

Cantower XIV**Communications and Ever-ready Founders****May 1st 2003**

This **Cantower** is peculiar in that the first section was not written for the series. Indeed, it was written in 1986, as the sixth chapter of a projected book which never saw the light of day. The title of that book was “The Foundations of Communications”: I would now drop the ‘the’ because it is evident, if you are with me so far, that while foundations as subjects are core-invariant, and while the thematic of foundations may be pretty stable during a significant period - think of the parallel I drew with the Calculus of Variations¹ - still, the slope of the tower- reaching promises enrichments beyond present fantasy and understanding. Thematic and expressed foundations are no more fixed, awaiting a few decimal-place corrections, than physics was rounded off in 1903, a century ago. Indeed, as you may well know, regularly I find dates suggestive: the periodic table emerged a century before Lonergan’s hodic table. With a little luck the year 2004, Bloomsday centennial, Lonergan birth-centennial, will produce some shake-ups in our perspective. This **Cantower** points towards that possibility, probability. It is a two-part invention on the same theme, with a bridge section. Part 1 is the afore-mentioned 1986 effort; part 2, in section 3, is my present effort to identify heuristically the full task of communications; the bridge, section 2, invites you to place the reading of this fourteenth **Cantower** in the context of two other fourteens: chapter fourteen of both *Insight* and *Method in Theology*.

There are, of course, many other contexts that could be, need to be, brought into present and proximate efforts to reach a conception and affirmation and implementation of the eighth functional speciality. This **Cantower** is just a nudge,

¹In chapter four of *Lack in the Beingstalk*.

added to previous nudges such as “Systematics, Communications, Actual Contexts”.² There is the large nudge of the previous **Cantowers** and of *Lack in the Beingstalk*. Depending on how much those nudges are heart-held by you, the third section here may lift you - as it does me - to a startling freshening of view regarding the manner in which “the antecedent willingness of hope has to advance from a generic reinforcement of the pure desire to an adapted and specialized auxiliary ever ready to offset every interference”³ with the pilgrim poise and progress of streets and states. You will notice in the quotation the source of the words “ever ready” in my title. The measure of that readiness is to be the measure of the beauty and unity of culture in humanity come-of-age.

14.1 Foundations of Communications⁴

The focus of this chapter is the structure, genesis and implementation of the heuristic named ‘the universal viewpoint’. Lonergan is moved to conceive of this complex heuristic by his thematization of the difficulties of the precise communication of meanings between authors and audiences by an interpreter.⁵ Against a broad indication of what is meant by such a viewpoint he proceeds to sketch its operation and, against the background of an additional discussion of the resistance to such a heuristic that can spring from the normal opposition to an enlarged change of perspective and from the deeper opposition of erroneous philosophic stances, he specifies further his notion of the operation of the heuristic through an outline of

²*Lonergan Workshop*, (7)1987, edited by Fred Lawrence, Scholars Press, 143-174.

³*Insight*, 727[747].

⁴The original title of the chapter was “Towards a Transposition of Hermeneutics”.

⁵*Insight*, 562-4[585-587].

canons of hermeneutics. His discussion throughout is dense and exclusive of illustrations and it might well be remarked, in his own words, that “there are many different states and patterns of consciousness and it would take volumes to give a tolerably adequate description of any one of them”.⁶ Moreover, to that problem of condensed treatment there is added the further problem of differentiations of consciousness that postdate in Lonergan, existentially and thematically, the treatment of *Insight*. We refer here particularly to the fundamental set of differentiations that come under the name of functional specialization. It is to this set that Lonergan refers when he remarks, at the beginning of his treatment of the specialty Interpretation, “observe how ideas presented there (in *Insight*, 562-594[585-617]), recur here in quite different specialties. For instance, what there is termed a universal viewpoint, here is realized by advocating a distinct specialty named dialectic”.⁷

The present chapter, then, tackles a variety of related fundamental issues. It takes off, first, from the discussion of chapter three {a missing chapter!} to pose more fully the problem an interpreter faces when he attempts to mediate the meaning of an author to a community. This problem will engage us through the first two sections on the universal viewpoint and the canons of hermeneutics. The third section of the chapter indicates the need to broaden the discussion towards an anticipation of the transposition of elements of Lonergan’s sketch of hermeneutics into a genetically-structured eightfold vortex of academic collaboration in the human control of human meaning.

14.1.1 The Universal Viewpoint

As was noted already, Lonergan’s treatment of the universal viewpoint and its

⁶Lonergan, *The Road to Nicea*, 9-10.

⁷*Method in Theology*, 153, n.1.

emergence is unadorned either by illustrations or by developed analogies. It should help, then, to begin with an extended analogy that gives some parallel to the procedural innovation constituted by the heuristic conception and implementation of the universal viewpoint, context for ongoing collaboration in the field of interpretation. The analogy comes from the history of chemistry and its methods, its centrepiece being the emergence and implementation of the conception of the periodic table: but, needless to say, what is sketched here in broad strokes requires personal involvement in detail for its intellectual intussusception.⁸

The chemical analogue is, of course, altogether simpler than the complex heuristics of the higher sciences. While the history of chemistry is both genetic and dialectic, the object of the science itself can be considered as a case of static system - not however in the sense opposed to dynamics in mathematical physics, but in a sense that includes chemical and thermal dynamics, and so not requiring intrinsically genetic methodologies. On the other hand, the object of hermeneutical inquiry is “not a static system, nor some dynamic system, but a variable manifold of dynamic systems. For, the successive systems that express the development of human understanding are systems that regard the universe of being in all its departments Only the broadest possible set of concepts can provide the initial basis and the field of differences that will be adequate to dealing with a variable set of moving systems that regard the universe of being”.⁹

So, more concretely, one may contrast the relatively invariant modern systematics of the periodic table with the vast genetical-dialectic array of interpretations of Christianity running through Mark, John, Tertullian, Origen, all the way through and

⁸Lonergan used the analogy from chemistry at the beginning of his lectures on Method in 1962. A solid background here would be J.R.Partington, *A History of Chemistry*, MacMillan, London, 1961, vols 2-4.

⁹*Insight*, 508[532].

beyond Hegel. Nevertheless, however different the two heuristics and the historical tasks are, the parallel is worth dwelling on as showing the dimensions of the transition called for by Lonergan, who can thus write of a significant resistance to his heuristic:

“The introduction into physics of tensor fields and eigenfunctions raised a barrier between the theoretical physicists that grasped the mathematics but possessed no great skill in handling laboratory equipment and, on the other hand, the experts in experimental work for whom the recondite mathematics was sheer mystery. In similar fashion one may expect the diligent authors of highly specialized monographs to be somewhat bewildered and dismayed when they find that instead of simply following the bent of their genius, their aptitudes, and their acquired skills, they are to collaborate in the light of common but abstract principles and to have their individual results checked by general requirements that envisage simultaneously the totality of results”.¹⁰

In this chapter we are pushing for an initial glimpse, especially through analogies with physics and chemistry, of the common but abstruse table or plateau of transposed hermeneutics. In the following chapter {never written!} we will avail of more complex analogies from the study of plant and animal development to further specify that future collaborative task of human studies.

In reaching for the analogy in chemistry for such a collaboration one must consider, not just simple innovations, such as is represented by the achievement of Lavoisier regarding oxygen,¹¹ but a fuller sweep such as that which includes the first serious formulation, within an incipiently theoretic context, of the phlogiston hypothesis by George Stahl (1660-1734), through Lavoisier’s successful challenge to

¹⁰*Insight*, 581 [603-4].

