

*Cantower X***Foundations: A Place in the Son**January 1st 2003**1.1 Contexts**

A new reader might view this comfortably and comfortingly as a beginning, and there is a sense in which it is just that. If you have been with me since *Cantower I*, then obviously it is a different beginning. You can perhaps recall at that beginning my quoting of Eric Voegelin's final fifth volume of *Order and History*: "Where does the beginning begin?". My nine-*Cantower* beginning was a complex contextualization of the present beginning that tackles the apparently simple question, What is it to interpret?¹ As you well know, either from a Lonergan background or just familiarity with the general problem of hermeneutics or history reading-writing, this is in fact one tough question. I would have us tackle it very gently and very slowly. How slowly? It is, for me, the six-year project of *Cantowers XI - LXXXI*, 71 monthly *Cantowers*. So, we begin with the next *Cantower*. What of the present *Cantower*? Originally, this *Cantower* was to have been the first of eleven that were to focus on physics: the year was then to end with *Cantower XXI*, placing the struggle of the year in the context of contemplation. That plan was changed after the August West Dublin Gathering:² the year of reflection on physics is at present relocated with something of a beginning in 2004, weaving around till it blossoms in the final three-year drive of these *Cantowers* for a fuller foundations inclusive of a heuristic eschatology.

¹You may move past this question easily at this stage, but it can be a deep haunting question. In my first years of struggling with Lonergan's suggestion of a "division of labour" in the late sixties and early seventies I paused in many strange places, in fields, on university campus grounds, on beaches, puzzling about how to interpret our human way from past to future. At the end of section three, below, perhaps you will sense a larger meaning.

²*Cantower VI*, which reflected on that gathering, gives the reasons for the change in section 6.3.

However, I have stayed with some of the objectives of the original version of this *Cantower*, which was to have dealt exclusively with the problem of the foundations of physics. So, the next section deals with that topic in an abbreviated and modified fashion. Section 10.3 homes in on what you might consider the proper context of our reflections on interpretation, the context of the book *Method in Theology* in so far as it sublates *Insight*'s treatment of the topic.³

The final section, 10.4, might well have been titled "Spacetime, Gracetime", but it seemed convenient and suggestive to give it the same title as the same section, 10.4, of chapter three of *Method in Theology*: "Undifferentiated Consciousness in the Later Stages of Meaning". It brings together, I hope fruitfully, positively, suggestively, existential contexts for our climb. But it also points to a richer context that has to do with our deepest mysterious exigence.

It is, of course, your climb and mine, at different paces. Coming to appreciate the difference of pace and perspective is itself, alas, part of the climb. If you have been with me through the previous *Cantowers*, better still, if you have struggled through *Lack in the Beingstalk*, you will have some sense of that. But I am holding to the challenge of making this a fresh beginning and I will claim that my drive here is mainly towards elementary foundational pedagogy. I want beginning-students to be able to stay with me through this venture. And I would hope not to bore those who have already a sophisticated grasp of what Lonergan was about in his two efforts to deal with interpretation.⁴ As I think of beginning-students I cannot help remembering my own experience of arriving at chapter seventeen of *Insight* for the first time in the late 1950s. I had never met the word 'hermeneutics'; I just staggered through the chapter gathering vague impressions of a vast achievement that paralleled the achievement of, say, chapters 3 and 5, where my background lay. And here I am, over forty years later, still struggling to get a reasonable grasp of that achievement as I attempt to guide you forward.

Yesterday I leapt to a delightful analogue from successful science, indeed successful science

³The problem of the sublation is raised in the first footnote of the chapter on "Interpretation", *Method in Theology*, 153.

⁴We will have to venture beyond the two obvious places - *Insight* chapter 17 and *Method in Theology* chapter 7 - but I will try to restrict such ventures. We cannot avoid, however, pulling in some of Lonergan's reflections on history from *Method in Theology* chapters 8 and 9.

teaching. My analogue for what I am attempting is Richard Feynman's Third Volume of *The Feynman Lectures on Physics*.⁵ I was rather tickled when I noticed that the three volumes contained 117 chapters: the magic number of my *Cantowers*! But my immediate parallel is with his third volume, with 23 chapters dealing with Quantum Theory. His approach is eccentric and novel, but I would say successful. I shall return to this more fully in 2004.

I wish us to exploit various parallels in existential fashion. The question for you is, What do I really think, hold?, and you may profitably tie this in with the "scientific moment" in hermeneutics that we paused over in section 5 of *Cantower IX*. Lonergan recalls that "the introduction into physics of tensor fields and eigenfunctions raised a barrier"⁶ for experts in experimental work. "In similar fashion one may expect diligent authors of highly specialized monograph to be somewhat bewildered and dismayed"⁷ by Lonergan's hermeneutic principles and canons. They are not of course: they have as yet to hear of them, to feel their pinch. The difficulty is that Lonergan's move is, especially if it is considered in the full sweep of *Method*, a major paradigm shift. This can be briefly indicated - as I have done on numerous occasions - by noting that his precisizing of method as self-attention fits into the larger context of the study of method, method-ology, which involves a third order of consciousness. You might be interested in following up that point about third order consciousness and methodology by noting that there are three chapters in *Insight* on method that roughly parallel the three orders: chapter three representing the shift from spontaneous method to method in the lower sciences; chapter fourteen representing the second order of consciousness; chapter seventeen raising the issue of the full transition to methodology. But no panic: we will be moving round this larger problem in these next years. Nor should you panic because I am plunging in at the deep end of methodology in a way analogous to plunging into volume three of Feynman. Indeed those of you with the bent towards the full challenge that was written about in *Cantower V* will find that there is a curious parallel here: Feynman III is an entry

⁵Richard P.Feynman, Robert B.Leighton, Matthew Sands, *The Feynman Lectures on Physics*, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Massachusetts, 1963; sixth reprinting 1977 in three volumes.

