

Cantower XVII**Hodics as Science I****September 1st 2003**

I have already written of the manner of arriving at the peculiar titles of this and the previous **Cantower**. The titles, indeed, are not that peculiar but perhaps, in hindsight, quite expected. The science of metaphysics in its genesis and formulation becomes the *per se* task of the two specialties dialectic and foundations. There is a rough correspondence between the drive for precision of chapter 16 of *Insight* and the categorial determinations that belong in foundations; there is a similar correspondence between chapter 17 and the retrievals involved in dialectic. In the new context, there is an apparent reversal of roles in that dialectic gives rise to foundations. But one must always bear in mind the cyclic dynamics of the hodic process: foundations gives rise, a rise, to dialectic. At all events, the title above becomes plausible.

Moreover the title number, "I" has here an added significance, rather like a course title, "Philosophy I", or a beginning course, "Chemistry I", "French I", and I would have you take this as a dominant significance in my effort here. This significance is worth rambling round for a bit: certainly I rambled round quite a bit before taking the present approach to this **Cantower** as paralleling the same numbered chapter in *Insight*. My solution to the cluster of problems that I saw as involved is very much a Damon Runyon solution, "doing what I can". But it would be an advantage to you to have my solution - a quite neat one, I would claim! - briefly laid out before rambling through the clusters of concerns.

The solution, as you will note when you get there, comes from the manner in which the three sections of chapter 18 fitted amazingly with the three problems I wished to deal with in **Cantower XVIII**. I had not yet tackled the present essay, but in the present case my challenge was, not fitting the problems I saw with this chapter into

the chapter headings but closing in on the manner in which the our **Cantower** effort could help with the problems that Lonergan focused on in his chapter 17. There are three sections dealing in some way with three core problems: mystery, truth, interpretation. These three problems had best be envisaged personally: the problem of being personally adequate to meet the unfamiliar, to meet truth, to meet life past and present. If you think of them in this way you may come to agree that the problem is one of somehow being formed and informed in openness. Wide-eyed innocent openness is not enough: but what is it to be **in good form** to meet the strange, a foreign person, an unpleasant fact, a weird situation?¹

The question, of course, is the question of cosmopolis, but all I can do in this short essay is give some pointers regarding educational helps towards that **good form**. So I come to the structure of the present complement to chapter 17 of *Insight*. Out of our **Cantower** twistings there have emerged three linked symbolizations: there is the first word of metaphysics that identifies heuristically the structure of any and all material reality; there is the second word of metaphysics that pivots on a correspondence between words and reality; there is the central diagram of the entire enterprise taken from chapter four of *A Brief History of Tongue* that has been reproduce at various stages here, that when properly 'cut out' represents three-dimensionally the hodic **Cantower** project with a tower and planes of meaning under an infinite height of meaning. I will reproduce these three symbolic structures in the related sections, but have you perhaps already anticipated the relations?

Let us name the three symbolic structures W1, W2, W3. Then what I wish to suggest is that, educationally, W1 can mediate a sense of the unknown, the unfamiliar, cultivating slowly a shift in the statistics of occurrence of the problems associated with

¹I cannot resist recalling one of those passages marked by Lonergan in *Lonergan's Challenge to the University and the Economy* when he read it in the early 1980s. It is a quotation from Paul de Man (*Blindness and Insight*, Oxford University Press, 1971, 88), about "the deceptive stability of everyday consciousness which, in reality, is only a kind of stupor".

section 1 of chapter 17; the problem of the second section, truth and its expression, is very evidently connected with the problem of human language; the problem of interpretation of the third section is the problem that led to the central idea imaged in W3.

Have you, at least vaguely, glimpsed the connections between the Ws and the three sections of chapter 17 of *Insight*?² Then let us ramble for a bit. You may wish, of course, to leap past this ramble to the first section: well and good, but do come back at some stage to browse on this stock-taking of our **Cantower** effort.

My quest, then, remains the quest for some few evolutionary sports, and each **Cantower** complexifies my invitation. “Evolutionary sport” is to be understood, in your own elderhood perhaps decades hence, in the rich context pointed to in the conclusions of the previous two **Cantowers**. My monthly climbing obviously differs from yours, if you are even a decade younger. I am speaking of norms: there may well be a new Aquinas out there, startling in her vision 45-year old vision. Then she - or you - will remember the Proustian climb through arts and sciences and suffering soaked into one’s straining molecules. You will have shared my luck, perhaps, that I have previously recalled: of growing into a familiar unfamiliarity with music, especially through a struggle with playing Chopin.

I am recalling now - and it is centrally relevant to the first section - an autumn country walk in the late 1950s, after finishing a master’s degree in mathematical physics, when I sighted that there was nothing of my surroundings that I could speak of comprehendingly. My quest now is more precise and more hopeful: how is this sensibility to be acculturated against the current mythologies? You may have had equivalent sightings. I think of Marcel and Hopkins. I think of Merce Cunningham

²I add a final short section 17.3.9 corresponding to section 17.3.9 of *Insight*, Lonergan’s single paragraph, “Conclusion”.

speaking of dance: “each day it remains just as unknown as when I started”.³ Anthony Burgess writes of music: “we do not know what it is, except a great and sustained mystery”.⁴ And there is Samuel Beckett’s conviction: “I think anyone nowadays who pays the slightest attention to his own experience finds it the experience of a non-knower”.⁵ Perhaps one of these arts sustains your darkness? Or you may be fortunate to find a religio-theological lift towards “luminous darkness”.⁶ So, P.J.Rosato writes on “The Influence of Karl Barth on Catholic Theology”:

“Viewed as a system, the full intellectual significance of Christianity is simply unknown. Both Newman and Barth, though for different reasons, simply assume a backcloth of massive human ignorance. The function of this backcloth is, however, identical in both theologians, in that it the more brightly illuminates the spot where the light shines”.⁷

But my question is about the shift from “viewed as a system” to a systematic viewing, a constitutive viewing that lifts one’s molecular walk. You might think of it as picking up and going forward from section 16.3, an intussusception of Burgess and Beckett and Cunningham into our daylight dance and our night music, an intussusception identified as a metaview that is not abstract but the concrete reality of

³A remark made in an interview on the BBC in the spring of 1989. I was in Oxford at the time, struggling with the book *Process: Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minders*. This and the next two quotations are there on p. 126. The quotation about Barth and Newman is there on p. 127. Obviously, the book is relevant in the present context.

⁴Anthony Burgess, *This Man and Music*, conclusion.