¹¹H.Butterfield, *The Origins of Modern Science*, Bell and Sons, London, 1965, chapter 11, considers the work of Lavoisier as marking the maturing of chemistry as a science. The broader perspective indicated above seems preferable.

that hypothesis and beyond to the relative maturation of chemistry brought about by the work of Mayer and Mendeleev around the year 1868. Moreover, it is well to bear in mind the deeper roots of the blind search for chemical system in Chinese and Arabic chemistry: one may expect to find a parallel, more subtle, alchemy, in the field of interpretation.

The transition represented by the period indicated is a transition from a largely descriptive chemistry having an overlay of methodological confusions and imaginative differentiations to the conception of the realities of chemistry within a relatively¹² clear explanatory pattern of terms and relations represented by the periodic table. Not it is this total transition that serves as a parallel to Lonergan's structuring of the task of hermeneutics. A great deal of present discussion of the problem of interpretation, of which Gadamer's classic *Truth and Method*¹³ might be taken as summative and representative, bogs down in descriptive meanings, mythic aspirations, and a failure to suspect or envisage the radical leap to a full explanatory context that results from Lonergan's formulation of the universal viewpoint with its concomitant implementable canons. So, for example, one moves from the naive hope of some fulsome transfer into a reader of a past author's meaning through a sympathetic open reaching of that reader, to a sober limited explanatory perspective that offers a precise control of descriptive meanings. The chemical parallel is helpful in that it is otherwise extremely difficult to come to grips with the large discontinuity represented by Lonergan's achievement. We must now, however, envisage that achievement in step by step fashion, not in some summary way that would express briefly what Lonergan expresses at some length in chapter seventeen of *Insight*, but in a manner that complements that treatment and seeks to make it more plausible.

¹²On the state of present chemistry and its methodology see W. Danaher, *Strategies of Chemistry*, University Press of America, 1986.

¹³Seabury Press, New York, 1975.

One might say that Lonergan's take-off point for a methodical hermeneutics is the parallel between common sense and historical sense. Just as common sense can hit on a correct, if limited, set of insights that describe a particular situation - one may recall shifts from alchemy to early chemistry - so an interpreter with a relatively sound historical sense can reach successfully such an appreciation of the common sense of another time as to permit precise indications of behavior and speech of that time to his or her scholarly contemporaries. Now in the chemical search there is the hope, and the drive within humans and circumstances, to move beyond the limitations of commonsense orientations by the discomfiting leap from description to explanation that lifts the account of chemical reality beyond the relativity and confusions of particular groups' perspectives. Description still remains a "tweezers"¹⁴ but the central scientific content is culturally invariant. What is needed, then, in hermeneutics is something that will lift the historical sense towards a thematic anticipation of some parallel cultural invariance: "if interpretation is to be scientific, then it has to discover some method of conceiving and determining the habitual development of all audiences and it has to invent some technique by which its expression escapes relativity to particular and incidental audiences".¹⁵ The key lies in the jump to the scientific perspective¹⁶ that embraces all viewpoints in an ordered pattern much as the periodic table orders the totality of chemical elements and compounds. We may note here that a parallel from biology adds a further dimension. "Study of the organism begins from the thing-for-us, from the organism as exhibited to our senses",¹⁷ but from

¹⁴*Insight*, 291[316].


¹⁵*Insight*, 564[587].

¹⁶In a fuller treatment of interpretation a discussion of perspectivism would be required. See *Method in Theology*, 216-18.

¹⁷*Insight*, 464[489].

the heuristic perspective of genetic method the organism is envisaged in terms of a sequence of increasingly complex operators and integrators,¹⁸ a problem we reserve to the next chapter {never written: but we'll get to it in ***Cantower LXIX!***}.

A simple image may help here. Lonergan's solution to the problem of the relativity and descriptiveness of interpretations may be diagramed as a 'right-angle shift' akin to a similar shift in ordinary science from description to explanation:



Just as the scientist shifts from description, for example, of 'push', 'size', to correlations like $PV = C$ or of acids and salts to reaction equations, so the interpreter moves out of relativity to self and self-s culture by the jump that contextualizes heuristically, for example, the interpretation of X_2 in the culturally-invariant explanatory framework that meshes the interpretation into a genetical-dialectic set of relations with previous and posterior authors, including the interpreter as author.

Lonergan at this stage of his analysis goes into some detail regarding the notion of the universal viewpoint, related levels and sequences of expression, and limitations that are inherent in any reach towards system.¹⁹ Rather than including what would necessarily be a summary indication of that general analysis it seems better to move to

¹⁸*Insight*, 465ff[490ff].

¹⁹*Insight*, 573-7[595-600].

a sketch of the actual dynamics of interpretation that makes that dynamics proleptically plausible through a parallel with the dynamics of inquiry in the lower sciences.

14.1.2 Canons of Inquiry

The present sections continues and broadens the discussion of analogies of inquiries by extending that discussion to the treatment of the two sets of canons of inquiry summarized in *Insight*.²⁰ These two sets of canons should be viewed as related, on the one hand, more to the debates on research methods and their history associated with people like Kuhn and Lakatos²¹ rather than older philosophies of science, and on the other hand to discussions of possible strategies of exegesis rather than to general philosophic comments on hermeneutics.²² Since the canons of *Insight* have so far received scant attention in the literature, the present brief treatment can only point up the need for lengthier empirically-based inquiry.

In discussing the structure of interpretation Lonergan remarks, “let us begin by recalling the structure of classical empirical method”²³ and goes on first to give general indications of parallels between the two methods, then to give canons of hermeneutics²⁴ that resemble the previous set of canons of chapter three of *Insight*. We will begin by indicating the relations and differences between the two sets of canons,

²⁰*Insight*, 70-102[99-125]; 586-94[608-16].

²¹One must note, however, that the efforts of these groups are crippled by truncation. See *Lonergan’s Challenge to the University and the Economy*, chapter 1. The canons are best appreciated when related to actual innovative scientific practice.

²²One may note how Lonergan’s treatment of interpretation in *Method in Theology*, which fits into a transposition of the *Insight* treatment, focuses on strategy.

²³*Insight*, 577[609].

²⁴*Insight*, 586-94[608-16].

reaching through that indication complementing illumination of the empirical operation of the potential universal viewpoint.

A listing of the two sets of canons bringing them into loose isomorphism helps towards more detailed discussion:

| <u>Canons of Empirical Method</u> | <u>Canons of Hermeneutics</u> |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Canon of | Canon of |
| 1. Selection | 3. Successive approximations: principles of criticism: (a) demand for UV (b) conditions of extrapolation {self-knowledge; schol. different.} |
| 2. Operations | (c) perspective of sequences of meaning and lags of expression (d) the goal, a hypothesis with evidence within (a), (b), (c). |
| 3. Relevance | 1. Relevance |
| 4. Parsimony | 4. Parsimony |
| 5. Complete explanation | 2. Explanation |
| 6. Statistical residues | 5. Residues |

First, let us note some particular points regarding the listings.

The last three canons on each of the lists require little comment. The canons of

parsimony and explanation correspond fairly well to the general descriptive requirement of a necessary and sufficient account of any phenomenon. The addition of 'complete' to the fifth canon of empirical method serves to emphasize the point, made at length in chapter 5 of *Insight*, that physicists, and consequently chemists, are regularly tempted - and thus plunged into paradoxes in their field - to let extensions and durations slip out of the net of explanation.