⁶*Insight*, 581[603].

⁷*Insight*, 581[604].

point to modern physics just as the problem of interpretation is an entry point into the full methodology that is hodic method.

So, let us move back from those distant heights to the introductory struggle: my struggle to introduce, your struggle to envisage correctly the character of your introductory climb, the character that is you, climbing. I have been round and about this topic too many times already, particularly in *Lack in the Beingstalk*. I might talk about the problem as a deep warp of general bias that constitutes a *Lack in the Beingread*. And again, my regular appeal has been to the parallel with reading physics, my students in mathematical physics **reading** my lectures. I never had any problem with assumptions of obviousness in those lectures, but in forty years of philosophic talk it has, as a massive sick cultural ethos, never been absent. Paradoxically, I wish here to do my Feynman best - this relates to a certain level of popularization, a larger topic - to communicate the nature of interpretation, yet the core of that best has to be luminosity with regard to the precise modest achievement of my effort and yours. The battle for that luminosity requires that the core be a regular topic. Here again we have a reminder of the Zen way that, with its Western sister the Ken way, is to be sublated into what I have called a Then way. The beginner should not be too concerned about these fancy allusions, familiar to readers of the previous *Cantowers*. So we begin again with you as patient reader. You may well indeed abandon this *Cantower* now in favour of an initial reading of the third section of chapter 17 of *Insight*. But you may also find it interesting to add a glimpse of the three contexts of the next three sections. As a beginner you would find that section 10.2 gives a fair description of what the *Cantower* project is all about.

1.2 Elevating *Foundations of Physics*

The fundamental elevation that I have in mind here is the elevation that locates foundations of physics as a fifth functional specialty. Those who have been reading along through the *Cantowers* will recall that such a specialty is not special to physics: foundations are an integral heuristic of the communal

will to progress.⁸ They are a community mediating the cycling and recycling, a sifting forward of the best in history's reach.

But let us simply consider physics. Then we might go through the present problematic of physics as we did with other zones of culture or inquiry to show that its fragmentations and confusions call out for the hodic enterprise that is the center of our attention.⁹ One such confusion was discussed briefly in the article mentioned in the previous footnote: confusion regarding the reality of space-time. It is a confusion that has a history reaching back to the dawn of human imaginative distinctions and it persists not just in general imagination and conviction but in modern specialist physics and cosmology.¹⁰ To enlarge immediately here on this simple illustration of confusion would leave my beginner-reader cold, and certainly it would be quite daft to venture into more complex consideration of warps in thinking about fundamental realities of physics, about thermodynamics, ends and edges in cosmologies, energy and entropy, galactic astronomy, eschatology.¹¹ What is important for you to think about is that there are muddles in present physics on all levels and that the search for foundational clarity must gradually take the humble and humdrum vortex form that is my dominant concern. In the concluding paragraph of my Introduction to volume 18 of Lonergan's *Collected Works* I wrote of the "functional-specialist perspective that crowned his life's achievement and that would replace Husserl's search for a rigorous

⁸I would note that this novel expression is a fresh reach for the an explicitation of the new perspective on willing that has been hinted at in the last few *Cantowers*. The direct speaking into history of the Tower of *Cantower IV*, the Bower of *Cantower V*, is a luminously willed control of fantasy that is massively pragmatic and democratic.

⁹There is some indication of this on pp. 205-208 of the article McShane, "Elevating *Insight*. Spacetime as Paradigm Problem", *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies*, 19(2001).

¹⁰We will discuss a classic instance of confusion in *Cantower XII*.

¹¹I am talking here, in fact of the secondary drive of these 117 *Cantowers*. (The primary drive is towards the implementation of functional specialization). The focus of the final 24 *Cantowers* will be on cosmology and eschatology. Later *Cantowers* will have some precise things to say about energy and entropy, but meantime you might ponder what Lonergan has to say about energy in *Insight*, chapter 15, section 4.

science with collaborative empirical humility”.¹² The foundations of physics, indeed even the foundations of Euclidean geometry,¹³ are not a matter of finding definitive axioms, but of recycling endlessly our best feeble human shot at thematizing the grounds of physics, of geometry, of geo-history.

This can lead us to a quite new slant on Lonergan’s normative view of the theologian’s competence: “he [she] should be able to read Lindsay and Margenau”. He was referring to the book that was used as basic reference in *Insight* on the method of physics, *The Foundations of Physics*.¹⁴ We will reflect by and by about this challenge for theologians, but do you see a new meaning of “should be able to”, or of “being enabled to” or of “the capacity to read”? That **capacity** and **need** are placed normatively in this new **institution** with its **roles** and **tasks**.¹⁵ So one can now see, view, Lindsay and Margenau as a particular twentieth century expression of foundations. Its expression gives it the character of foundational pedagogy and - unlike *Insight* of twenty years later - it was reasonable adequate.¹⁶ But now the question of reading it and the emergence of the capacity for that read have a new context.

It is best to pause over one aspect of the inadequacy of *Insight* before we go on. It is one of the ironies of the Lonergan’s massive solitary effort to establish a new philosophical perspective and a

¹²*Phenomenology and Logic*, xxiv.

¹³ The issue is enormously complex. In chapter three of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A fresh Pragmatism* I indicate how Husserl’s essay on geometry points to a massive task of functional specialization. But to get a sense of the problematic one has to plunge into recent research on Euclid’s meaning, or efforts to get beyond Hilbert. In *Cantower XII* I will point to the effort needed to get beyond a false objectivity that is meshed with either Euclidean or Minkowskian envisagement of real geometry.

