Chapter 7

SYSTEMATICS, COMMUNICATIONS, ACTUAL CONTEXTS

"Successive contexts have been formed only to provide the base and the need for forming a further, fuller context; and as is clear from our final chapter, even several hundred pages have not brought us to the end of the process" (Lonergan, 1957b: 731).

The present essay points towards contexts, specifically the upper open blade of an actual context of adequate theology in future millennia. The essay stands in genetic continuity with a previous Festschrift essay: not an appendix, then, but rather a tale wagging the dog. Where the previous essay centrally drew attention to the challenge of the achievement of the forty-eight year old Lonergan who wrote the initial quotation, the present essay moves that challenge from the seemingly only personal challenge of Circulation Analysis and Insight to an historic role-full humdrum challenge of the vortex of functional specialization, a vortex which will impishly wag the sluggish individual quest.

In that same page of the work Insight Lonergan remarks on "the inception of a far larger one." I suspect that none of us has real intimations of the lonely sick heroic climb of Lonergan to the mist-prints of the short work, Method in Theology. It certainly was the inception of a far larger one, and it is only by sifting through unpublished lectures, notes, scribbles, that one can come to sense the dimensions of his reach for a methodical redemption, under grace, of history. I would hope to intimate a growing structured sense of that reach in a later book (McShane, 1989).¹ here I can only express clues, suspicions, map-readings. There are four sections to follow. A first section gives

¹1. See the concluding page of McShane, 1975.
some indication of my deep respect for, and long struggle with, Bernard Lonergan's meaning. It should be useful for young people who constantly feel pressured towards a mythic speedy growth in understanding. The second section is substantially my panel presentation on economics for the Santa Clara Symposium. This section places "the actual context of economics" (McShane, 1981: 543-71) in a new context. The third section here both enlarges that new context and fits genetically into the discussion of bridges of meaning that forms the first part of the article just referred to. The fourth section places the clues to the enterprize of methodical redemption in the larger context of that vein of the Cosmic Word which is modernity's\(^2\) genesis of an ongoing genesis of scientific humility and method.

I have had the privilege of writing in honor of Bernard Lonergan in various Festschriften since 1964, and in this essay, paying homage to him in his eightieth year, I find it difficult to know what further to say. I have, on occasion, compared Lonergan to Beethoven, Rembrandt, Galileo, Mendeleev, Joyce. Perhaps I might recall here the initial quotation of my contribution to Creativity and Method, regarding Joyce keeping "the scholars busy for 300 years, so that anyone who has been working on Finnegans Wake for the past 20 years, still has 280 to go. Not every Wake commentator has accepted the full measure of the dedication, apparently, for some have paused for long respites along the way" (Benstock, 237). Lonergan's cultural profundity, in fact, goes far beyond the great men to which I have compared him. I have taken little respite along the way in reaching for his meaning and "that reaching has changed me profoundly" (Lonergan, 1957b: 748). But unlike Lonergan with Aquinas, I am no first rate mind chasing after another. So perhaps here I may write for lesser minds like my own in an honest biographic sense so that they may be less discouraged by "the murderous grotesque of our time" (Voegelin, 1974b: 251), as it effects the academy, from slowly stumbling round

\(^{2}\) For the meaning of "modernity" see the preface and chapter 1 of Searching for Cultural Foundations (McShane, 1984).
and up the mountain of meaning.

I was fortunate to discover both Insight and the Verbum articles in the late fifties. I had just come through four years of mathematics and mathematical physics and still regard it as a major turning point that I learned to read by struggling through such works as Whittaker and Watson, A Course of Modern Analysis. In that particular work the chapters were short, but each ended with a substantial collection of problems. A first reading left one blank before the problems. Only after weeks of laboring through the problems did one arrive at the state that Lonergan describes in another context: "one has simply to read, and the proper acts of understanding and meaning will follow." (1967b: 219). I mention this experience here because I see as central to present confusion in philosophy and theology the problem Lonergan points to in remarking that present culture does not teach people how to read. And of course one may take 'read' in a larger sense: reading houses, attics, nests, and so on, with Bachelard (see 1969: 14, 21, 39, 47, 83); or with Don Quixote and Lonergan, "reading the book of himself" (Joyce, 175).