⁵Quoted in the Introduction to Beckett in *Masters of Modern Drama* edited by H.M.Block and R.G.Shedd, Random House, N.Y., 1973.

⁶The Website archives contains the relevant article, “Towards a Luminous Darkness of Circumstances. *Insight* after 40 Years”.

⁷*Gregorianum* (67) 1986, 687.

our character.⁸ But I would have you think of it here as an elementary project, a beginning, a classroom project even in the years before highschool. Has W1 a place in that project? You may well be tuned to mystery, like Marcel, but is that tune a meta-tune yet? Even if not there is the possibility - and I would like to think, growing probability - that thinking and teaching would lift it into your systematic bones, making you a generalized empirical reality, working and breathing in luminous darkness.

Recall, then, our friends the sunflowers of ***Cantower II***: the question there was within an intellectual pattern of loving: “how do you work?”. The question turned towards our ignorance of their sun-soaking lives: p_i, c_j, b_k in a wondrous collaborative climb to the swaying smile of the flowers. The issue now is the word *begins* in my regularly quoted page, “study of the organism begins....”,⁹ and in my regular twisting of that phrase to “self-study of the organism begins....” The issue is “the genesis of adequate self-knowledge”¹⁰ where that knowledge is anticipated as twining round our veins and nerves so that humanity Tower-lifts its molecules, in the third stage of meaning, to become “molecules of description and explanation”.¹¹

I look back over previous efforts in order to look forward. I like to think of these present ***Cantowers*** as yet another beginning. I wish to move now into a certain simplicity of what I would designate as foundational pedagogy. Some of my efforts will be closer to foundational doctrine: summarily indicating patterns and structures of climbing. There is a way in which you might consider that I am moving backwards,

⁸The context is the meaning of *character* in the first section of chapter 14 of *Method in Theology*, or if you like the first paragraph of Aristotle’s *Magna Moralia*.

⁹*Insight*, 464[489].

¹⁰The title of section 1.2 of *Insight* chapter 17.

¹¹I am recalling the title and the content of ***Cantower IV***. In ***Cantower XXIV*** we will dig deeper into the problem of the betrayal that describing can be.

from a style of writing that involves reference, as in *Method in Theology*, to a style of direct un-referenced address, as in *Insight*. And this is true: but it ties in with a major decision about the direction of ***Cantowers XXXIV to XCIII***. Earlier I wrote of these as pivoting on the question of interpretation, the question then of this chapter of *Insight* and its sublation not just by chapter 7 of *Method in Theology* but by the entire hodic enterprise. This remains true. But what I originally had in mind was an interpreting of Lonergan's work that would include an amount of dialogue - or, more realistically, critical reflection, since not too many of established Lonergan scholars wish to dialogue with me. I have been an outsider from the beginning, although I didn't notice it in those early years.

I have recalled previously a moment of disappointment in the mid-sixties when I enthusiastically posed to an respected expert my difficulty of understanding what Lonergan meant by "flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence".¹² I recall now, from that same period, a moment of disappointment in discussing human meaning with Fr. Fred Crowe: as I recollect it, he considered that we had a richer grasp of human meaning than of lower realities because of our human living together. My view was that we had less of a glimpse of the human meaning than we had of the electron. The difference of opinion remained: in the mid-1990s at a seminary we clashed on the meaning of *attention*: if you want to know the meaning of *attention* then you have to get down to some biophysics, biochemistry, neurology, etc.¹³

This is a discomforting view of Lonergan's transcendental precepts, to which we must return in the second section of ***Cantower XVIII***, and because a root problem is involved its absence breeds a familiar type of Lonergan talk which implicitly rejects the

¹²I was struggling at the time with Lonergan's relation to Darwin and company.

¹³I will have occasion to deal in more detail with Fr.Crowe's perspective in ***Cantower XXIV***, where I invite you to face the solidly-established myth that subtle and rich description somehow reach the essence of affairs. Fr.Crowe corresponded with me on this topic in the early 1970s: see *Lack in the Beingstalk* pp. 45-6, 62.

need for serious understanding. Most Lonergan articles in journals are eminently readable. Should they be? Is this the new theology that Lonergan sweated for? Certainly, it is deeply removed from the project I have been trying to envisage. And since I am on a roll, I might as well add to my unpopularity, especially since my comments give a very direct background to my decision to concentrate on foundational pedagogy.

Within the past week I have reading two articles in *Theological Studies* on Lonergan, articles titled “Lonergan and the re-structuring of X”.¹⁴ They both suggest the use of functional specialization. They remind me of a standard joke in Ireland about the two old ladies coming home from a sermon on sex. “A grand man, that” “”Indeed, a lovely priest” “Yes, and I wish to God I knew as little about sex as he does”.

There is a problem here that I wish to tackle more fully in 2004. ***Cantower XXII*** has the curious title “Redoubt Lonergan: the Ministry of Mayhem”. But here, briefly, let us think analogically, “bolder spirits, selecting the conspicuously successful science of their time”.¹⁵ What happens to Lonergan in the present tradition would be quite unacceptable in physics. Certainly there is an initial phase of resistance and incomprehension. But, one does not find, thirty years after a creative effort of Einstein, writings - whether creative or critical - which show that the original work was actually not read with any seriousness. I already commented on this sort of thing in ***Cantower IX***, where I drew attention to the volume that emerged from a conference on

¹⁴A word to the curious here, relevant also in a larger context of determining e.g. the sequence of the *Cantowers* and their advance towards the goal of an eschatology. Their dates of composition do not correspond to the dates at the top of each. So, for example, ***Cantower XIV***, dated May 1st 2003, which deals with New York, emerged during the month of July 2002, upon my return from a visit there. The present ***Cantower***, dated August 1st 2003, was written well before the appearance of the current *Theological Studies*. Still, who needs? There may well be an article in *Theological Studies* of June 2003 which fits the bill!

¹⁵*Method in Theology*, 3.

Lonergan's Hermeneutics. Scientifically, it was a disgrace. How to handle the problem, as I said, is a later question, too difficult to discuss in the present essay.

The point is that I see no value in building into this ongoing **Cantower** effort criticisms of such work. So, foundational address is in order. In the language of masonry or war, **redoubts** are added to **Cantowers**. My dictionary gives under *redoubt*, "a breastwork outside or within a fortification", or even "a fortification". But it has other echos, overtones: Reedout, Readout, Re doubt, etc. My primary meaning is to "read out Lonergan" in the sense of "voice forward", the *praxis* bent to Aquinas' "*respondeo*" of his *Summae*, the implementational aspect of categories. The meaning of fortification is present. So, hodic method is to be fortified, for example, by pushing for precision on dialectic method, genetic method, the fundamental meaning of energy: these three pushes claim the attention, respectively, of three **Cantowers**: **Cantower XXV**, "Redoubt *Method* 250"; **Cantower LXIX**, "Redoubt Development"; **Cantower XXVII**, "Redoubt *Insight* 443[468]".