¹⁴First published in 1936 it became a Dover Publication in 1957.

¹⁵A context is provided by the final chapter of Michael Shute’s book, *The Making of the Catholic Marx. Lonergan’s Early Writings on Economics*, University of Toronto Press, 2004.

¹⁶I do not wish to complicate this section further by writing of the inadequacy of *Insight* that relates to the deficient philosophical and theological context that received the book. I have regularly done this by comparing the book to a book of the same period, *Theoretical Physics* by Georg Joos, and will do so again in relevant detail in *Cantower XII*, section 5.

new Thomism in the mid twentieth century that we may well apply his own *Insight* words to the book: “The great difficulties of interpretation arise when the new wine of literary, scientific, and philosophical leaders cannot but be poured into the old bottles of established modes of expression. In such cases the type of expression, so far from providing a sure index to the level of meaning, originally was an impediment which the writer’s thought could not shake off and now easily can become a misleading sign-post for the unwary interpreter.”¹⁷ His book was, in its overly compacted way, an altogether more adequate thematic of foundations for physics than Lindsay and Margenau - we’ll get back to that - , but it didn’t reach the right audience or perhaps I might say that there were low probabilities of any serious audience or that the audience that read it was not sufficiently cultured. Further, his life-work afterwards lead, not to a shake off, but a shake down of his expression and his disciples did not generate the context that would lift probabilities of an adequate audience. His Roman works were for theological students and were systematically misinterpreted in that the context of questions and answers of *Insight* were of no consequence or interest to the vast majority of students, or indeed to his professional and regularly male clerical followers. His ‘transatlantic lectures’, on the other hand were forced into a popular mode of which mode, ironically, he was deeply critical.¹⁸ The challenge of writing *Method in Theology* was too much for him, both physically and pedagogically: something that relates to the following section. Finally, when he returned to the teaching of his early scientific work on economics, neither his communication nor his revisions can be described as successful.¹⁹ Charles Hefling writes of

¹⁷*Insight*,572-3[595].

¹⁸See his comment on *haute vulgarization* in volume 6 of the *Complete Works, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-64*, and his comments on popular physics in *Topics in Education*, 145. The related disorientation of Lonergan’s life needs serious consideration. See further the context of note 22 below.

¹⁹My Boston Workshop of June 1977 (during the usual week, with an additional weekend presentation) was a fresh beginning of interest for Lonergan (see the question sessions with Lonergan at that Workshop). I worked with him through the Autumn on bibliography etc for his January presentation. He was nervous about it and arranged that I attend by flying down each Thursday in the Spring semester. At some stage in that Autumn we had that wonderful session of “decision” that I have recalled in various writings, when he greeted my arrival with a grin and the statement, “Well, I’ve

Lonergeran's "sparse and lapidary style"²⁰ of those days, and remarks that "calling his work a primer was surely a bit of irony on Lonergan's part".²¹ So you will surely admit that all this leads to the suspicion that there is a problem regarding the interpretation of Lonergan: grist for the mill of these next 70 *Cantowers*.

The full deep solution to the problem both of interpreting Lonergan and of locating the structure and relevance of a Foundations For Physics is the recycling solution. It is obviously not a hodie recycling merely within philosophy or theology, for in the main these are sick zones of axial decline. It is a matter of recycling in the full fragmented and searching cultures of the globe.

The key to that effective re-cycling is the shift to theory that characterizes the second stage of meaning, what I call the Butterfield shift,²² and this is true even when the shift has a clearly reductionist bias. Furthermore, this claim is in continuity with Lonergan's own suggestions. *Insight's* inadequate

figured out what to do about presenting this manuscript: I'll read it to them twice!". I cannot resist adding an anecdote about "decisions". The topic was his daily walk. Living in St.Marys offered the possibility of walking on the roof, so different from his days in Regis College on Bayview Avenue, where he could go to the end of the driveway and return (a two kilometer walk?). Now, he said, the option of the roof meant deciding for or against another length.... "decisions, decisions!". Again, perhaps a certain lack of solemnity regarding my Thursday journeys is of interest, even relevant to the problem of theoretic seriousness. My time with Lonergan on arrival in his room was often a time of joke-swapping. His contribution, regularly, was the humour of *The New Yorker*.

²⁰*Macroeconomics: An Essay in Circulation Analysis*, xix.

²¹*Ibid.*, xxiii.

²²The shift I write of is the shift to theoretic consciousness that Butterfield writes of in *The Origins of Modern Science 1300 - 1800*, London, Bell and Sons, 1965. Lonergan referred regularly to this book and Butterfield's view of the importance of this transition. There is another piece of Butterfield's view that he does not mention but which is very relevant to a central problem of cultural decay and the problem of *haute vulgarization* mentioned in note 18 above. I am referring to such men as Fontenelle (1657-1757) who "invented and exploited a whole technique of popularization" (Butterfield, 160; see also the index references). I will deal with this at some length later, beginning with *Cantower XXIII* "Redoubt Describing", which carries forward the discussion of popularization introduced in chapter 3 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*. The topic is of immense importance in dealing with the transition of Lonergan's work into popular forms and with the need for precision in detecting patterns of decay.

expression allows the challenge to slip through, but the challenge of benefitting from the march of modern physics is a regular theme in the book and he has no doubt about the position of traditional humanist defenders “left in the unenviable position of always arriving on the scene a little breathless and a little late”.²³ *Method in Theology* suffered from a different type of inadequacy but Lonergan managed to make the same point in what might be regarded as a cheeky - or tongue-in-cheeky - claim made after he listed his own solitary categorial position: “from such a broadened basis one can go on”²⁴ to rewrite those early “Background” chapters of *Method in Theology*.