In the case of the final canon of both listings one may note that the canon of hermeneutics is more generic: residues are not only statistical. "An unverifiable host of accidents can enter into the decision"²⁵ leading to the production and survival of manuscripts. Furthermore, the interpreter reaching for a particular hypothesis does so in a way that differs from the natural scientist's reaching for a general hypothesis and from it to particular situations through boundary conditions contextualized by statistical laws.

The first two canons of empirical method are paralleled by a single canon of hermeneutics. Instead of operations on the selected data of sense, there occurs in interpretation no selection - since interpretation reaches both data of sense and data of consciousness - but a cycling towards ever-improving approximations to the history of the meaning of meanings. Lonergan's view here reaches for a sublation of August Boeckh's idea of philosophy as "the interpretative reconstruction of the constructions of the human spirit".²⁶ Lonergan's view indeed goes on to transpose that of Droysen. As Lonergan remarks, "What Boeckh did for philology, Droysen would do for history. He moved the notion of understanding from a context of aesthetics and psychology to the broader context of history by (1) assigning expression as the object of understanding and (2) noting that not only individuals but also such groups as

²⁵*Insight*, 593[616].

²⁶Quoted in *Method in Theology*, 210.

families, peoples, states, religions, express themselves”.²⁷ How Lonergan effects this transposition into a perspectivist universal heuristic requires precise discussion but first some more particular comments need to be made regarding the first three canons on each list.

The canons of selection and relevance aim at determining the limited type of understanding sought by empirical science: an understanding of the forms of the actually seen etc.²⁸ In contrast, the hermeneutic canon of relevance and the first principle of criticism both assert the openness of hermeneutics in the demand for the universal viewpoint. The universal viewpoint has limits set only by the notion of being and indeed is open to a full theological transformation.²⁹

One final comment before moving to the ground of the universal viewpoint in the notion of being regards the second principle of criticism. It points up two conditions of adequate extrapolation. In the later Lonergan these emerge as two precise differentiations of consciousness, that of explanatory interiority and that of scholarship.³⁰ However, an accurate reading of the context of the discussion of the demands for the universal viewpoint leads one to the conclusion that the full conditions of extrapolation require the fullness of the fivefold differentiated consciousness specified by Lonergan in *Method in Theology*.³¹ Without that full differentiation, “the full range of possible combinations”³² of experiences, insights, judgments and orientations would escape the interpreter. The interpreter could be

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸*Insight 76[100].*

²⁹*Insight, 740[762]; Method in Theology, 23.*

³⁰*Method in Theology, 274.*

³¹*Method in Theology, 272.*

³²*Insight, 567[590].*

faced with an object of inquiry “quite beyond the horizon of ancient Greece and Medieval Europe”.³³

The achievement of an adequately differentiated consciousness is of prime importance in coming to grips with the uniqueness and clarity of Lonergan’s solution to the fundamental modern problem of hermeneutics, and to bring out elements of that importance and clarity a further context needs to be added, supplied by the doctorate work of Professor Frederick Lawrence, summarily presented in a paper at the Florida Conference of 1970.³⁴

Lawrence treats of the long and not entirely successful struggle of the German tradition of hermeneutics to escape various facets of Cartesianism. The fundamental aspect of that perspective is expressed in the question “how can subjectivity dwelling within itself (*res cogitans*) know objects existing outside (*res extensa*) itself? This posing of the problem is objectivist in so far as it implies the ultimacy and the primordially of the subject-object dichotomy; and within that set-up a distorted primacy of the subject who, in isolation from the world, instrumentally disposes of ideas and representations (*Vorstellungen*) by means of a reflection thought of only as technical, and who has therefore the problem of deciding whether or not these immanent creations have any transcendent reference to the ‘real out there’. And as a final irony, the subject of this relationship ultimately knows itself as object distinguished from other objects only by being present in an immediately evident way”.³⁵

Gadamer’s struggle with this perspective as it pervades the tradition is discussed in detail by Lawrence, who acknowledges “that Gadamer has made his important contribution to the shift of the hermeneutic tradition from an epistemology

³³*Method in Theology*, 317.

³⁴F.Lawrence, “Self-knowledge in History in Gadamer and Lonergan”, *Language, Truth and Meaning*, Gill and Macmillan, 1972, ed. P. McShane., 167-217.

³⁵*Ibid*, 168-9.

of interpretation to an ontology of understanding”.³⁶ But Gadamer, according to Lawrence, fails to reach an adequate viewpoint clearly beyond the tradition, to some extent because “anti-Cartesianism causes him to shy away from confronting the procedures and norms incarnate in authentic scientific inquiry”.³⁷ And it is precisely by not shying away from such a confrontation - or intussusception - that Lonergan comes to his own clarification of subjectivity’s orientation to being. The basis of that clarification may best be summed up for present purposes in Lonergan’s comment on the problem of transcendence:

“The principal notion of objectivity solves the problem of transcendence. How does the knower get beyond himself to a known? The question is, we suggest, misleading. It supposes the knower to know himself and asks how he can know anything else we place transcendence, not in going beyond a known knower, but in heading for being within which there are positive differences and, among such differences, the difference between subject and object.”³⁸

Our digression on the basic modern problem of hermeneutics brings us closer to the value of drawing together the canons of empirical method and those of interpretation as illuminative of the heuristic, the universal viewpoint. Both sets of canons are heuristic structures, the first strongly, the second incipiently growing out of strategies of investigation that enlarge and precise the protean heuristic notion of being. That notion must be taken, however, in the full subtlety given by the context of the first 388 pages of *Insight* (1957). A proximate context certainly is the seventy pages prior to the statement of invulnerable performative assumptions of page 388, but the first part of *Insight* is a contemporary existential necessity. The escape from

³⁶*Ibid.*, 175.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 201.

³⁸*Insight*, 377[401].

Cartesianism and the root liberation of the human mind are achievements “that modern science has made possible”.³⁹

Let us come closer, then, to specifying the limited assertion that is implicit in the advocacy of the universal viewpoint by enlarging of the core heuristic operation of the two sets of canons.

First it should be noted that both sets of canons are remote yet concrete and the fruit of the illumination of subjectivity possible only through the strategy of generalized empirical method as formulated in the later Lonergan.⁴⁰ This distinguishes clearly the canons both from the German tradition already discussed and from the range of subjectivity-opaque contemporary efforts in the methodology of the sciences. Both sets of canons, then, are heuristic specifications of the notion of being as it is existentially and explanatorily contextualized by a positional stand on what is real. Just as the canons of empirical method find that context in its full richness in the developed heuristic of emergent probability, so the canons of hermeneutics share the richness of that heuristic but enormously enlarged - the difference is between system and source of systems - by the heuristic that is the universal viewpoint. Just as the first set of canons reaches towards genera and species of beings within the four lower sciences, so the second set of canons reach towards genera and species of intentional⁴¹ beings, viewpoints that provide, by mediation and muddling, central components of the sequence of cultures of the human group.

This parallel should help to make the various properties of the universal

³⁹*Insight*, 487[511].

⁴⁰*A Third Collection*, 141.

⁴¹The meaning of ‘intentional’ must be gleaned from the context of Aquinas’ thinking.

viewpoint listed by Lonergan⁴² more intelligible, more plausible, more acceptable. The universal viewpoint is potential just as the heuristic of generalized emergent probability is potential. It no more determines the genera and species and varieties of viewpoints than does emergent probability determine the emergent species of particles, chemicals, plants and animals. Yet it is, like the more elementary heuristic, ordered, total, ready to advance on, and with, the discovery, genesis, criticism, survival of genera and species and varieties of viewpoints. Unlike the heuristics of the non-spiritual⁴³ evolution, however, the heuristics offered by Lonergan under the blanket name of 'universal viewpoint' is novel, unappropriated, untried, and hampered in its acceptability by the present culture of interpretation. "The core of meaning is the notion of being and that notion is protean in the measure that one grasps the structure of this protean notion of being, one possesses the base and ground from which one can proceed to the content and the context of every meaning. In the measure that one explores human experience, human insights, human reflection, and human polymorphic consciousness, one becomes capable, when provided with the appropriate data, of approximating to the content and context of the meaning of any given expression."⁴⁴ But what is lacking in present culture - and one should continually recall the structure of community in the natural sciences - is a community of interpreters adequately controlled by, and in control of, the structure of the heuristic notion of being of viewpoints.