What of the criticism of what I would consider ongoing inadequacy? There is, first, the hope that such inadequacy would include self-criticism. Secondly, the hodic cycle moves slowly to gather no moss, *nomos*. Thirdly, a more accurate account of strategy should emerge from the considerations of the **Cantowers** of 2004 and later, where problems of such major paradigm shifts will be tackled. There, foundational speech will reach for precisions in canons of criticism and strategies of normal performance that seek to lay the axe to the root instead of burying the hatchet in some unfortunate attempt to interpret Lonergan.

What I mean by *unfortunate* harks back to our reflections of the two previous **Cantowers**. What can the unfortunates of a period do when some genius shifts the entire front of human thinking? There was the cry of despair of Schubert in the face of the achievement of Beethoven. Or, if you prefer, *Who* comes after Elvis? The response is to be a larger learning that trusts history and the hodic way. "A classic is a writing

that is never fully understood. But those that are educated and educate themselves must always want to learn more from it”.¹⁶

Meantime, the task is for us all to muddle along, twisting around the dynamic of major and minor authenticities, with as much growing luminosity and honesty as possible. “There is the minor authenticity or unauthenticity of the subject with respect to the tradition that nourishes him. There is the major authenticity that justifies or condemns the tradition itself. In the first case there is passed a human judgment on subjects. In the second case, history and, ultimately, divine providence pass judgment on traditions”.¹⁷

In this regard I would make two further points, both of which require much lengthier consideration. First, there is the question of teaching authentically in the situation described. This is best done by becoming a learner and a class leader: indeed, this is the general strategy in dealing with classics. I recall Leo Strauss’ view of lion-tamers in the classroom¹⁸ exemplified by the music professor slicing up with chalk as weapon the first 20 bars of Beethoven’s first symphony and remarking “this is really all that Beethoven was doing here”. Secondly, there is the problem of popularization, which is not the present topic but demands complex and precise discussion.¹⁹ There is nothing wrong with abandoning Lonergan’s work when one has sufficient to operate on a level that works, for example, with a highschool chemistry class. The question of sufficiency, of courses, still remains: but here the Damon Runyon principle operations, “we do what we can”. In section 18.2 I will touch on a particular disorientation of

¹⁶Friedrich Schlegel, quoted in a relevant context, *Method in Theology*, 161.

¹⁷*Method in Theology*, 80. See also the index entries under *Schools in Phenomenology and Logic*.

¹⁸I quote Strauss in a relevant context: the final page of *Lonergan’s Challenge to the University and the Economy*.

¹⁹Chapter 3 of *Lack in the Beingstalk* makes a beginning on this.

Lonergan scholarship that has a massive detrimental effect on popularization, not to speak of the effect on the conception, affirmation and implementation of the forward specialties: but we will get to that.

Indeed, I had better halt here and get into the three promised sections. I am, of course, a learner, a sixth rate pianist introducing Chopin. My selective direct speech will, I hope, encourage others to take a like risk in teaching and writing from their own luminously inadequate stance. It seems fitting to recall Lonergan's modest conclusion to his chapter on "Interpretation" in *Method in Theology*. You might replace the word "exegete" in the quotation by "teacher" or just "searcher". I have been searching in "transcendental method coupled with a few books" for 45 years, still reaching up out of my present inadequacy.

"Is this a possible project? Might I suggest that the section on stages of meaning in Chapter Three offers a beginning?²⁰ If transcendental method coupled with a few books by Cassirer and Snell could make this beginning, why might not transcendental method coupled with the at once extensive and precise knowledge of many exegetes in many fields not yield far more? The benefits would be enormous; not only would the achievements of exegetes be better known and appreciated but also theology as a whole would be rid of the occult entities generated by an inadequate methodical type of investigation and thought."²¹

17.1 Metaphysics, Mystery and Myth

My interest here is in us pondering over the single contribution to culture that the new symbolic version of "the Great Chain of Being", represented by W1, might be.

²⁰I think that the modification of that analysis of stages in terms of an axiality that lifts it into a perspective on the two times of temporal subjectivity is of central psychic importance for hope and optimism regarding the distant goal.

²¹*Method in Theology*, 173.

I mean *culture* in the very broadest sense, indeed I might say that I mean culture in its broadest sensibility. I am thus reaching forward optimistically here in a way that should put you in mind of the central drive of foundations: foundational fantasy. Culture in general means a degree of reflectiveness. “Man can pause and with a smile or a forced grin ask what the drama, what he himself is all about”.²² What I look towards is the genesis of a culture that would intussuscept the orientation of W1 in such a fashion that the next global generation would grow up with the mood of unfamiliarity that it invites. I do not wish to digress here, but it would be an added richness of perspective, continuous with the corresponding section in *Insight*, to attend to the manner in which compact consciousness was and is advantaged in the mood in question. This adds an axial perspective to our struggle. At any rate, I am looking to, taking a forward position on, a coloring of spontaneity that would mesh with the estimative sense.²³

We should recall W1, since reading it and of it in previous ***Cantowers*** cannot be expected, in the present ethos of reading, to have lifted you to the psychic presence that I “have in mind”. I have been struggling with this problem since I first came across the symbolic work of Woodger in biology in the mid-1960s, and later in those sixties I had a first shot at subscripts and superscripts of meaning when I was working on zoology.²⁴ W1 eventually emerged, about 1970, and is a piece of the Epilogue, “Being and

²²*Insight*, 236[261].

²³I introduced reflection on the estimative sense, the *vis cogitativa*, in ***Cantower VIII*** (I was considering the work of Julien Peghaire, “A Forgotten Sense; The Cogitate, according to St. Thomas Aquinas”, *The Modern Schoolman* 20(1943), 1233-40, 211-29) and again in ***Cantower IX***, where I pointed to the possibility of sublating Peghaire’s work.

²⁴See footnote 42 (p. 167) of “Zoology and the Future of Philosophy”, *The Shaping of the Foundations*, published in 1976, but mostly written much earlier (available on the Website). The notation suggested there is much more complex than the present effort.