The drive of these *Cantowers* has been and is towards an initiation of the recycling, but *Cantower VIII* made relatively clear that the process is going to be a struggle up various slopes. The present phase of the drive is towards finding, specifying, various gentle slopes that can be associated with the set of problems that surround interpretation, with the interests of people working in hermeneutics, with the struggle of those who have been attracted to interpreting Lonergan in any of the senses of “interpretation”. Few of those people are interested in Lonergan’s challenge to read Lindsay and Margenau, to cultivate adequate self-knowledge through physics, etc.²⁵ Indeed, most of those at present interested in Lonergan would, frankly, not be up to the struggle: in my own case, even with four concentrated years (1952-6) of mathematical physics behind me, I could barely make sense out of chapter five of *Insight* when I first read it in 1958, and I am still trying to get Lonergan’s meaning. So I am not simply inviting you to take up Lonergan’s challenge. But I do invite you to consider that somehow it is the way of the future and to consider how you might help it along: perhaps by inviting your students to read Lindsay and Margenau! This latter helping along is an obvious simple suggestion, and we will later see how realistic it is. But the former task is larger: it here leads us to consider the way of the future and where that future points, normatively, in terms of the three books, *Insight*, *Foundations of Physics*, and *Method in Theology*.

²³*Insight*, 733[755].

²⁴*Method in Theology*, 287.

²⁵*Insight*, 535[559].

What would be best here is a complex flow diagram - which I have - but perhaps a paragraph can lead you to your own. *Insight*, a deeper work than *Foundations of Physics*, did not flow forward into a larger work conveniently named here *Foundations of Theology*.²⁶ But envisage now a different flow than the flow through the years of Lonergan's life sketched above. This is the flow that is the recycling dynamic envisaged by *Method in Theology*, some of which has been described in previous *Cantowers*, and indeed throughout *Lack in the Beingstalk* and *Postkeynes*, but for the moment think just of *Cantower VIII*, which spoke of "slopes". That flow and "elevating" eventually will creatively merge the successes and pointings of *Insight* and *Foundations of Physics*. The merging will involve a re-expression - and regularly a re-thinking - of physics and its history. That recasting will make *Insight* readable both to physicist and to theologians. The missing background, if you like, of education and of literature, will have emerged as enabling context. One can envisage the emerging as giving rise to a new book to replace *Foundations of Physics*. Perhaps we may call it, for the present and modestly, *A Foundation of Physics*?²⁷ And I will yield to the temptation to leave it at that for the present and go on to consider, in section 10.3, the move to a new version of *Method in Theology*. Should it be called, modestly, *A Foundation of Theology*? Or with larger modesty, *Foundations of Theology*? And why should that represent a larger modesty? Because **foundations** are people: the book should be a sort of humble handbook of the calculus of cultural reflection, to be re-written for each generation, or for each minor paradigm shift. Think of the parallel made in chapter four of *Lack in the Beingstalk* with the stages of the Calculus of Variations. And entertain the question that bubbles up from *Cantower VIII* on "slopes": would *A Foundation for Theology* overlap with *A Foundation for Physics*? Should there be a book simply titled *Foundations*? We will struggle towards answers in the next few years But

²⁶The convenience is questionable, especially by those who have an anti-foundational perspective. Lonergan's achievement is in fact anti-foundational in the sense that it leads, not to an axiomatics, but to a re-cycling progressive process. But let's stick with "Foundations" for the present.

²⁷The point made in the previous note applies here. A context is chapter 4 of *Lack in the Beingstalk: A Giants Causeway*, titled "The Calculus of Variations", where I write of the sequence of perspectives on that calculus - the object of Husserl's 1882 doctorate - and draw an analogy with the recycling dynamics of functional specialization.

what are your answers, now?

In conclusion I would like to comment, as I promised, on the value of the suggestion of inviting students, and theologians, to read Lindsay and Margenau. Laced in with my comments there are hints about its elevation through the general perspective of *Insight* that will connect with my peculiar point above regarding *Insight* being a better philosophy of physics than Lindsay and Margenau.

In the old context of philosophy of physics, the book survives its 65 years amazingly well. Indeed, it is hard to replace it with enlightened contemporary stuff, and in so far as some of you remain interested in pursuing foundational questions in physics - to which we return necessarily but spasmodically this year but more energetically in 2004 - I would consider *Foundations of Physics* a suitable jumping off zone.

1.3 Elevating *Method in Theology*

In the past decade I have written and spoken about the problem of *Method in Theology*. Eventually there will be learned books about its origin and its content: here my comments must be brief, anecdotal, suggestive. What the energetic 49 year old genius envisaged as a “far larger” work than *Insight* turned out to be a “brief appendage”.²⁸ In 1966 he was tired, recovering from surgery, but I suspect that writing the book would have been problematic even were he healthy. In that year he remarked to me “What can I do? I cant put all of *Insight* into the first chapter of *Method*.” When I indexed the book in December of 1971 his solution pleased me: *Insight* was back in on pages 286-7 - though it was decades before I became clear on the cunning of the paragraph in the middle of page 287: “...one can go on...” to rewrite the “Background” part of the book, lift the readable descriptions of the early chapters into the discomfort of a relevant metaphysics. Since then my view of an adequate foundational statement has been gradually refined. Could a brief description help here to nudge us forward? What I will do, after a few more introductory comments, is to parallel my reflections on *Foundations of Physics*. First, I will comment on the book as it is; then I will sketch an alternate book.