So it is that the key canon of hermeneutics of present scholarship must be the third canon, the canon of successive approximation, with its four principles of criticism. What Lonergan foresees here is the cumulative labour of generations of

⁴²*Insight*, 564-8[587-91].

⁴³For an initial meaning of the word 'spiritual' see *Insight*, 516-20[539-543].

⁴⁴*Insight*, 567[590].

interpreters. In the first principle of criticism he points up the demand for the universal viewpoint which a critic can make of a contributor, as a contributor can make it of himself or herself, in order to lift a contribution into the context of a scientific program analogous to that controlled progress imposed by the canons of emergent probability in physics, chemistry, botany and zoology. The second principle of criticism pins down the basic condition of such progress in the need for adequate self-knowledge as ground of the possibility of adequate knowledge of the other.

What we have, then, is a program and a heuristic for generations of scholarly collaboration that calls for detailed empirical slow honest initiation. Moreover, it is a program that survives, with refinements of specification, the transposition of hermeneutics into the further differentiation of functional specialization. While this transposition is the concern of the following chapter {another unwritten chapter!}, some further points may be added here to indicate the focus and dimensions of that transposition.

14.1.3 Towards a Remote Complex Transposition

What Lonergan sketches so briefly in *Insight*⁴⁵ becomes in *Method in Theology* a finely tuned historic enterprise in mutual self-mediation⁴⁶ within the third stage of meaning. It becomes an invariant change in the control of meaning and “if social and cultural changes are, at root, changes in the meanings grasped and accepted, changes in the control of meaning mark off the great epochs in human history”.⁴⁷

The sketch referred to is brief and stark, and can best be illuminated in its anticipation of functional specialization by relating it to a short section of the Epilogue

⁴⁵*Insight*, 579-581[602-3].

⁴⁶See Lonergan, “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer”, *Method*, (2) 1984.

⁴⁷Lonergan, “Dimensions of Meaning”, *Collection*, conclusion.

of *Insight* which merits full quotation:

“The discussion of interpretation envisaged

- (1) initial statements addressed to particular audiences,
- (2) their successive recasting for sequences of their particular audiences,
- (3) the ascent to a universal viewpoint to express the initial statements in a form accessible to any sufficiently cultured audience, and
- (4) the explanatory unification from the universal viewpoint of the initial statements and all their subsequent re-expressions.

But isomorphic with this interpretative process, there is the Catholic fact of

- (1) an initial divine revelation,
- (2) the work of teachers and preachers communicating and applying the initial message to a succession of different audiences,
- (3) the work of the speculative theologian revealing the doctrinal identity in the verbal and conceptual differences in (1), (2), and (3).⁴⁸

In the sketch one can recognize the canons of hermeneutics in compact form. Lonergan twice draws a parallel between this sketch and the general statement that physics is a metathematization of sensible data. The sketch and the parallel provide a clear lead to the goal of hermeneutic inquiry - a goal which will become highly differentiated through the mediation of functional specialization. For one may note that, just as an explanatory physics reaches for a set of invariants that go beyond particular observers and particular boundary conditions,⁴⁹ so the search in scientific hermeneutics must be for like invariants, which Lonergan calls ‘pure formulations’. Just as the invariants of physics are contextualized by some heuristic of world

⁴⁸*Insight*, 739-40[761].

⁴⁹In the analogy being developed here, I pass over complexities related to quantum theory, as well as considerations of secondary determinations of relations.

geometry,⁵⁰ so the pure formulations are contextualized by the world heuristic of meanings which is the universal viewpoint. Just as the physics invariants lead to expressions of possible concrete and verifiable equations through integration and the addition of boundary values so the pure formulations can lead, through the inclusion of concrete conditions and contexts, to hypothetical expressions that approximate expressions in particular cultures.

Among the tasks of the following chapter {!} is the investigation of this parallel in its full suggestiveness within the context provided by the transposition to functional specialization. Here, however, I add some points connecting the text quoted from the Epilogue of *Insight* with the problem of that enlargement of perspective.

A first approximation of correspondence between the task sketched in *Insight* 579-81[602-3], 739-40[761] and functional specialization would relate pure formulations to systematics, “(3) the work of the speculative theologian seeking a universal formulation of the truths of faith”, and hypothetical expression with the effort associated with historical and doctrinal theology requiring that the totality of verified hypothetical expressions stand in some one-to-one correspondence with the totality of documents.

But there is the larger task of interpretation that leads to a second approximation. That second approximation would see pure formulations as the bridge of systematics linking doctrinal expression with the hypothetical expressions of the functional specialty communications. Here, secular analogies are helpful. Descriptive agricultural doctrines such as ‘spare the hedges’ in some particular temperate zones or ‘do not clear stones from soil’ in some particular arid zones have systematic ecological explanations that permit their refined transfer to other like zones. Again, in literature there are descriptive doctrinal characterizations of the human significance of particular

⁵⁰*Insight*, 510[533-4].

culture-bound epics and lyrics which, through purification and enrichment⁵¹ can mediate perspectives on contemporary and future symbol and narrative. Again, there are descriptive doctrines of tranquility in such oriental tradition as Taoism which can have explanatory systematizations in biochemistry, reflexology and human zoology in general that make them relevant and available to any culture in stress. And so on.

Yet however rich these approximations may seem to be they are liable to suffer from major and minor deficiencies. The major deficiency is that which Lonergan characterizes as “post- “⁵² : post-systematic, post-theoretic etc. The functional specialties represent a differentiated academic shift that can be lost in a nominalist identification of parts of the old wine of theologies and other disciplines with the new bottles of a sophisticated focusing of consciousness, in two modes, on each of four elusive levels. The major deficiency is a permanent feature of human culture: general bias and commonsense eclecticism.⁵³

The minor deficiency has to do with the need, not for approximations, but for a total transposition, and so it will dissolve in the full identification of the total set of tasks⁵⁴ of hermeneutics defined by functional specialization. Then the first and second approximations will be seen as calling for approximations of other orders, all to be transposed through differentiation and richer procedural analogues. The further orders spring from reaching back to the primary, secondary and tertiary documents⁵⁵ (and one must widen ‘documents’ to broader expressions of meaning) to display a spectrum of

⁵¹One may think of the transposition of the work of such as Fry, Levi-Strauss, Proff, Durand.

⁵²*Method in Theology*, 304-5.

⁵³*Insight*, 225-42[250-67], 416-21[441-48].

⁵⁴The context is the scheme of the human good of *Method in Theology*, 48, 184, 359.

⁵⁵*Insight*, 579[602].

interlocking schemes of collaborative recurrence spanning the first four functional specialties, generating a set of movements⁵⁶ towards approximations to pure formulations circling round the demand for personal foundational expression on the part of the dialectician⁵⁷, and so seeding the permanent academic demand for the universal viewpoint.⁵⁸ The reaching back is proleptically oriented beyond foundations towards a sublating transposition of the first and second approximations geared, within emergent probability, towards the flowering of human history and destiny.

