*'s statement of "The Position" in *Cantower IX*, section 6. Further problems were raised in *Cantower XX*, around pp. 5-6.

⁴⁸Recall e.g. Candace Pert, *Molecules of Emotion. The Science behind Mind-Body Medicine*, Touchstone, New York, 1999. Pert's work was discussed in *Cantower IV*. Relevant here also are the various problems raised in *Cantowers VII-IX*, centering on the lifting of discussion of the *vis cogitativa* into a contemporary context.

⁴⁹"Anxiety" illustrates well the beginning and the road taken, for instance in the work of H.S.Sullivan. See also *Phenomenology and Logic*, the index under *Anxiety*.

⁵⁰*Insight*, 464[489], a key page in this entire issue.

disagreement with Fr. Crowe, and of the ways forward. The broad way forward, of course, is the hodic way dealt with in Part One. But there is the way that was and remained Lonergan's central concern all his life: a stand against scholastic nominalism with its myths and lazy procrastinating imperialism,⁵¹ a hope that, with humble hard-won categories regarding molecules and minding in the new millennium, there can be a life-saving forward global movement of many - not just one: "From such a broadened basis one can go forward to a developed account of the human good, values, beliefs ... to the question of God, of religious experience, its expression, its dialectic development".⁵²

22.4 A Rhumb with a Few

Of course, what matters to me is a few who pick up madly on my *Dark Tower* challenge, issued in particular, in ***Cantower IV***, to the ladies. The desire is simply a transposition of Lonergan's pre-specialist appeal into the new context. As familiar as it probably is, it is worth quoting now. "There is bound to be formed a scattered left, captivated by now this, now that new development, exploring now this and now that new possibility. But what will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait".⁵³

Here I risk or rather cherish the possibility of annoyance by identifying much of present Lonerganism with the scattered interests of a left. My suggestions about what Lonergan points to have been politely - or politically - ignored for over thirty years. For instance, could some of the scattered please come out in the open and tell me, us, that I

⁵¹"Merely a constitutional monarch"(*Phenomenology and Logic*, 126) "pseudo-metaphysical myth-making"(*Insight*, 505[528]) "arriving on the scene ... a little late"(*Insight*, 733[755]).

⁵²*Method in Theology*, 287.

⁵³The conclusion of *Collection*, in the essay "Dimensions of Meaning".

am quite wrong in my interpretation of the middle of page 287 of *Method* - and tell us Why?

And is functional specialization, the crown of Lonergan's efforts really the puny little neglectable thing that it has become in the past thirty years? I wrote quite coherently, for the Florida Conference of 1970, of the desperate need for it in musicology. I was writing in foolish optimism for my Lonergan colleagues, not for the field of musicology. To me, these decades later, it is most evidently one of the two great achievements of Lonergan, globally-relevant: the other globally-relevant achievement is his establishment of a pragmatics of economics. Yet his disciples seem quite content to fart around with a trimmed-down postmodernized version of his re-discovery of Aristotle. Perhaps now I can expect articles in the *Method* Journal refuting my views, justifying the flatulence?

But I should attempt light on my section title. A decent dictionary can tell you that a *rhumb* is any of the thirty two points of a mariner's compass. My twisted - but cute, eh?! - reference is to the matrix of specialized collaboration, C_{ij} , (i, j running from 1 to 8): for instance, $i = 5$ and $j = 1$, points to the address of a foundational person to a research person; $i = 1$ and $j = 5$ points to the address of a research person to a foundational person.⁵⁴ If you think, less generally, of conversation rather than address, than the matrix becomes symmetrical, $C_{ij} = C_{ji}$. Then 32 is close enough to the number of independent elements.⁵⁵ The main point is that, in the new ethics of culture, you ought to know your rhumb or direction or function. Nineteenth century Anglicans talked of the beauty of holiness: to this norm must be added in the 21st century, serious

⁵⁴The Matrix is fully presented in *A Brief History of Tongue*, p.108 and in *Process: Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minders*, p.110.

⁵⁵The number of independent elements, or conversations, is in fact, 36: not too hard to work out. Perhaps you might try working out the number of "conversations of three"?!

talk of the beauty of efficient metaphysics.⁵⁶ But we have been round this topic sufficiently in the past few years.

I introduced this matrix of collaboration as a topic in a Boston Conference paper of the early 1970s.⁵⁷ To me it was a quite plausible, indeed essential,⁵⁸ symbolization of a future pattern of global collaboration. Neither the idea nor the symbolization caught on: perhaps my **Cantower** effort, or this particularly offensive **Cantower**, will cause some stir? While I have mentioned “the few” there is the reach towards the many - including myself as finally trying specialization! Is it not possible for you and me to try a turn into a specialized effort? If you are trying to do a thesis or get a job, forget it for the present - or at least keep your conversion to functional specialization a secret. And if you contact me in this regard, I promise to keep it a secret at least till you have found your niche, even your tenure!

And it seems best for me now to cut these reflections short, simply recalling that the this and the previous **Cantower** mesh strangely. You are being invited to seek a room with a view through a new contemplative stance: perhaps a Proustian room of

⁵⁶I have been enlarging for some years now the meaning of the claim, in *Topics in Education*, p. 160, that efficiency is part of the unity of a science. It is a key feature of Lonergan’s solution to Plato’s problem of implementation, giving unity finally to metaphysics or methodology. The massive shift in cultural orientation deserves a new name. **Cantower XXIV** is titled “Introducing Hodology”. In the new culture of the second time of the temporal subject the “meta” becomes superfluous.

⁵⁷The conference, as far as I remember, was on “Instrumental Acts of Meaning” The paper was titled “Instrumental Acts of Meaning and Fourth-level Specialization”. I do not think it appeared in a Workshop Volume, but it is chapter 4 of *The Shaping of the Foundations*. It was also the paper in which I first introduced reflections on Proust.

⁵⁸Recall the reference to *De Constitutione Christ*, p. 80 in W3. A piece of it is worth repeating here in the new translation, especially for those who just don’t like the complexity of symbolization. “Formal comprehension, however, cannot take place without a construct of some sort. In this life we are able to understand something only by turning towards phantasm; but in larger and more complex questions it is impossible to have a suitable phantasm unless the imagination is aided by some sort of diagram” (*The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, 151)

private sanity.

The next **Cantower** plunges you into the difficult problems and the dangers of the 'descriptive bent', but this is followed by gentler reflections, in **Cantowers XXIV**, **XXV** and **XXVI**, that should help in finding your room, you rhumb. However, I would note that I have already treated of strategies of such finding.⁵⁹ It would be nice, in this centennial year of the birth of that strange genius, if we could each find our humble way towards (1) being sensible, about (2) finding a function in the hodic vortex.

Since this **Cantower** is being posted a year ahead of its due date - to facilitate the taking of stands in the centennial year of Lonergan's birth - and the three gentle **Cantowers** are thus a year away, it seems as well to make the key point of that gentleness here.

It is a matter of inviting a personal and elementary version of the suggestions of page 250 of *Method in Theology*. The invitation, then, is to figure out as best you can where you stand, what your basic categories are. It could require an honest and humorous admission into luminous consciousness that the categories Lonergan lists as his, on pages 286-7 of *Method*, are way beyond you. So, what DO you stand for, existentially? And you may be helped here by doing an elementary version of the end of that page 250: find a trusty friend with whom to compare notes and votes.

⁵⁹The main source I would recommend is chapter 3 of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A Fresh Pragmatism*, where I articulate and contextualize the two elementary categorial commitments with which the last sentence here concludes. Chapters 5 and 6 there give further homely clues.