My few random comments can stay with the 2 pages mentioned. I have on previous occasions

²⁸I am quoting from the first page of the Epilogue to *Insight*.

suggested that after (9) on p. 287 Lonergan might have added (10), indicating the key foundational addition of functional specialization to the integral heuristic commitment to change history. But I have also in recent times suggested that his powerful unshared categorial view might have been omitted - going against my view of 1971 - and replaced by two categories: (1) an indication of the emergence of the division of labour, beginning with something like section 4 of chapter 5, but not adding the grounds of the division; (2) a category corresponding to a compact (and generally acceptable) pragmatic imperative, Be SensAble. I might well add a third listing that would suggest using my first word of metaphysics as a working heuristic of expression.²⁹

Indeed, I could be daring and add, in a fourth listing, the second word of metaphysics that correlates two general aggregations of molecularity to give a working heuristic of linguistic meaning. But let's leave it at two listings.

Now I am suggesting a further possibility. Lonergan might well have given the list (1) to (10) as his own foundational statement - which belongs at the end of page 250 - and then added to his foundational perspective a further listing that relates to probability schemes of progress, to concrete fantasy: the new (11) would note the significance of my (1) and (2) as constituting a collaborative tolerance etc. Food for reflection here, especially for Lonergan over-enthusiasts, on tolerant and persuasive implementation. And also, of course, on self-tolerance and group tolerance.³⁰

My final preliminary comment regards what, perhaps, is now an obvious point. The book *Method in Theology* might well have been called *Foundations of Theology*. You see now, too, the parallel that we are reflecting on between physics and theology? You, like many others, have possibly puzzled about the relation of *Insight* to *Method*. Both are primarily foundational works. The first focuses on objectifying the solitary foundational drive and its possible achievements. The second considers the communal drive and its collaborative needs. Perhaps, too, you can see the way through and beyond foundational and anti-foundational debates? Contemporary fragmentation in all areas

²⁹That was spelled out in *Cantower IV*. I will return to the significance of the "words of metaphysics" in *Cantower XVII*.

³⁰More on this in section 3 of the next *Cantower*.

screams out for a sensible division of labor. No foundational or anti-foundational axioms here, but simply a humble pragmatism. Luminous foundations are, if you like, a remote eschatological achievement.

And now for some comments on the actual work that could be helpful in our struggle forward. I have, of course, been commenting on the work steadily for over thirty years, and more recently in *Lack in the Beingstalk* and in these *Cantowers*: you might consider the present comments as just gathering highlights of importance.

There is the first important word “A”, “A theology mediates”, replaced erroneously in some translations by “the”. One could of course think of theology in its full geo-historicity but that is not what Lonergan had in mind here. And it is as well to recall the work of *Cantower VII*. Systematics or Pragmatics is a system of theologies that mediates communications. Still, that system is itself on the move in the Tower cycles. Perhaps I might get you thinking anastomotically by noting that “A” at the beginning of *Method* replaces “the” at the end of *Finnegans Wake*!

What of the first half of the book? It is a descriptive introduction to foundations. I have already talked of the problem of writing a chapter one, and this is brought out more concretely by the sketch of a first chapter (probably from Spring of 1965) made available by Darlene O’Leary.³¹ More recently I discovered another 15 pages which, I would say, are candidates for a continuation of the nine typed pages of the “discovery file” mentioned in the previous footnote: I have quoted elsewhere from these pages, regarding Lonergan’s sublation of Hegel’s view regarding the full objectification of the human spirit, worth putting in here.³² At all events, that first chapter promised a much heavier introduction to

³¹Darlene O’Leary, *Lonergan’s Practical View of History*, Axial Press, Halifax, 2002. The work contains what I call the “discovery file” of February 1965. Included are sketchings of a treatment of functional specialization. There is also a complete 4-page handwritten sketch of a first chapter and nine pages of typescript covering the first part of that sketch. The chapter promised to be more complex than what finally appeared in *Method*.

³²See *Lack in the Beingstalk*, p.176, where I quote from p. 14 of a Lonergan Archival file labeled A697. It contains a typescript numbered pp. 8-23. I repeat that quotation here to give an impression both of Lonergan’s reach at the time and of our own goal in the full *Cantower* problem, the vast panorama being explored methodically. “As the labor of introspection proceeds, one stumbles

the topic of the book on *Method*. The fifth chapter of the final book, *Method in Theology*, on functional specialization, was the first chapter written and published separately. It set the problem that Lonergan faced, without reference to his previous outline, when he began his writing of a new chapter one: William Mathew's biography will deal with that struggle in some detail. Much of the chapters to follow, before chapter five, can be traced back through various workshops and Summer-schools, shuffled into shape to meet the needs of this part of the book. The same, indeed, can be said of chapters in the second half of the book, especially those on history and doctrines. One can recognize chapter four as a descriptive move towards general and special foundational categories. By 'move towards' I include the idea that there is a generous amount of random dialectic work here, as there is throughout chapters two and three. I recall the first time I encountered chapter three: Lonergan read it to us at a Summer school in the late sixties. I was still in the mind set of expecting a continuation of the solid doctrinal presentation of *Insight* so I posed a rather naive question about whether the presentation was systematic: after all, it does climb from elementary intersubjectivity to community and history. Lonergan's reply was delightfully off-hand: he was just dealing with a few things that should be borne in mind.

So, one can expect surely that there will be those who "can go on" to write new versions of foundations for different audiences, but particularly the one mentioned on that page 287, one that would merge, in an up-dated fashion, the achievement of *Insight* with the descriptive suggestions of *Method*'s "Background" so as to provide a richer foundational challenge. A key shift would be a lift of meaning as "a relation between sign and signified"³³ to a fuller incarnational inclusion of the signer. Depending on the sophistication of the audience it would move up from the inclusion of random

upon Hegel's insight that the full objectification of the human spirit is the history of the human race. It is in the sum of the products of common sense and common nonsense, of the sciences and the philosophies, of moralities and religions, of social orders and cultural achievements, that there is mediated, set before us the mirror in which we can behold, the originating principle of human aspiration and human attainment and failure. Still, if that vast panorama is to be explored methodically, there is the prior need of method".