Among the enriched procedural analogues the central place is occupied by the meta-analysis of development, including the development of the understanding of development. The relevance of that analogue is clearly indicated by Lonergan in the context of the quotation from the Epilogue of *Insight* given above. Lonergan speaks of the relevance of “our analysis of development”⁵⁹ and notes that “if the parallel with the interpretative process emphasizes identity and continuity, there also is development though its complexity can be no more than sketched in an epilogue”.

Lonergan’s own long struggle with the problem of a full inclusion of meta-developmental reflection in the transposition of theology is evident mainly in his unpublished works. There is a grappling with the relation between history and system in *De Intellectu et Methodo* (1959); there is the incipient effort to lace system into the history of system in his late economic writings; there is the earlier heuristic, which surely coloured these efforts, specifying logic as a genetically-structured system of

⁵⁶One’s heuristic perspective should reach out to the concrete actualities of scientific practice: departments, libraries, conventions, etc.

⁵⁷*Method in Theology*, 250.

⁵⁸See *Method in Theology* 153, n.1.

⁵⁹*Insight*, 740[762].

system.⁶⁰ What would result from that century-slow full inclusion is a matter of fantasy: “a process of self-constitution, a *Selbstvollzug*”⁶¹, mediated by luminous foundational subjectivity, mediating, through the vortex of specializations, a new radiance of poet, prophet, priest.

14.2 Method in Metaphysics and Theology

I have already, in the introductory comments to this **Cantower**, drawn attention to the need to contextualize your effort here at reading as best you can. Chapter six of *Process. Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minders* was an earlier (1989) attempt to push the advantage of explicit contextualization.⁶² There I paralleled the sections 6.1, .6.2, 6.3, 6.4 with two sequences in *Insight*: A sequence of complexifications mounting from chapter 15 of *Insight* through *Method in Theology*; a sequence of neglected prerequisites that noted a parallel between the four sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and the four chapters 4,3,2,1 of *Insight*. While that final chapter of *Process* contains, certainly for me, its own enriching lift of perspective, it can be seen to be at least an effort to invite a serious re-reading of Lonergan’s works.

And the same comment applies to the present section, to the present **Cantower**, to the **Cantowers** of this year. Certainly, the few pointers of the next paragraphs cannot be mistaken for adequate reference, essential contextualization. While they may have for me the significance of a startling re-reading after forty years with *Insight*, they are just a nudge for you to read the two chapters referred to with a new verve, a fresh

⁶⁰See *Searching for Cultural Foundations*, edited by P.McShane, University Press of America, 1984, xix-xxi, 126-7, 193 n.96.

⁶¹*Method in Theology*, 363.

⁶²It was there, also, that I first brought out (see pp. 150-1) the need to parallel the two sets of canons, a task key to handling the popular Kuhnian thinking of the past fifty years. I will have more to say on this in **Cantower XVI**.

seriousness. And the same may be said even more about the final section with its focus on New York. Even a single serious reading may well light up the concrete problem of “the reorientation of common sense”⁶³ and the reality of that reorientation’s challenge in which “in each case ends have to be selected and priorities determined. Resources have to be surveyed... Conditions need to be investigated..... Plans have to be drawn up... and coordinated”.⁶⁴ There you have a meshing of quotations and references to the two chapter fourteens that surely freshens your reading of either. And the meshing is worth continuing here.

Both chapters are concerned with the implementation of a quite new conception of metaphysics, a conception that has been the topic of these **Cantowers** from the beginning. Indeed, you might well consider that the **Cantowers** parallel the previous chapters of *Insight*. So, for instance, **Cantower XII**, on Spacetime, can be uncomfortably associated with the discussion of your notion of being as it is fostered by chapter 12 of *Insight*. The discomfort is that in reading the **Cantower** you may have had the honest discovery that you missed this bridge in the book *Insight*. The discomfort is part of the invitation of the conclusion of the section on “Absolute Objectivity” in chapter thirteen of *Insight*, but you may not have felt it on a first reading or even on a twenty first reading. If you grimly and honestly come to grips with your notion, your horizon, of being, you may find that, yes, you are really stuck with some view of us *being* in space and time, with lurking problems of edges and ends. **Cantower XII** brings you back to that “bridge too far”⁶⁵ for your previous efforts at reading *Insight*, of reading in

⁶³*Insight*, 399[425].

⁶⁴*Method in Theology*, 364.

⁶⁵“The Bridge of Size” is one of the bridges considered as possibly too far for contemporary Lonerganism in the article, “Features of Generalized Empirical Method and the Actual Context of Economics”, *Creativity and Method*, edited by M.Lamb, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1983.

particular the first sentence of the final paragraph of section 13.2, “Interpretations of being or of absolute objectivity in terms of space and time are merely intrusions of the imagination”.⁶⁶ What of chapter 11 of *Insight* in its relation to **Cantower XI**? If you move to a comparison you will find that there is a much more discomfiting challenge of self-affirmation, a heavier “scientific moment”, involved in the **Cantower**.

You might think here in terms of Joyce’s *Ulysses*, how he managed to echo the sequence of the work of Homer. And so you will find it profitable, as you work through this present year’s **Cantowers**, to stay alert to the parallel. The paralleling, indeed, becomes increasingly explicit, with the final 21st **Cantower** being paralleled by the Epilogue of *Insight*.⁶⁷

But let me return to the present effort, which involves a triple relating. My hope is that the section to follow will help you to read chapter 14 of both *Insight* and *Method* with fresh wonder, freshening eyes. You will see the frightening improbability of the emergence of such a metaphysics as *Insight* describes, and appreciate the modest shift in probabilities that the revised metaphysics of *Method in Theology* promises. You will

⁶⁶*Insight*, 379[404]. The intrusion referred to is a key reason for the canon of complete explanation in chapter 3 of *Insight*. **Cantower III** offers another entry into the problem of that intrusion by raising such questions as, What do you mean by *phantasm*?

⁶⁷**Cantower XV** is to be taken in tandem with chapter 15 of *Insight*. It deals with the massive 1400-page final effort of Stephen Gould, *The Structure of Evolutionary Theory*, Harvard University Press, 2002. **Cantower XVI** will place the work and tradition of Kuhn in the context of the 16th chapter; **Cantower XVII** will focus on active interpretation, especially that associated with popularization. The title of **Cantower XVIII**, “The Possibility of Cultural Ethics”, makes evident the parallel. The proposed titles of **Cantowers XIX and XX** are, perhaps, sufficient clues to their parallels, “Ultimates”, and “Intimates”. **Cantower XXI**, as promised in a previous **Cantower**, will be on the topic of contemplation, but it will also be sublational of the drive of the Epilogue of *Insight*. It will end the year 2003 and open up to the new **Cantower** rhythm of 2004, one which will pay a considerable amount of attention to the New Yorker, Richard Feynman.

glimpse enlightening parallels between Plato's various efforts and hopes regarding Athens⁶⁸ and my hopes regarding New York or Dublin⁶⁹, or your hopes for your home town. You will sense a need for a massive shift of metaphysics towards realistic fantasy, and of the canons of inquiry of *Insight* chapters 3 and 17 to inquiries into the future. You will feel, and perhaps be burdened with, the huge role and task of "The Shaking of the Foundations"⁷⁰ where the foundations in question are the professors of philosophy and theology comfortable in recurrence-schemes of tiresome and second-rate re-shuffling of past philosophic perspectives, recurrence-schemes that do not mesh with the ongoing recurrence-schemes of boroughs and wards and blocks that "make life unlivable".⁷¹ You may even begin to glimpse your own small contribution to the rise of fresh Founders, ever ready to offset the Tammany Halls that foster the fester of politics, economics, health, protection, joy, education, that warps the reach of our globe.