Loneliness” of *Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations. Self-Axis of the Great Ascent*.²⁵

I print these titles in full here deliberately, because they are relevant to our struggle in the present ethos of mythologies of the obvious. The full issue is the issue of a self-axis which is also a metaxis, sublating Voegelin’s reflections in a view of an inner wealth that would merge a horizontal and vertical metaxy into constitutive meaning. But that full issue is beyond our present short introductory reflection.

First, I repeat W1: **H S f (p_i ;c_j ;b_k ;z_l ;u_m ;q_n).**

Yes, you remember meeting it before. Can you imagine - a reflective question and achievement, not just an imagining - becoming used to this symbolization? Suppose it were part of the cultural air, altogether more familiar in high school that the symbol for water, H₂O? Its familiar function would be as a door to the unfamiliar.

But there must be a beginning to that functioning: so, how might it function in you, for you? You see now why I speak of an introductory reflection? In the next **Cantower** this twist will be raised to a question of cultural ethics, and it will be related to what you might call a popular version of the “scientific moment” that I introduce in **Cantower IX**. Perhaps you are at present quite opposed to such symbolization? Have you had a shot at appropriating that opposition, of making that opposition positionally clear? This is trickier than it might appear. Think of the tasks sketched on page 250 of *Method in Theology*. The opposition may be grounded, deeply psychically grounded, in an educational disorientation: one unpleasant incompetent teacher put you off symbols for life!

But I suspect that, if you pause over the matter, you will admit that symbols, symbolic diagraming and mappings, are part of your modern life. In a later quotation, that connects to W3, I draw attention to this general phenomenon of cultural complexification: musical scores are perhaps the most obvious examples, but there are the complexities of choreography or architecture, and most immediate are the

²⁵See p. 106 there.

complexities of scenes: if I lift my eyes from typing I view two such scenes, seems: Renoir's *Moulin de la Galette*, of 1876 and from almost 300 years earlier, Pieter Brueghel's *Wedding Dance* of 1607. The words that I introduce here may grow to have the same vibrancy of meaning, distance, invitation: relations to us - recall our struggle with relations in section 3 of ***Cantower XVI*** - of cosmic yearnings.

I do not wish to make this section overly long. I do wish you to pause over the **notion, an notion that is you, an ocean of complexity**, to pause even now, eyes off the page.²⁶ The question haunts²⁷ this entire ***Cantower***: but then it haunted my entire enterprise from the first, haunted me from my teen years with the complexity of Chopin's scores, the complexity of diagrams of Descartes and Pascal²⁸, each an inviting complexity that caught my breath, my breadth.

17.2 The Notion of Truth

There is a sense in which this new section cannot be a fresh beginning: to read it adequately requires that the first word of the title catches our breadth, our breath. But

²⁶I am recalling here Bachelard's view, that one only begins to read when one's eyes are off the page. (See his *The Poetics of Space*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1970; 14, 21, 39, 47, 83). I am drawing your attention to what I might call the anastomatic word of this ***Cantower***, 'notion'. The equivalent word for the previous *Cantower* might be taken to be 'tree'. And I would consider W3 to be the equivalent for the aspirations of global culture. In "The Field, Foreign yet Friendly", section 3.5 of chapter 3 (a relevant context here) of *Lack in the Beingstalk*, to two issues that blocked people at the Florida Conference of 1970. One issue was the meaning of myth. On my view now the dominant present myth is the myth of the obvious, the serial killer of fascination.

²⁷I am thinking here of a sublation of Marx's spectral presence or Derrida's hauntology. See pp. 97 and 113 of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A Fresh Pragmatism*. The problem is the problem hinted, haunted, at in the previous section: a permanent cultural presence of luminous darkness 'readout' Redoubt of print: one aspect of the linguistic feedback of note 34 p. 88 of *Method in Theology*.

²⁸I cannot resist mentioning Pascal 'hexagon' theorem and its complex imaging, produced at the age of 16 (in a six-page *Essai sur les Coniques*), "the three points of intersection of the opposite sides of a hexagon inscribed in a conic section lie on a straight line".

we will return to that first word, *the*, in 17.3. Paradoxically, the reading must be fresh, with whatever freshness of mystery one has been lifted to by brooding over, in and under the previous section. I invite you to begin, then, with the second word, *notion*, read with the help of what for me is one of the great paragraphs of Western literature. The fictional character, Emma Bovary (but is she fictional?: recall Flaubert's remark, "La Bovary, c'est moi") is seated at table with her husband Charles.

"But it was above all at mealtime that she could bear it no longer, in that little room on the ground floor, with the smoking stove, and the creaking door, the oozing walls, the damp floor-tile; all the bitterness of life seemed to be served to her on her plate, and, with the steam from the boiled beef, there rose from the depths of her soul other exhalations as it were of disgust. Charles was a slow-eater; she would nibble on a few hazel-nuts or else, leaning on her elbow, would amuse herself making marks on the oilcloth with the point of her table-knife."²⁹ Much later in the book she can rise to another truth and express it to Charles, "you are a good man", but here her notion rises to the truth of "her dreams dropping in the mud".

You recognize, perhaps resonantly, the complex reaching of truth? The reach is Emma, a molecular notion, bones and breasts of loneliness. The recognition is possible only because of your own molecules and bones and breasts and heart tingling with some like sense and sensibility. What does the word *notion* mean for you, to you, in you? It could well be or become an anastomatic word, like the word *tree* in the previous *Cantower*, or the word *sea* in the conclusion of chapter two of *Lack in the Beingstalk*. Only

²⁹ I recall here my previous complex discussion of Flaubert in *Loneragan's Challenge to the University and the Economy*, ranging through chapter 4, "Modernity and the Transformation of Criticism" where references to the text and to the commentators are available. I would note especially the peculiar imaging of objectivity through the use of the Mobius strip, countering the inside-outside imaging that is native to us.

once have I used the word *notion* in a title, “The Notion of Survival,”³⁰ and in our class use of the little text we would pause over the title - my class got used to this crazy reading style - self-reading the title, self as notion, as an ocean, a more or less hidden yearning: so that eventually they could come to read the final sentence of the chapter with a deeper pause. Perhaps it is no harm to quote the entire final paragraph now, that we might read it together, for me still a fresh invitation to self-taste after thirty years.