³³*Insight*,x[5].

dialectic allusions to a starker doctrinal guidance mediated by the genetic systematics envisaged in *Cantower VII*.³⁴

In section 4 of *Cantower I* I wrote of Lonergan's bent towards a dialectic reflection on the past, and it certainly colors the second part of the book. Later I noted that, despite this, he was a master of fantasy in my technical sense of the word. But I do not think that further detailed reflection would help our effort here. As my reflections on systematics and Robert Doran's continued work illustrate, a great effort will be required to replace that feeble second-last chapter of the book with a full challenging heuristic: and parallel illustrations are needed to bring out the deficiencies of the other chapters of Part Two and to replace them with a fuller heuristics. But what is most important here, I think, is to turn back to the "scientific moment" that became a topic in section 6 of *Cantower IX*. It is the moment of personal expression of position associated with the tasks outlined on page 250 of *Method*. We will return to some details of the personal problem in section 3 of *Cantower XI*, and more fully in *Cantower XXV*, but here I would repeat a point already made: that what follows logically in *Method* here is Lonergan's statement of his own position: roughly the context of pages 286-93 of the book. Our problem, which will be considered in that later section, is to reach for a like honest personal and communal exposure. The fuller future problem is to reach for a broad systematics of differentiations and conversions - or transformations and displacements as I prefer to call them - that would enlarge the first two words of metaphysics and replace the various partial accounts of history's differentiations given by Lonergan in *Method* and elsewhere. It seems plausible, too, to expect a more comprehensive account of the three stages of meaning and the two phylogenetic times of the temporal subject, one that would envisage the longer cycle of decline as "better than was the reality".³⁵ This points us towards the final section, so I had best put in a few remarks about one possible rewriting of some such book as *Method* or *Foundations*.

These remarks carry forward equivalent suggestions made in the course of writing *Lack in the*

³⁴I will try to illustrate that starker guidance in the third section of *Cantower XIV*, dealing with the foundations of the specialty, Communications.

³⁵*Method in Theology*, 251.

Beingstalk. So, one could envisage a book of five chapters. A first chapter would powerfully sublate section 4 of the chapter on “Functional Specialties” in *Method*: “The Need for the Division”. I attempted such a chapter already, the third chapter of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A New Pragmatism*. Part of the new pragmatism is not to foist on any group or culture a foundational perspective but to go with the flow of history, with a positive view of the fragmentation that has occurred in all areas of human inquiry and human interest. Functional specialization then emerges as a plausible solution to the mess of libraries, journals, seminars, and the shambled inefficiencies of policies, plans and executive efforts. The chapter, then, would focus on the plausibility of the primary category of an eightfold division of labor, without any reach for their grounds (section 3 of chapter 5 of *Method*) but including aspects brought out by other sections of that chapter. As I argued in *Cantower V*, the first word of metaphysics fits in here: it represents a pressure of completeness and reductionism that emerged especially in the twentieth century. And, of course, the category, “Be SensAble” is massively pragmatic, very hard to dodge, even if you are anti-foundationalist.

So I have here, in these few pointers, come, even to my own surprise, at my answer to Lonergan’s edgy question, already mentioned, of twenty five years ago, as we stood - he pacing - in his cell in Regis College on Bayview Avenue, Toronto.”What can I do? I can’t put all of *Insight* into the first chapter of *Method*?”. Neither of us could have foreseen this odd answer: I could not foresee it earlier this morning in its present random dialectic form and its concluding section lifting rhythmically to a solitary “scientific moment”.

Yet it is so obvious, now. My first chapter of a new *Method* would be a fuller version of chapter three of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A Fresh Paradigm*, and indeed its title isn’t bad: “Inventing Pragmatism”. Its final section, 3.4 is titled “Inventing the Future” and it ends with a cute but telling slogan: “Nothing succeeds like *suck seeds*“. But it should not end there. What and to whom does my telling slogan tell? What does it invite? The original first chapter of *Method* has the same incompleteness, pointing to a first rock, mentioning a second rock - part of the same rock - but not asking concretely for a personal invention, a scientific moment. Here, if you like, I am coming to the high point, the focal point, of the entire *Cantower* project: drawing attention to The Third Rock from

the Son. But the new chapter one of *Method* should end with that drawing out in a certain random fulness. The seed to be sucked is the slim thematic of the search for the unknown unknown that will be my final topic in this *Cantower*. But the seed to be sucked is your core-reach whirled round in the adequate/inadequate expression of that slim recollection of the ground-break heart-break blossom-break³⁶ of the second stage of meaning. The final missing section 5 of *Method* chapter 1, the final missing section 5 of some later lift of *Pastkeynes* chapter three, is a weaving round and up the sucked seed in a third-order Franciscan consciousness³⁷ of this morning's minion³⁸ with your "heart going like mad and yes I said yes I will yes".³⁹

1.4 Undifferentiated Consciousness in the Later Stages of Meaning

The title of this final section is the same as the title of the corresponding 10.4 of chapter three of *Method in Theology*. Add to that section *Insight* chapter 7, section 8, and you will have a first context for a reading of the present section. But my reach here is far larger: can I intimate the distant view?