So, returning to the beginning of the previous paragraph, the first stage of our effort is to freshen your interest-reading of the two chapters 14 so that you can envisage a pragmatic-reading that would ground personal efficiency and metaphysical beauty. The pragmatic-reading should move you back, or forward, into the context of your own problem of implementation that was a key conference topic both in 2002 and in 2003. There is the suffering beauty and efficiency of withdrawal that pivots on a deep faith in

⁶⁸A context here is the third volume of Eric Voegelin, *Order and History*, Louisiana State University Press, 1957, where he deals with Plato's reflections on the structure of governance.

⁶⁹In the conclusion of chapter four of *Lack in the Beingstalk* I note The achievement of Joyce in making present the 'usual' of 20th century Dublin: the forward-heuristic task is to ground a third *Ulysses* that pivots on epiphanies and aspirations.

⁷⁰The title of Tillich's book that lurks behind my title, *The Shaping of the Foundations*.

⁷¹*Topics in Education*, 232.

the patience of God and a luminous long-term commitment “to implement in all things the intelligibility of universal order that is God’s concept and choice”.⁷² That living is a living within a hidden effort to conceive ever more adequately the “three stages”⁷³ of metaphysics and the “three stages of meaning”⁷⁴ and to express the concrete possibility in effective fantasy. But there is, too, the beauty of proximate effectiveness, but even that commitment needs its patience: effects will rarely be immediate.

“Practical people are guided by common sense. They are immersed in the particular and concrete. They have little grasp of larger movements and of long-term trends. They are anything but ready to sacrifice immediate advantage for the enormously greater good of society in two or three decades”.⁷⁵ But metaphysics in both cases is to be “factual”⁷⁶ and a leavening of “the material that it generates, transforms, and unifies.”⁷⁷

The **material** that I have focused on mainly in these **Cantowers** has been the material of culture to be leavened in its needs, “a profound exigence in the contemporary situation”,⁷⁸ by hodic method. But that material is within the material of local cultures, and proximate operations must be tuned to these cultures. Both long-term and short-term founders must “enlarge their horizons to include an accurate and intimate understanding of the culture and language of the people they address [and care for]. They must grasp the virtual resources of that culture and that language, and

⁷²*Insight*, 726[748].

⁷³*Insight*, 391[416].

⁷⁴*Method in Theology*, 85.

⁷⁵*Method in Theology*, 360-1.

⁷⁶*Insight*, 393[418].

⁷⁷*Insight*, 393[418].

⁷⁸*Method in Theology*, 367.

they must use those virtual resources creatively.... in a line of development within the culture”.⁷⁹

I am thinking here, and I would wish you so to think founder-fashion, whether long-term or short term, of an illuminating day spent wandering the area of Coney Island (in south Brooklyn), absorbing the sad needs of that recreational beach with its shabby subway-stop and battered play-zones where poorer people can still smile and share moments of light and flight. To move to such thinking you may avail of the multitude of books on cities and urbanization, Jane Jacobs or Lewis Mumford or Tom Wolfe. But you must reach out in your contextualized⁸⁰ sensibility to local streets and struts and stutterings, to the universe in the here and now of its groaning finality. So you come to re-read the word *situations* as Lonergan uses it in that fourteenth chapter of *Method*. Whether in Brooklyn or Bombay or Beijing, “situations are the cumulative products of previous actions and, when previous actions have been guided by the light and darkness of dialectic, the resulting situation is not some intelligible whole but rather a set of misshapen, poorly proportioned, and incoherent fragments”.⁸¹

The following section is my small effort to tune you to this way of metaphysical and hodic thinking.

14.3 Founders of New York

I have been in and out of Manhattan, and indeed the other four boroughs of New York City, since my journey to the Florida Lonergan conference of Easter 1971. Only recently, however, did I luminously approach the city with my present perspective for ten days of “field work”, where *field* has the strange meaning given it by Lonergan in

⁷⁹*Method in Theology*, 362.

⁸⁰The contextualization is briefly presented symbolically and diagrammatically in the fourth chapter of *A Brief History of Tongue*.

⁸¹*Method in Theology*, 358.

his lectures on existentialism. “The field is *the* universe, but my horizon defines *my* universe. Both are relevant to metaphysics, for metaphysics deals with *ens*, with *omnia*, with the universe. The field regards metaphysics as such, but the horizon regards metaphysics as possible-to-me, relevant-to-me.”⁸²

My present perspective is not *yours*, and if you have managed to open yourself to the notion of adult growth and you are under my age of seventy, you expect an existential gap. The gap is not closed by summary but by life luminously lived against all the odds. I have written previously - for example, in the final Bacchus pages of *Lack in the Beingstalk* - about incommunicability with the self of last week if one is living thus. My present inclusion of New York within metaphysics startles me, and could not be communicated easily to me of last month. Yet it is all there, “so obviously” in the claim of *Insight* that metaphysics is integral, concrete. Perhaps my few pages and pointers might shorten the climb to the obvious for you?

Why New York? Because at least the borough of Manhattan is familiar to many readers and its mapping is relatively simple: Avenues from 1st to 12th across the map, streets running from 1st (starting north of Soho and Little Italy) to 220th way up at Inwood, where few visitors go.⁸³ New York City has been five boroughs since 1898, but perhaps you might focus just on Manhattan for the present ride.⁸⁴ Or indeed you might

⁸²*Phenomenology and Logic*, 199. It is worthwhile to check the index and the pointing at the end of the introduction to that index, 382.

⁸³Below First Street is the sort of mess of streets that one associates with the core of older cities like Dublin or Jerusalem. Then there is Broadway, rambling up from Battery Park at the south end and cutting across from 4th Avenue at 8th street through the Theater district to beyond 10th Avenue on the Upper West Side.

⁸⁴Here there is the obvious need of a diagram, which in this case is a map or a series of maps: streets, subways, wards, economic, racial, histomaps, population, etc etc. You may remember the boroughs: The Bronx (recalling a land-grant in 1640 to Jonas Bronck, a Danish Lutheran farmer), stretching up to the north-east. Across the East River, on Long Island, there are Brooklyn and Queens (with its two airports, La

attend to your own native place or where you now reside and handle it with the same stretching focus. All I can do here is resonantly invite. Walk with Jane Jacobs and James Joyce. Pause with Ignatius of Loyola's "Contemplation for Obtaining Love" haunting your sensibility. Taste with Proust. But you are stretching for a self-luminousness that was beyond these four. And you must banish, to the best of your ability and time, amnesia: something of Toynbee's *Mankind and Mother Earth* in your bones. Probably you know of Peter Minuit paying the Indians sixty guilders (about \$25) in 1626 for the Dutch possession of the 25 square miles, but you might also walk the Bowery in the memory of the Dutch farms, Boweries, of that century. By 1776 the town stretched a mile up; by 1810 it was two miles; by 1974 there was 34th street and the famous 42nd street was there in the 1880s.⁸⁵ And in the two miles south of 1st street there is a mesh of memories in street names and structure, not only of New York but of the globe. Joe Di Maggio Highway is not far from the hole in the ground that was the Twin Towers and a little north from there a quarter acre was dedicated, while I was in Manhattan in July of 2002, to the memory of the Irish Hunger.⁸⁶ But your reading of faces and streets

Guardia to the north, JFK to the south). The less-populous Staten Island is to the south, accessible by the famous ferry (with its view of the Statue of Liberty) and by the Verrazano Bridge.