“And now I hope that I have succeeded in indicating just how definitely we are at a beginning and only at a beginning. The possibility of intentional existence - Aquinas’s *potens omnia fieri* - is the subject’s possibility to be focal-fashion all that she or he is not. Not to some way attend to that possibility is opting for what Heidegger calls a forgetfulness of being. To attend seriously to that realm, that notion of survival which is you at core and you in kilos, is to open yourself to a new vision of the globe with its natural rhythms overlaced and orbited by man-made assets. A final paragraph in an introductory book is no place to treat of the contrast between *ens extensum* and *intentio entis*.³¹ Popularly put, you are larger than the Red Square, taller than Manhattan, deeper than galactic space. Not to contemplate that aspirative universe within is much more than a sorry personal loss”.³²

So, the book ends, but moves into the Epilogue with title “Being and Loneliness”: the same title as “notion of survival” in another guise, where the first

³⁰The title of chapter 10 of *Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations: Self-Axis of the Great Ascent*.

³¹Extended being and the notion of being. Prime matter and prime mind are both possibilities of multi being: but what radically different possibilities, what radically different evaluations of Gross National Product they ground!

³²*Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations. Self-Axis of the Great Ascent*, 95-6. The book is on the Website.

word, W1, was introduced.³³ And now we edge towards the second word, W2, the word about truth and expression. Perhaps it is as well to lay it before you, tumble it into your phantasm.

$$\mathbf{V} \{ \mathbf{W}(\mathbf{p}_i, \mathbf{c}_j, \mathbf{b}_k, \mathbf{z}_l, \mathbf{u}_m, \mathbf{q}_n) > \mathbf{HSf}(\mathbf{p}_i, \mathbf{c}_j, \mathbf{b}_k, \mathbf{z}_l, \mathbf{u}_m, \mathbf{q}_n) \}$$

The first word is evident as a component. The W function is a symbolic indication of another reality, the reality of **wording**, lunging forth or brailing forth or whatever: the key element is the “ > “ that is a spontaneous achievement in the talker after its wonderous establishment as a human pattern of behavior: that should remind you of the Helen Keller struggle.³⁴ There is the further struggle - part of our present struggle - to understand that which was established so easily in us in early childhood. So, we have a correlation that is instantiated by Helen Keller’s excitedly understood hand-movements, W, “pointing to” (yet not pointing to, but meaning the heart of the problem of the present section) the reality f (p_i, c_j) within history, water.³⁵ V { } indicates the open set of all such correlations, a massive multi-lingual set which can be taken to point - like a meta-word (contained in the set!) - the core of the field of linguistics. Think, then of its various sub-sets, of problems of invariance (linguistic universals?), etc etc. Pretty mysterious, eh? At least we are pushing the point of the first section!

³³*Ibid.*, 106.

³⁴There is a detailed introduction to that struggle in chapter 1 of *A Brief History of Tongue*.

³⁵I am skipping over bundles of difficulties here, not unrelated to the way Lonergan skips over bundles of difficulties with the word “virtually” in the phrase “virtually unconditioned”. I am simply introducing this second word of metaphysics, not explaining it: indeed, not even describing it decently. I originally introduced it, also inadequately, on page 122 of *A Brief History of Tongue*. Part of the inadequacy there was a misprint! The “f” is missing after “S” in the formula!!

I know that for many of you, and perhaps you in particular now, the symbolization is stressful: I can only ask you, as I have done before, to peruse thoughtfully, the footnote that goes with W3, reproduced in section 17.3.³⁶ Gradually the culture will get a hill-climbers grip on its pieces, its cliffs-of-fall. I would like to think that for some of you, it can become even at an elementary stage, with W1 and W3, a holdall analogous to the periodic table for a chemist, something that always matters, that always is the matter, in the form of your notion of truth, your form of inference.³⁷

But we should return to the word *notion* and brood some more. How much more? In the essay “Elevating *Insight*” I suggested a type of Dogen-like reading of the chapter in *Insight* on “The Notion of Being”. But perhaps now, if you have struggled with these ***Cantowers*** and even perhaps with *Lack in the Beingstalk*, you have begun to get a larger sense of the meaning of brooding? I would wish this section to add a dimension to the meaning of brooding self-taste: it is the addition of the control of metaphysics represented by our three words W1, W2, W3. But let us move slowly.

The word *notion* occurs many times in *Insight*, but notice particularly its recurrence in chapter-titles and in subtitles. One can ask, What does Lonergan mean by the word? A complex question. Remember, first, that the book is written from a moving viewpoint: he then, presumably, wants the reader to move towards a richer meaning as the reading and self-reading proceeds. The best illustration of this problem of enriched reading in the book is the reading of the two occurrences of the ABC problem: it can be quite embarrassing to admit - to oneself in private of course! - that one is not much wiser when meeting it the second time!

I do not wish you to fuss over this issue of the meaning of *notion*: there are

³⁶See below at note 59.

³⁷I take the opportunity here to recall that little article of the young Lonergan. “The Form of Inference”, which is, after all, on the same topic, indeed with the same object referred to by the title: we should be asking, in this metaphysical shift in our struggle, What form or forms grounds the reality of the notion of truth?

problems of loose usage, problems of the rush of the final chapters. And there is the problem of Lonergan's own moving viewpoint. I recall, on this precise topic of truth, a conversation we had on one of those wonderful 14 boozy evenings together in Dublin in the summer of 1971, asking him When did you get clear on judgment? "Oh, when I got that far in *Insight*". And how far was that?

On loose usage, I recall, that December, writing to him while indexing *Method*, remarking to him that he used "unconsciously" loosely - I see it now as fussiness on my part - and he replaced the word with "inadvertently" (the same number of letters, so that he didn't disturb the proofs!). How loose is the use of *notion* in the statement at the beginning of chapter 8, "the notion of a thing involves a new type of insight"?³⁸

In one place he does make a precise distinction, relevant to our struggle, between the pure notion and the heuristic notion, and there he remarks, "since the pure notion of being unfolds through understanding and judgment, there can be formulated a heuristic notion of being".³⁹ It unfolds in all of us, in our understandings and in our judgments of fact and value; but the "can be" is a delicate question. Desmond Connell's pure notion of being unfolded through a long life: he is now the elderly Bishop of Dublin and before that appointment in the early 1970s. He was professor of metaphysics in University College Dublin. In the sixties he read *Insight* but he just could not formulate the heuristic notion of being or of truth: there was the block of years of training and of teaching and thinking. But he could move Lonergan's words around in skillful debate. The problem here, of course, is not Bishop Connell but your possible problem, your can or cannot. So what do you make of his take on the relation of the notion of truth to the notion of being?

"We are told that what is involved is isomorphism, not identity; but Father Lonergan does not seem to have the resources to distinguish between an object posited

³⁸The first page of chapter 8 of *Insight*.