My first impression of Lonergan's achievement was of a massive paradigm shift, something like a shift from pre-Lavoisier chemistry to the context of the periodic table. This became painfully evident when I began to study theology in 1960 and found not a queen but a confused commonsense eclecticism. The discovery forced me to express my early enthusiasm in such articles as "The Contemporary Thomism of Bernard Lonergan" (McShane, 1962a) "The Hypothesis of Intelligible Emanations in God" (1962b).³

That early enthusiasm and respect has not dwindled but grown over the years. I find, even after almost three decades, that I have only begun to glimpse the remote subtlety of Lonergan's discovery of subject and object, and in this I seem to be at odds with many of his disciples. Yet I am not more than averagely slow-witted. That problem was ever present to me as I edited the Florida conference papers and I expressed it

³I take the opportunity to note that the first two lines of p. 549 of this article should be omitted.
briefly in the preface to volume 2: "And so, while it is true that the verbal expressions of the minds of great men shorten our labours, that like pygmies we stand on their shoulders, there can be an element of illusion regarding just how much shorter our labours are to be, just how authentic we stand" (McShane, 1972: ii).

Here I think it useful to illustrate the problem of reading Lonergan from personal experience. I recall three clear instances. The first instance comes from the book Insight. By 1963 I had some suspicion of what the book was initiating but I was acutely aware of being bogged down in chapter 8, which deals with the heuristic notion of the notion of thing. That chapter was my central preoccupation through the winter of 1963-64, and only in the spring was I satisfied that I had the beginning of an appropriation of the spontaneous notion. And certainly my experience leaves me out of sympathy with David Tracy's view on the distinction between 'things' and 'bodies': "The distinction (perhaps his best known one) is easy enough to grasp if the previous chapters have been understood" (Tracy, 121-22).

A second instance regards Lonergan's economics. In the late sixties he sent me the manuscript which had remained in his files since 1944. It was only in the seventies that I came to attempt a serious reading. After five years of persistent re-reading it became clear to me that Lonergan had done for dynamic economics something equivalent to a jump in astronomy from Tycho Brahe to Laplace. The meaning of Lonergan 's economics is part of foundational theology. Yet that meaning is quite beyond the present perspective either of political theology or of standard economics. Its discontinuity with thinking in these areas warrants fresh starts free from comparisons either with contemporary faulty revisions in economic theory or with the hazy reflections of political theology in these past decades. One must read Lonergan's political economics over against the actual object—which centrally is subjects—that of which

4 The word "notion," which occurs regularly in headings and texts in Insight, has layers of meanings, paralleling the variety of ways of being "at home in transcendental method" (Lonergan, 1972: 14).
he has conceived the normative heuristic.

A third instance of personal difficulty is a present one. I find the eighth functional specialty as elusive in Method in Theology as I found the eighth chapter in Insight twenty years ago. The following sections represent present gropings. What, for instance, is meant by the brief initial section of chapter 14, the ninety-second of Method in Theology, the 199th of Insight and Method combined, entitled "Meaning and Ontology"? Could it be read profitably under an alternate title such as "passionate subjectivity in the lucid closed options of the finality of implementation"?

Is it pointing towards what I will conclude to at the end of section III below, the mutual self-mediation of the actual contexts of mindful theology and meaningful history? What I write here will help, I hope, towards a communal search for the meaning of the executive reflection that crowns theology's withdrawal. What I write, then, is not summary but rather tentative pointers, map-readings, suggested directions for climbing.

As I grow older I believe less and less in summary expression, even when one has reached a worthwhile perspective. Too many people seem willing to attempt for Lonergan what Fichte attempted for Kant, or what De Quincey attempted for Ricardo. I have little faith in such attempts, particularly if they have no content driving rhythmically from below upwards towards morning dreams and images. In their clarity they belong largely to undifferentiated consciousness in the later stages of meaning. They had no place in compact consciousness. They will, one hopes, dwindle as we come to the end of the horrors of modernity, the age of garrulousness, during the next

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The fundamental issue is hierarchically-harmonious adult growth, particularly in that displacement towards heuristic system which is the foundational enterprize.

We live between the passionate passivity of the empirical residue and the dynamic passion\(^7\) of infinite Persons. What is primary in history, even without sin, is silent darkness. Even late in life, or in history,\(^8\) there cannot be more than illusory twilight, and the foundational search Is an endless metempirical asking for greater depth in the same questions. It is a struggle against the terror of biography which parallels what Eliade names the terror of history (1955: 139-62.

I have written biographically here, and while the writing may seem mainly descriptive it expresses a fundamental foundational stand. When I was forty-five years old I wrote in agreement with Husserl, without foundational misery, "How I would like to live on the heights. For this is all my thinking craves for. But shall I ever work my way upwards, if only for a little, so that I can gain something of a free distant view? I am now forty-five years old, and I am still a miserable beginner."\(^9\) I would hope, in the future, to remain in agreement with Bachelard: "Late in life, with indomitable courage, we continue to say that we are going to do what we have not yet done: we are going to build a house" (Bachelard, 61).