⁸⁵Some idea of the growing population of New York is clearly relevant. The population of Manhattan was about 5,000 in 1700; it rose to 11,000 by 1740 and to 22,000 by 1772. The revolution reduce it almost by half, but it surged again to 33,000 by 1790. It had risen to 96,000 by 1810. The famine brought the Irish: by 1860 there were 200,000 of them, about a quarter of the population. The census of 1870 put the number at 942,292. In 1910 Manhattan - now within Greater New York - had a population of 2.33 million. By 1928 Greater New York had a population of 7 million, and it has oscillated above that since. These numbers need the enrichment of details of race, profession, micro-colonies etc etc. As well as Little Italy there is now Little Odessa, and less than half of the total population is white.

⁸⁶The quarter acre is symbolic: there was a British Law that limited poor relief to those who had less than a quarter of an acre of land.

must be a battle against naivety. You are poised in the problem of the Poise and the Protopossession raised in **Cantower IX**: the real Manhattan is in an embrace of the universe that lifts you and the scene toweringly up from the scene.⁸⁷ And the embrace should, for instance, include economics: perhaps, for you at present, a discomforting pointing. I recall the last time that I lectured in Manhattan - it was at the Fordham Law School.⁸⁸ I had worked my way in ten hours to some intimation of the meaning of the 'square diagram' of economic flows that is probably familiar to you.⁸⁹ I concluded by stretching the square into a rectangle so that it could overlay Manhattan (on its side, indeed!). It is a massive task to read the history of money in Manhattan through that overlay.

What is it to read Manhattan? I am speaking now of the reading that is a piece of the operation of dialectic, the operation described on that page 250 of *Method in Theology* to which I constantly return. Then the reading is both factual and contra-factual, a felt presence of fact and fantasy, of agony and aspiration.⁹⁰ One seizes the hustle and bustle of past and present, but also one sights roads not taken and one cherishes strangely that past and present as "something better than was the reality"⁹¹: the emergence of overway and subway travel that places faces in rattling silence on the

⁸⁷I am recalling here the drive of **Cantower III** towards understanding's centrality, towards the Dark Tower.

⁸⁸Fordham University is in the Bronx, where the town of Fordham was founded in 1673. The University was originally St. John's College, founded by Bishop Hughes at Rose Hill in 1841.

⁸⁹I am referring to the fundamental diagram of Lonergan, twisted through an angle of 45 degrees as in the presentations of *Economics for Everyone. Das Jus Kapital*.

⁹⁰This type of dialectic reading, both precise and existential, is a difficult and slowly-developed habit: it twines fantasy with accurate interpretation, lifting the object line by line into a perspective that seeks to echo God's agony with evil.

⁹¹*Method in Theology*, 251.

edge, perhaps, of their real journey of inner contemplation. So, one freshens O. Henry's remark, "New York will be a great place if they ever finish it" or the comment of Ed Koch, the 119th mayor, "New York is not a problem. New York is a stroke of genius. From its earliest days this city has been a life boat for the homeless, a leader for the hungry, a living library for the intellectually starved, a refuge not only for the oppressed but also for the creative".

But one does not lose sight of the invention in 1788 by William Noonan of the Society of St. Tammany and the twisting story of Tammany Hall all the way up to the 1950s. One has to hold to the possibility of satirizing power lust and avarice in the tradition of Zenger's *Weekly Journal* of the 1730s. One has to push New York towards a larger world view as Karl Marx did there in the *Tribune* more than a century later. And Marx brings to mind both the piano that he wished his daughter to have and the pianos that emerged from Henry Steinway's factory after 1853. There we find the echo of the realities of loneliness and longing that reach out globally in Marx's Soho or in Manhattan's Soho. The *Stranger's Handbook of New York* of that year of 1853 lists 7 theaters, 25 Broadway hotels, and 272 churches in the city. And, as with the flow of money and Tammany, so the twisted flow of piety needs a massive attention to reveal roads not traveled, a dire absence of ongoing founders. What did these 274 churches represent, dictate, demand, direct? And to the emergence of churches and concert halls one may add the emergence of educational structures on all the levels in the five boroughs. The warps in the recurrence-schemes that crippled these emergences and their orientations go back to the beginning of the axial period. Plato's efforts at founding were already too little too late.

So I slide forward to the question of my title: what might be meant by "founders of New York"? First, I obviously mean ongoing founders, and this is illustrated by Plato. Athens was there: how should it be organized, ruled? Plato had a shot at thinking that out, especially in *The Republic* and *The Laws*. But it is a geo-historical

issue: there are Chinese, Indian, Egyptian, etc versions of the effort, or lack of it, and the resulting *polis*.

Recall now the work of **Cantower VIII**, on “Slopes”, on the manner in which the various zones of inquiry move up through research, interpretation, history, converging “at different angles” on the dialectic task. There I noted that later I would deal with the move forward to the eighth specialty of executive reflection, but made the point that it is not symmetrical to the angling up of the previous four. The contrast can, perhaps, best be conveyed by noting that in Research, etc one is picking up on random “sports”, successful practical thinkings related to urban dwelling in any zone. But the aim is to shift from the random sports to “democratic spreads”. You need diagrams here: can you manage some? I once presented the process - in New York in fact - in terms of two cones the top one resting, “point to point” on the vertex of the other. There is the move up in the lower cone to dialectic which, you remember, generates not only positional discoveries but also a richer gathering of culturally viable types.⁹² What is specified in foundations, the connected point, is a foundational pointing: in a terrible pun I talked about a “Coney Island” of founding mothers. The way forward, mediated by these founders, is complex in that the richer dialectic gathering is not lost but lifted forward through the last three specialties to mediate a fuller urban life globally.

Have you got the picture, roughly? I do now wish to enter here into the complexities of the lifting forward, stuff for later **Cantowers** and for future collaboration. My main hope here is that you enrich you image of the Tower-climb of **Cantowers III** and **VIII**. And this also helps you to add a discomforting touch of realism to the modest shift from Plato to Lonergan. Functional specialization is not magic: but it will change the statistics of mediated happiness; it is an improvement on

⁹²See *Method in Theology* 250. The paragraph on *Classification* and *Selection* ends with the words “and dismisses other affinities and oppositions”. The dismissal may be only foundational; the last three specialties will pick up on some ‘dismissed’ seeds of progress.

Plato's solitary reach.

This can best be seen by returning to our concrete reflections on New York, its history, its present structure. And perhaps you might find it useful to think at first merely in terms of architecture. A style can emerge, for example, pre-1940 in Germany or post-1960 in Japan, and can be spread - regularly uncritically, accidentally: think of the Bauhaus invasion of New York; read Tom Wolfe's witty book *From Bauhaus to Our House*. Such uncritical accidental spreading is to be replaced - I write with distant normativity - by a hodic structuring of the mediation of local building. It would be good here to recall the comments on the present inadequacy of aesthetic criticism exemplified by the writings of Seamas Heaney.⁹³

But again I do not wish to enter here into detail. Indeed, I wish you now to focus on the present state of philosophy - and theology - in New York. It is not a matter of me giving the location of New York Universities and the history and statistics of philosophical allegiances in different departments. It is a matter of you thinking concretely about some department that you are familiar with, and asking What happened to the care of Athens shared by Plato and Academes? A member of a department of philosophy and theology can certainly care about their city: but I am talking here about integral care, the integral heuristics that they are called to be. Perhaps you notice that, whatever their commitment to the affairs of state and street, their academic bent is largely academic, in a shocking reversal of Plato's meaning of academic bent. Obviously you will not find the hodic division of labour luminously operative: that is something of the next century. But think broadly of the forward specialties: are their shadows present in present departments? For instance, there is such a thing as Systematic Theology in many departments: does it even vaguely anticipate the massive generative genetic pragmatics⁹⁴ that would powerfully mediate

⁹³See *Cantower VIII*.