³⁹*Insight*, 642[665].

by the 'yes' of an affirmation because it satisfies the desire of intelligence and an object that has being in itself, between the 'yes' of an affirmation and the being of the object affirmed, to prevent the absorption of *esse* in *esse verum*. It is difficult to maintain that being is the object of affirmation unless one has some understanding of being as the ultimate, the absolute, in relation to which alone *esse verum* can be understood. As St Thomas puts it, *ens precedes verum* in the order of our understanding. If one reverses this order it is difficult to see what a being can be for us other than that which is constituted as an object of knowledge through conformity with the structure of intelligent and rational consciousness. No doubt, it is claimed that to know such an object is precisely to know being. But this is so only because being is defined as the objective of the pure desire to know. This simply means that being is whatever is attained by the exercise of the mind's dynamic tendency. But being is given no proper intelligible content which would enable one to say that it is more than a mere object for consciousness. Unless being is grasped as absolute, idealism seems inevitable. What is it that enables one to claim that 'objective' (in the phrase 'objective of the pure desire to know') means more than merely what is constituted by the imposition on data of the structure of consciousness?"⁴⁰

Now what do you make of that? I am throwing you back here to the problems of **Cantower IX**, problems of reaching a constitutive meaning in the position and poosition. And I am throwing you forward towards formulation and expression in a metaphysics: W2. Connell, certainly, read the relevant words in *Insight* very seriously but he was blocked by a deeply inboned perspective from conceiving of his own operative notion and so he intelligently held on to his view. You, on the other hand, may be a sympathetic reader of Lonergan's work, perhaps thinking that you have an open mind: but I invite you to find that what blocks you from serious reading and

⁴⁰Desmond Connell, "Father Lonergan and the Idea of Being", *Irish Theological Quarterly* (37) 1970, 125.

formulation is precisely your openness to agree. The formulation that Lonergan wishes within you at this stage of the book - with, I think, an over-optimism born of his solitary work - is a massive achievement that would carry the dialectic climbing of chapter 2 of *Verbum* into a personal thematic answering that central question, “What is, then, this *lumen animae nostrae*?”⁴¹ What is this light of our souls? What is this notion of truth that is the light of my life?

I am interested here, in this section, in our reading properly a little less than two pages of this 17th chapter of *Insight*,⁴² and you may well claim that I am pushing too hard, and yes, I concede that I am doing now a “heavy reading” of the book. There are problems here of the dynamics of the book, and the pressure on Lonergan to finish: what e.g. if he had been given the extra year which he desired? But the key issue for me here is the topic of section 17.3, when we come to brood over the word “the” in the title “The Notion of Truth”. Meantime, let us proceed with our heavy reading, a Readout corresponding to a fuller presence of the achievement of chapter 2 of *Verbum*.

What is this notion in us? “We have now to penetrate more deeply into our subject”,⁴³ and, twisting Lonergan’s words, our subject is ourselves. We are talking about an energy, a *virtus* in us, “the habit and virtue of wisdom. For wisdom is the virtue of right judgment. Wisdom has to do with the real as real, while it is in judgment that we know reality. Indeed, I would say that wisdom, the act of reflective understanding, and the act of judgment are related as habit, second act, and the act that proceeds from act”.⁴⁴ Some plate of meat, this, set before you on a white page: does it

⁴¹*Verbum*, 1997, 91.

⁴²Specifically section 2.2 on the definition of truth, and the first four paragraphs of section 2.4, on truth and expression. The reference is *Insight*, 552-4[

⁴³*Verbum*, 78.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

give you something of the poise of Emma Bovary? I have spent years trying to digest this meat. I wish you luck, but especially in your struggle towards slow adult growth, against convention. Back to that in the next section: meantime sketchings of the crazy personal climb.

The details of the climb are yours: perusing Aristotle's "On the Soul" just now, it strikes me that you might well benefit from reading along with him: even if he didn't break through on the notion of truth, he is quite on the ball when he writes "thought, as we have described it, is what is by virtue of becoming all things, while it is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours".⁴⁵ This **notion** in us that we are grappling with is not simple: it becomes, it makes: it is a mixed blessing. Go figure. But you'll need help from Thomas, handily sorted out by Lonergan in that chapter of *Verbum*. And if you are in good **forms** - for there is more than one form involved - you will slowly, over years, ingest and digest the plate of meat and come up with a better grip on the first word of metaphysics. Your struggle centres on that part of W1 between two related semi-colons: " ; **u_m** ; ". There are two instances of the subscripted properties of this complex notion that Aristotle's words above identify: an active and a passive reality, form, capacity-for-performance. It is a long journey to move with Aristotle through Aquinas with an insistent focus on this light of your life and to find luminously the relation of this light to life. Your actual context of answers and questions has to grow and take possession of your nerves until "within that context there follows the traditional definition of truth as the conformity of correspondence of the subject's affirmations and negations to what is or is not".⁴⁶ So, we come to the end of that short section 17.2.2 that can be a fresh beginning of the life-

⁴⁵*Book 3*, 429^a1, 14-17. I am quoting from the Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes, Princeton University Press, 1984, 684.

⁴⁶*Insight*, 552[575].

journey sketched in *Cantower IX*.

And we move to the first four paragraphs of section 2.4, on “Truth and Expression”. Our topic now is the second word of metaphysics, W2: “the expression corresponds to the material multiplicity of experience and imagination”⁴⁷; the expression is strategic - like the expression of the periodic table - and the hope is that W2, “the expression, enters into the very process of learning and the ability to express” , so that “ the interpenetration of knowledge and expression implies a solidity, almost a fusion, of the development of knowledge and the development of language” , and that “sensitive routines” would develop that would sustain a communal entry into the world invisible of the notion of truth.⁴⁸

I have been pointing you back, inviting you to back into, the context of understanding and mystery that might be the achievement of reading *Insight* thus far in a later culture. Then you would be soaking up that part of your organism that is the two-faced phantom of the opera of reaching “Yes” in such regular layered molecular liftings.⁴⁹

There seems no point in giving further summary indications of that slow self-soaking, thee-tasting. To the initial startling strangeness of the position there must be added the Keller experiment to give the beginnings of the central meaning of expression. Then one can be freshly shocked by reading again the expression of the position, sited within now, as it is already-out-there-now stated in *Insight*. The expression of the position is an internal achievement, expressing the character, my

⁴⁷*Insight*, 553[576].

⁴⁸*Insight*, 553[576]. Add here the sophistication that comes from the linguistic feedback of a later stage of meaning, when the words are lightsome with subjectivity. See *Method in Theology*, 88, note 34.