A broad sweep might be a first help. It may bring to mind for you previous reflections on Hegel or Jaspers or Voegelin on nescience, on the twilight nature of human history, where *nature* there means *our* grasp of it. I might throw in other thinkers who refer relevantly to details instead of eons: von Karajan in his seventies for whom Beethoven's symphonies remained novel, yet unheard; Proust who had not yet tasted tea. And I might recall an early reflection of my own, where I was beginning to taste the absence of taste and was led to express that absence in terms of James Joyce's "Oxen of the Sun"

³⁶I think here of a four-wheeled carriage for eight.

³⁷A useful context here is Chesterton's book on St. Francis of Assisi.

³⁸I refer to Hopkin's Windhover. For a context see the Epilogue to McShane, *Music That Is Soundless*, Axial Press, 2002.

³⁹And what of the other four chapters of the new book that I mentioned? What do you think? That obviously depends on the blossoms from your own scientific moment, and on whither you are taken in the telling by your core-bent to a commitment to invent pragmatics.

episode in *Ulysses*: I wrote of “The Bridge of Oxen”.⁴⁰ The episode in it was a maternity hospital episode where the birth of a child was expected, and Joyce sweeps up through the styles of English prose towards a birth and a babel, perhaps towards the edge of *Finnegans Wake*. Who could have envisaged beyond that edge to the reality of *Finnegans Wake*? But then what primitive human could have envisaged the lift to birdsong in symphonies of Beethoven or Messien?

A crude expression of the counter-position is with us, heartheld. We all have a pretty good idea of human life, its cities and trades, its arts and exchanges, its anthems and antics. Yes, there have been changes, from cross bow to bomb, from ox-pace to Mach-pace, but really this is just a shift of sameness. And, as Kurt Vonegut Jr., would have it in each chapter-end, “so it goes”. One can, of course, recognize human aspiration and desperation: the same hope against hopelessness throughout the millennia.

But what is this same, this sameness? It is the sameness of an unknown unknown.

And here’s the rub. Our habitats and our estimative sense - both biochemically bound - convict us to an obviousness that is a lie. And the unknown unknown in us occasionally rebels against that lie, even speaks out. But the speaking out is dominated not by the unknown unknown but by biochemical sameness. Tea has always been tea, and type - since Guttenberg - has always been type, and *Cantowers* can interestingly supplement Solomon’s Canticle’s and Pound’s Cantos. The speaking out is of our achievement, not of our unknown unknown. We speak then - the history of human speaking and writing and aesthetic meaning - of the known unknown unknown that we name *capacity, need*. Sometimes the unknown unknown sneaks gracefully through our biochemical barriers but the thematic turns it down, down, a sandy mound, wind-formed.⁴¹ The unknown unknown remains so.

Let me take another take on this. I have a problem envisaging precisely the functional specialty called history, which reaches for a differentiated transposition of Ranke’s *wie es eigentlich gewesen*.

⁴⁰In *Creativity and Method*, edited by Mathew Lamb, Marquette University Press, 1980. The article was titled “Features of Generalized Empirical Method”.

⁴¹I am thinking here of the Indo-European roots of the word *enthymeme*: *dhumos, dheu-*, and their reference to the movement of dust.

That specialty deals with fact, with truth. Does it deal with what I wrote of in the previous paragraph? There is the fact of neglect of the unknown unknown. But is not this somehow the topic, the focus, of the next specialty, dialectic? History, one might say, deals with what happened: dialectic reaches for progress in that happening and for the grounds of progress. But pause over the meaning and nature of that reach. The nature of the reach is an unknown unknown; the meaning of that reach - the "outgoing of subject" - is a partial knowing of the unknown unknown. It is a heuristic recovery of that knowing and its effects within history. The specialty history is the knowing that is its data; the reach operates on that data to reach a thematization of the revealed heuristics of the reach itself. If history at its best is ecstatic, as it is, then dialectic is reduplicatively ecstatic. But, paradoxically, the reduplication at its best makes luminous the slenderness of the knowing, the dark gap between that knowing and the unknowing unknowing that is the raw reach.

The raw reach is hidden in history. So, if the specialty history has anything to say about it, it is a speaking of nothing; a positive nothing, then, is neglected in history either as written or as lived. A historian certainly can give an account of neglected meanings, and a dialectician can note failures to advert to such neglected meanings. But the unknown unknown is not a meant: it is an aggregated dynamic in history that escapes facticity. The facts are doings and knowings of doings, and they can reach the comprehensiveness and refinedness of second order critical history. Dialectic sifts that facticity to make darkly manifest "something better than was the reality".⁴² But the manifestation is simply fantasy built on facts, a temporary fruit of the unknown unknown that is the nothing at the heart of progress.

And what, you may well say, has all this to do with undifferentiated consciousness? What constitutes undifferentiated consciousness is precisely the unknown unknown, it is "an always future hollow,"⁴³ it is the "nothingness lying coiled in the heart of being - like a worm."⁴⁴ But not Sartre's

⁴²*Method in Theology*, 251.

⁴³J.-P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, London, 1957, 128.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 21.

worm: rather the worm written of earlier in homely metaphor, the earth-bound worm circling with blind hunger the sunflower seed whose distant life is a Go Gogh sunflower. Nor is it Sartre's nothingness: it is the wormwhole core of trillions galactic residues, star and scar trekking, "each member, each group, indeed our whole host and its great pilgrimage".⁴⁵

The whole hole pilgrimage spews out its monumental tale, and one can see a detail as *The Decline of the West* or an Eastern Cycle of return or even "a longer cycle of decline". Then, yes, one can say that "the will to achieve both slackens and narrows. Where once there were joys and sorrows, now there are just pleasures and pains. The culture has become a slum".⁴⁶ But when one rises, or sinks, to the level of **nothing**, the nothing that you and I are, then what is this speech of will that slackens in this slum but a flickering thematic of the unknown unknown that is the galactic pilgrimage of colored holes?⁴⁷ The full thematic of the unknown unknown is strangely not an object even when it is surprisingly a Thematic.⁴⁸