⁹⁴See *Cantower VII*.

the gentle transformation of the interlocking recurrence-schemes of present institutions, roles, tasks, of religious and socio-economic theory and practice? Or is it rather some type of puttering with past systems, usually of the static axiomatic type? Indeed, what is found generally in departments of philosophy and theology is an evident lack of any serious commitment to the forward mediations.

Perhaps you are beginning to sense better “The Need for the Division”⁹⁵ of labour within a functional unity and beauty of methodological influence? Generalized empirical method would extend that unity into all the veins and capillaries of culture to reach this village and that suburbs, this farmland and that rice paddy. Founders are to be the leaven of the cultural lift within and without the hodic tower, initially only a mustard seed.⁹⁶ But only the detailed accounting of the random effects of such seeding will be solidly persuasive in our mad hurried, yet relatively mindless, modern world.

Think again, for instance, of New York money: the graft and payoffs of the nineteenth century, the federal and state bail-outs of the twentieth century, the mythology of Wall Street. What is needed in New York is a massive shift of economic thinking, and it seems good to quote here from the conclusion of Lonergan’s reflections of sixty years ago on the challenge. “Now to work out in detail the conditions under which this must be done, and to prescribe the rules that must be observed in doing it, is a vast task. It means thinking out afresh our ideas of markets, prices, international trade, investment, return on capital. Above all it means thinking out afresh our ideas on economic directives and controls. And if we are to do this, not on the facile model of

⁹⁵The title of section 4 of chapter 5 of *Method in Theology*.

⁹⁶Recall and enlarge Lonergan’s reflections on present leading by the nose. “... it will give new hope and vigor to local life, and it will undermine the opportunity for speculation corrupting central governments and party politics, it will retire the brains trust but it will make the practical economist as familiar a professional figure as the doctor, the lawyer, or the engineer”. (*For a New Political Economy*, 37)

the totalitarian or socialist regimes⁹⁷ which simply seek to abolish the problems and with them human liberty, then there will be need not merely for sober and balanced speculation but also for all the concrete inventiveness, all the capacity for discovery and for adaptation, that we can command".⁹⁸

Directives and controls, that is the issue: and perhaps it is better to think of directors and controllers, but now in the fantastically new sense associated with microautonomy⁹⁹ and mesoeconomics.¹⁰⁰ You need to stretch your imagination to envisage new patterns of conversation in wards and boroughs, in theaters and banks, in school boards and stock-markets. But above all, if you are thinking hopefully and efficiently of the future, then you must think "of persuading eminent and influential people to consider the advance thoroughly and fairly",¹⁰¹ and you must think and talk of that advance as an advance in education from kindergarten to college.¹⁰² But I have written of this already: perhaps I need only remind you of the slogan that gives popularly the core of the advance: "when teaching children geometry, one is teaching

⁹⁷In 1942 Lonergan had mainly in mind fascism and communism. But sick centralisms are the order of the present day.

⁹⁸*For a New Political Economy*, 105-6. It is the conclusion of his 1942 typescript of that title.

⁹⁹The notion of microautonomy was first presented in chapter 10 of *Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations*. It will grow in significance as we move through **Cantowers XIX and XX** on "Ultimates" and "Intimates".

¹⁰⁰The notion of mesoeconomics was emphasized in *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A Fresh Pragmatism*. Eventually the present non-empirical tradition of "general textbooks" in economics (regarding their disorientations, see Anderson and McShane, *Beyond Establishment Economics. No Thank You Mankiw*) will be replaced by local analyses. School texts should show even more local interest.

¹⁰¹*Method in Theology*, 366.

¹⁰²Recall the beginning of the first chapter of *Lonergan's Challenge to the University and the Economy*.

children children”.

And from this invitation to read each and every classroom normatively I return to the problem of section 14.2, the question of reading more adequately chapter 14 of both *Insight* and *Method in Theology*. Perhaps you already notice the freshening of meaning of the few quotations given in that section from these chapters? So, **situations as cumulative problems** may now take on the shapes and tonalities of Manhattan’s Chinatown or Greenwich Village or your local equivalents. But were not such shapes and tonalities already there, steaming from the typewriter of the 65-year-old Lonergan?

We are, of course, back to the question of interpretation in both the active and the passive sense.¹⁰³ The 48-year-old writer of *Insight* had already walked with luminous attention the streets of such cities as Rome and London. He had no doubt but that metaphysics included those streets and so he - much later - resonated with Jane Jacob’s descriptions of city life. Nor, even if his own expression was flawed, did he doubt but that “all we know is somehow with us”.¹⁰⁴ So, while he wrote of the goal of reorienting common sense and science in terms of major and minor premises¹⁰⁵ he knew where those premises were to be; he took his stand on the fact that “the goal of the method is the emergence of explicit metaphysics in the minds of particular men and women”,¹⁰⁶ and that this goal required that “theology unites itself with all other relevant branches of human studies”.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³I discussed this previously in the final section of chapter one of *Lack in the Beingstalk*.

¹⁰⁴*Insight*, 278[303].

¹⁰⁵*Insight*, 399-400[424-5].

¹⁰⁶*Insight*, 401[426].

¹⁰⁷*Method in Theology*, 364. You might find it interesting, or startling, to read now the next very dense page of *Method* and discover the subtle patterns of dialectic practice in integrated studies, patterns related in particular to the effort, in **Cantower VIII**, to

Reading New York, or wherever, into chapter 14 of either work is not, then, reading in, but reading with a full metaphysical reach for the field, the garden, the town. And what of my own effort in section 14.1? Does it not seem remote from the present topic, from departments of theology, academic campuses, block associations in cities? Yet I wrote the chapter in the wake of an effort to point towards the rich complexities of Communications as a functional specialty. In that previous writing I was thinking concretely but writing symbolically of sets of systems, S_{ij} , and the intermeshing of such systems with actual contexts through the operations of the eighth speciality.¹⁰⁸ Within a developed heuristic science, such symbolism is recognized as reaching to the concrete realities of the globe.

The problem, THEN, is one of unshared context, and that is the problem being faced in these **Cantowers** with their drive to a communal sharing of the first and second words of metaphysics and a diagram of global collaborative endeavor analogous to the periodic table that guides chemical and biochemical collaboration.¹⁰⁹ Perhaps you might return to that diagram now and look for New York there. For instance, the diagram envisages the sequential operations of aggregates of viewpoints on viewpoints: so it includes, certainly for me the writer, my dialectically-twisting viewpoint on the viewpoints of the 120 or so past mayors of New York. The Founder's task, in any specialty, is to make such an inclusion a vibrant operative reality so that,

describe collaborative disciplinary slopes.

¹⁰⁸“Systematic, Communications, Actual Contexts” was not published until 1987 in *Loneragan Workshop* (7) 1987, 143 - 174. There were occasional concrete illustrations in the article: “So, French agriculture-based theory-policy of an earlier century, transposed by general functional economic categories, might be found relevant to a culture-sensitive economic transformation of a twenty-first century Indian province” (151).

¹⁰⁹The diagram, from page 124 of *A Brief History of Tongue*, has been presented regularly.

like a good New York school coach, she or he is ready, ever ready, to nudge the specialized or local human team gamely forward.