⁴⁹I am especially recalling the task of harmonious personal development of chapter 15 of *Insight*. *Cantowers IV* and *IX* point to full challenge of that development.

human character, of Yessing: claiming in a Great Mysterious Assumption an identity, a correspondence, with the real that is not real but needs another name. What is this identity of the known tree with the real tree, of the known me with the real me, of the known friend with the real friend? Does it help at all to call the identity “intentional”? Only, perhaps, if one is schooled properly by Old Aquinas. “To the Aristotelian theorem of knowledge by immateriality Aquinas had to add a further theorem of knowledge by intentionality. The difference appears clearly in the case of one immaterial angel knowing another immaterial angel without the former’s knowledge being the latter’s reality”.⁵⁰

To know your friend is to be your friend, but that being of you is not the being of your friend but a mental being of you, “an ineluctable modality of the visible of the audible.... I am getting along nicely in the dark”. And in that dark of finite minding you can utter “Jack” or “Jill” or “my friend” to hidden face of your friend and mind and loneliness of your friend, a yes of intentional identity that can mesh with accepting⁵¹ molecules way past the acceptance of Emma for Charles, way past even the acceptance of Molly for Leopold Bloom, “to say yes my mountain flower and first I put my arms round him yes and drew him down to me so he could feel my breasts all perfume yes and his heart was going like mad and yes I said yes I will Yes”.⁵²

⁵⁰*Verbum*, 84, note 116.

⁵¹I am hinting forward towards the understanding of that piece of minding that we name “will”, operatively meshed with molecules, its amazing availability to intellectual light so neatly claimed by Augustine in a claim that Aquinas quotes against the objectors in his question “Whether understanding understands the act of willing?” (*Summa Theologica*, I q.87, a.4). St. Augustine stand? “Intelligo me velle” (*De Trinitate*, X): “I understand me willing”. But I am opening up a huge territory of enrichment here, regarding the presence of the beloved in the lover. (See Lonergan, *De Deo Trino. Pars Systematica*, Question IV (wrongly printed ‘V’ in the present text))

⁵²James Joyce, *Ulysses*, the concluding lines.

17.3 The Truth of Interpretation

You have surely been curious about my decision to postpone commenting on the first word, *The*, of the title of the previous section, “The Notion of Truth”. There is much to be written about the definite article, quite beyond analytic philosophy’s debates about it. Here, however, I wish to make just two peculiar points about it. First, I would suggest reading *the* with the full concreteness of metaphysics as non-abstractive, as a concerned with the good: “the good is concrete”. What, then, would I mean by *The* Notion of Truth? I would mean all the realities involved in its consideration, reaching thus in an integral, if heuristic, fashion to all humans past and future, to the choirs of angels, to the Yessing God: is that not the reach of metaphysics? Further, there is the inclusion of all the views of these humans on those realities: if you like, all the interpretations of truth. In this context you may well wish now to reflect on the title of this section and the corresponding section of *Insight*, and puzzle over what might be meant by “The Truth of Interpretation”? Is it, perhaps, a suggestion of a selection - by some means or other - of some “right track” in history’s efforts to interpret?

I am talking here about beings of meaning in a way that has an analogue in physicists talking about beings of physics. And indeed, there is a set of analogies that connect mistaken views about each area, but that would certainly take us quite far afield. Let us keep this relatively simple. Front-line physicists at present are reaching towards some unifying theory of the various forces that relate particles: the search is for GUTS or TOES, Grand Unification Theories or Theories of Everything. Few physicists are clear about what is going on. The search is for an integral view of primary relations, but somehow also including the secondary determinations that are usually grist for the statistical mills. Lie Algebras are complexified, but fundamentally the search is for real geometry. But enough of that: what matters is to notice that the heuristics of

envisagement in physics is a huge complex, reaching back to those *First Three Minutes*⁵³ and even forward to *The Last Three Minutes*⁵⁴, reaching mindfully into mammoth global experiments and into the intergalactic realities. The reach is for a universal viewpoint on the beings of physics in their emergence and their ongoing interplay, where universal can be appreciated in two senses: universal in the sense of scientific and universal in being about the entire universe. Now beings of meaning are viewpoints, inclusive of their contents: there is nothing startling, then, in the project of reaching for a universal viewpoint on all viewpoints.

I have already exploited the parallel between Grand Unification heuristics and Lonergan's suggestion of a Universal Viewpoint in commenting on Ivo Coelho's work in *Cantower XIII*, and there is no need to repeat. The important thing is to notice the plausibility of these heuristics, however ambitious they may seem. I am not interested here in commenting on this massively complex section 17.3 of *Insight*: I am interested in an attitude pivoting on the analogy of successful sciences. You need not have any great grasp of the physics: popular treatments abound (should I say, unfortunately?!) which leave you with sufficient vague notions. If you have more appreciation of contemporary physics and its problem, then you may well find even more analogues within the problems of the two fields. But I think that you would find it rewarding to read section 17.3.2 with some sense of the front-line search in physics. Pull in Aristotle's view of science as potential, if you like.⁵⁵ The main thing is to take the myth out of talk about the universal viewpoint.

If you are tempted to think of a Grand Unification Theory in physics as so much

⁵³Steven Weinberg, *The First Three Minutes: A Modern View of the Origin of the Universe*, Basic books, New York, 1988.

⁵⁴Paul Davies, *The Last Three Minutes. Conjectures about the Ultimate Fate of the Universe*, Phoenix, 2000.

⁵⁵*Metaphysics*, XIII, 10, 1087a 16-20.


simpler, think out the fact that the issue is real geometry, the massively complex entropic reality that is also a topic of statistical thermodynamics. And remember that other piece of the analogy to which Lonergan draws attention. “The introduction of tensor fields and eigenfunctions raised a barrier in physics ... so one may expect diligent authors to be somewhat bewildered”⁵⁶ by a heuristic such as the universal viewpoint. Or, worse still, think of the bewilderment and the resentment to be caused by the heuristic represented by W3. W3 is not, of course, a word, but a diagram: lets repeat it here and ponder about some of its constituents. Nor is it any harm to preface its inclusion by the footnote that comments on it in *A Brief History of Tongue*, a footnote that broadens the range of analogies:

“The diagram in fact introduces complexities such as ‘mutual self-mediation’ which are beyond the present introductory sketchings. The diagram seemed important in itself, an invitation to do one’s own reaching that would always be partial, revisable, open. From that point of view the key reference, near the top of the left corner, is the reference to Lonergan, *De Constitutione Christi*, Gregorian Press, 1959, 80.⁵⁷ On that page Lonergan reaches the 24th point of his discussion of the identity of Jesus in which he notes that, unless you have a diagram you won’t have a controlling understanding. Obviously, I took his advice seriously, and have passed it on to you. Further, and paradoxically, the diagram is an invitation not to take fright: as humanity progresses, images necessarily complexify as invitations both to control and to reverence the density of growing meaning. Instead of notes of birds we have the melodic and symphonic notes, manuscripts of musical genius, mightily beyond our own sensibilities. A good diagram, like the printed image of a piano concerto, calls us, if not to actual reading at least to admiration. So, there is a final general point to be made

⁵⁶*Insight*. 581[603-4].