A return to a previous thematic and metaphor may help. The reduplications that I write of are to be the climbing sloping achievements of a tower climbing reaching plains of lightsome darkness. The towering achievement is to ex-plane undifferentiated consciousness to itself. At present, in the muddled arrogance of uncooperative searchings and a postmodernism that is thoroughly modern, it is true that "never has adequately differentiated consciousness been more difficult to achieve. Never has the need to speak effectively to undifferentiated consciousness been greater".⁴⁹ But we may tower, *Can Tower*, to a new statistics of achievement and a new luminosity of speaking, of ex-plainning. And what will that achievement and speaking be? The simple metaphor

⁴⁵Hermann Hesse, *The Journey to the East*, London, 11970, 12.

⁴⁶*Method in Theology*, 99.

⁴⁷I am recall here another context and another titling: *A Brief History of Tongues. From Big Bang to Colored Wholes*, Axial Press, Halifax, 1998.

⁴⁸See *Method in Theology* 266, 341-343.

⁴⁹*Method in Theology*, 99.

already introduced prevails. The plain of common meaning and of undifferentiated meaning remains infinitely remote, infinitely below an infinite skylark: but the same infinity is above the Towered searchers. Only, the unknown unknown is better named in the aye of the Whirlwind Tower.

And a return to a previous image may also help: it is the three line image of the human good that Lonergan provides in *Method in Theology*. Think now of the first two lines as a complete account of the human good: human capacities and needs are embedded in the good of order: what else is there? And why, then, the third line? Might one think of that lines' names as somehow meshing the reality with the "better than reality", as mentioning a massive incompleteness in the specification of historic being? In telling the hole story? Then one suspects that the future holds further genetically-related tadpole thematizations of the frog that will be Queen, and such thematizations will flesh out still-thin stillborn-threatened meanings for *liberty, orientation, conversion, personal relations, terminal value*. But even that thin meaning will lift the street-value of humorganic meeting to new lights of loneliness, longing, lorgnetting.

And I still have not mentioned our place in the Son: "to those who prove victorious I will give some hidden manna and a white stone, with *a new name* written on it, know only to the person who receives it."⁵⁰ And what would the point be of going here beyond mention, of lifting *Cantower II*'s Sonburst to further wordyness? There are leads there, and in the flights of chapter five of *Process*, that echo thinly the deeper leads of Aquinas and Lonergan.

There is, then, a serious literature on the Speaker, Word, Listener, the identity of the Ultimates within the Christian tradition,⁵¹ and there will be more about the circuminsession of the Divine in later *Cantowers* in continuity with *Cantower II* and Lonergan's reachings as they appear in translation. But

⁵⁰Revelations, 2:17.

⁵¹For those of other traditions this is perhaps only a matter of interest: for some there is a larger multiplicity in the divinity, for others a singleness of being; for all, there is the orientation towards a Oneness.

I have yet to invite you to pause over the word “place”.⁵²

The pause will actually be initiated in the prolonged reflection required by *Cantower XII*. There you face, and perhaps enter, the discomfort of trying to cross the bridge of chapter five of *Insight*. Only in the final *Cantowers* will we venture into the heuristics of everlasting placement. But it seems fitting to conclude here by noting the key difficulty in the reading of this section, or the corresponding section in *Method in Theology*, or the reflections of *Insight* 7.8.

I suppose that I can bring that difficulty to light for you by noting that I would very much like to think that the majority of the readers were over that bridge: a foolish desire, as I know from the decades I have struggled to come to grips with the geometry of our lives. Few readers will have had my opportunity to so struggle. But the central question I would ask you to consider, to raise in your molecular space, is the question of attitude. You may well be a relatively undifferentiated person: no panic about that. But have you within you a bent beyond general bias, beyond commonsense eclecticism? The next *Cantower* brings this question into focus and generates a context for the personal pursuit of this question.⁵³ Meantime, I would like to think that the complexity of my reach here, and indeed through these first ten *Cantowers*, has not discouraged you. I think that you will find that the next ten will have a gentler pedagogical orientation, and perhaps later efforts will be more geared to dialogue.

⁵²*Cantower XXI*, “Epilodge”, paralleling the Epilogue of *Insight*, will place place in a new contemplative context. By *Cantower XIV* it will be pretty clear to you that I am paralleling the corresponding chapters of *Insight* through the rest of this year.

⁵³It is of interest for you to note that there is a peculiar parallel emerging here between the rest of the *Cantowers* for this year and the corresponding chapters of *Insight*. So, there is an entertaining connection between *Cantower XI* and chapter 11, pivoting on the need for a humble tongue-in-cheek approach to self-affirmation. The paralleling becomes more explicit from chapter 14 on, and the final *Cantower* of the year, fulfilling an earlier promise of dealing with contemplation, has the odd title “Epilodge” which echos the title of the Epilogue of *Insight*, and meshes its considerations with the reflections of that epilogue. The parallel between the present *Cantower* and chapter 10 of *Insight* is certainly obscure, but you may find it interesting to ponder over the dynamics of corrective learning and the remoteness of fundamental axioms in method, mathematics, mathematical logic, the logic of the divine. Part One of *Phenomenology and Logic* is helpful here.

Still, there are those of you who have been climbing for years, with me or unknown to me. And there are those who anticipate the climb. For all, these *Cantowers* can be considered as anticipations. A commonsense, relatively undifferentiated reader, can read them in anticipation of a better human future, whether or not they intend sharing the climb. A climber can anticipate the long years of climbing to an adult growth that present times neither invites nor permits.