⁵⁷The work is now available in translation: the particular reference is p. 151 of *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, University of Toronto Press, 2002.

about the diagram here. It has a central dividing line: above it is 'the turn to the idea', the rolling⁵⁸ of chapter three; below is the zone of general common meanings. The drive of this little book is towards aiding the self-discovery that would leave you contented in some of the nine general zones of meaning."⁵⁹



⁵⁸The chapter's title is "A Rolling Stone Gathers *Nomos*". It could well be the slogan of W3.

⁵⁹I quote from pp. 123-4 of *A Brief History of Tongue*.

My first suggestion above was related to concrete reading: my second is related to re-readings. Its symbolization is quite simple: even if you do not know Joyce's book, *Finnegans Wake*, you know that it is cyclic, or at least now know (believe!). It ends with the word *the*, and it begins, lower-case, 'riverrun past Eve and Adam....'.⁶⁰ It is not a great leap to connecting *Finnegans Wake* with the program of *Method in Theology* and thus with W3, especially if you have the added imagery both of the raised tower⁶¹ and of the slopes⁶² of achievement that occur in repeated cycling. My first three words of metaphysics are not at all acceptable in the present culture. What I hope is acceptable - this is the drive and the thesis of the New Pragmatism of chapter three of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism* - is the two unthematized attitudes, Be Sensable and Divide the Work (following Adam Smith's advice, and the directions forced by history's fragmentations of disciplines).

On the other hand, what I have done in the previous section is follow - or merely note - the drive of three evolutionary sports, Aristotle, Lonergan and Aquinas. That section leads to, points to, a massively remote sophistication of methodological perspective. Here I can only hint at that remoteness by suggesting that you turn your

⁶⁰'Adam and Eves' is the name of a church on the south bank of the Liffey about two miles before it enters the sea in Dublin Bay. The book ends with that entry, worth quoting here to give you a smell of the riverrun of every life: "I sink I'd die down over his feet, humbly dumbly, only to washup. Yes, tid. There's where. First. We pass through grass behush the bush to. Whish! A gull. Gulls. Far calls. Coming, far! End here. Us then. Finn, again! Take, Bussoftlhee, mememormee! Till thousandsthee. Lps. The keys to. Given! A way a lone a last a loved a long the". I have brooded over this ending in various anastomatic ways in different places, in *Process*, in *Lack int the Beingstalk*. The anastomatic bent relates to this final chapter of *Finnegans Wake*: see Margot Norris, "The Last Chapter of *Finnegans Wake*: Stephen Finds His Mother", *James Joyce Quarterly* (25) 1987-88: "using the device of *anastomosis*, Joyce attempts, in the last chapter of his last work, to bridge all the great ontological chasms" (*op.cit.*, 11). [*ana-* again, *stomein*, to provide with a mouth].

⁶¹Introduced in *Cantower IV*.

⁶²The topic of *Cantower VIII*.

attention to volume 18 of Lonergan's works, *Phenomenology and Logic*. Consider in that context the previous section's title and content: it is quite removed from the interests and efforts described there. The common issue in the two fields under consideration is What is truth: the best that has emerged in the two fields is, perhaps, Benacerraf's view in mathematics and Merleau-Ponty's struggle in phenomenology. Lonergan draws attention in the volume - he is lecturing mainly to a Jesuit audience - to the Christian invitation of Trinitarian conviction that can, could, lead to a deeper perspective on the notion of truth, on the procession of act from act, the act that is the inner word of truth when we say Yes in a non-parrot fashion. The drive of *Insight* expressed Lonergan's naive hope, in his late thirties, that the legitimately-detached result of that convicted search would appeal to serious-minded people of all persuasions. It did not, in fact even seriously appeal to Christian intellectuals. This claim, certainly, will be disputed, and I see no point in plunging into debate here. But my claim is clear and blunt. Lonergan writes about fragmenting schools that flow from a master: I would say that there was never a serious Lonergan school to fragment. Perhaps the same can be said, in a deeply serious sense, of Aristotle and Aquinas. The difference now is that a recycling program is being forced on us by history, a program of competition and embarrassment,⁶³ a complexity of emergent interdisciplinary canons that will "at times force interpreters to prefer frank admission of ignorance to plausible guesses beyond the confines of science".⁶⁴

17.4 Conclusion

Lonergan writes in his concluding single paragraph of his effort in *Insight's* reach through modern scientific developments towards the adequate self-knowledge

⁶³The "making conversion a topic" of *Method in Theology*, 253, is boosted by a doctrine of effective academic embarrassment (*Ibid.*, 299).

⁶⁴*Insight*, 594[616].

that makes it possible and actual, in this chapter 17, “to draw upon the consequent theories of objectivity and meaning to outline the possibility of a general heuristic structure for a methodological hermeneutics”.⁶⁵ The adequate self-knowledge was his and one can see a certain foolishness in his conversation with himself at this stage of his writing. Or perhaps, in the privacy of his climb, he sensed the same response that many great composers have had to express to instrumentalists or dancers who couldn’t cope: “I was not writing this for you”. What emerged from his struggle twelve years later was the fuller heuristic that would solve the problem of implementation, of history coping. Then the concluding words of this chapter make glorious sense: “our realism permits us not only to respect but even to include every valid conclusion of empirical human science”. But the realism now is not just a solitary improbable achievement but a realism of history’s finality, comprehended increasingly in ways (some of which can include extreme realism) that force - or cajole⁶⁶ - the global culture towards some elementary version of the three words of metaphysics, W1, W2, W3. That force-field⁶⁷ constitutes the possibility of a cultural ethic.

⁶⁵*Insight*, 594[616].

⁶⁶*Insight*, 398[423].

⁶⁷I mean *field* here in the full sense given it in *Phenomenology and Logic*: see the index and the concluding words to the Introduction to that index. The implicit perspective on force opens up profound questions both of the finality of energy and of the various anthropic principles: see *Lack in the Beingstalk*, 104-5. On energy and entropy, see *Cantower XXVII*.