Burl Ives, at seventy-four, spoke of his endless struggle against deficiencies in his

\(^7\) On the relation of Trinitarian passion to suffering and evil, see Lonergan, 1980: 327-30.

\(^8\) One must sublate, through Lonergan's view on emergent probability, inverse insight and mystery, what Voegelin has to say of history: "history is discovered as the process in which reality becomes luminous for the movement beyond its own structure; the structure of history is eschatological" (Voegelin, 1974a: 304).

\(^9\) From a letter of Edmund Husserl to Franz Brentano, October 15th, 1904; quoted in Spiegelberg, 1965: 89.
voice: he was still, at that age, devoting two hours each day to singing scales. The theologian and the philosopher, indeed the academic who would face the challenge of generalized empirical method in history, must endlessly return to the scales in a contemporary context, to the ABC of the reality of the self, the historic world, the Absolute, all revealed only within the self in solitary quest.

10. An interview with Stereo Morning, CBC, November 1983; repeated July 1984

11. I think of the triangle ABC of *Insight* (27, 504), as well as the "Transcendent Triangle" advancing as lover (see note 7 above). There are the scales, too, of poetry, and the risks of integral presence of finitude (see McShane, 1984: 145, n60).
II

My primary intention, in this brief panel presentation, is to give some indication of the complexity of a new systematics of economics as a functional specialty. Secondarily, I wish to indicate the larger significance of the foundational conception of this systematics by relating the heuristic both to the last functional specialty and to the general task of theology. I will pass over Lonergan's contribution to the foundations and systematics of economics, the history of that contribution and its relation to other views: sufficient indications are already available (McShane, 1980: chapters 6-8; 1981: 556-71).

The conventional view of Systematic Theology is the one which contrasts a via systematica with a via analytica, best illustrated perhaps by the Trinitarian theology of Aquinas sublated by Lonergan's treatises of the 1960s. What I am suggesting as a possible third-stage heuristics of a New Systematics comes from Lonergan, but clues to it come from the modern sciences that deal with genetic development—growth of plants and animals, and studies which deal with the dialectic development of humans. Sources in Lonergan for the notion are mainly two: Lonergan's discussion of systematic understanding in De Intellectu et Methodo, 12 his own efforts during the past decade culminating in the 1982-83 version of his economics. A useful and available context for theologians is Caput Primum of Lonergan's Divinarum Personarum Conceptio Analogica (1957a) and Its revised version in De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica (1964c).

A brief panel presentation is not the place to try to detail the novel heuristic structure in itself and in its relation to the other functional specialties. I will attempt, rather, to give clues, analogies, and random illustrations that will open the discussion towards later comprehension and functional specialist collaboration.

A first aid to the notion of the new systematics comes from reflection on the heuristics of the study of a growing plant or animal - Insight's discussion is relevant

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The understanding of such realities involves a seeking of the form of a sequence of Integrations of varying lower manifolds. One may next complexify this notion by envisaging human development which adds a dialectic factor. Next, it is perhaps helpful to consider the difference between a reflective diary of such a development and a completed biography which, among many other things may add the tonality of destiny, or "just right" ... making the life "better than it was" (Lonergan, 1972: 251).

Next, a shift from the individual to history, indeed specifically to a fourfold history: the history of economic fact, the history of economic theory (see, for example, Schumpeter), the history of economic policy, and the more-recently-emerged contrafactual economic history (see Fishlow). I would note here that these histories will be slowly and remarkably transposed by "the use of the general categories in all specialties" (Lonergan, 1972: 292), categories which will include the culture-invariant general economic analysis of Lonergan meshed into a heuristics of schemes of recurrence. So, for instance, a restructuring of research by the functional distinctions of the productive process will throw up new patterns of statistics: again, the same distinctions will ground fresh patterns of the rhythms of nineteenth-century British, or twentieth-century Soviet, economics. This shift from individual to history brings us closer to an appreciation of the two struggles of Lonergan: his struggle in De Intellectu et Methodo to link history and systematics in a manner that, so to speak, would carry history forward "with minimal loss," his struggle in this past decade, working with Schumpeter and a few other books, to apparently "supplement, illustrate, etc.," his own basic systematics with insights and even rescued oversights, with the labors of economic innovators and 'oddballs' alike. A key issue here is the task of 'reversing the counter-positions' so as to carry forward into the genetic systematics any understanding possibly contributory to the practical understanding of some economic situation in some culture somewhere.

A secondary and quite different issue is the extent to which Lonergan's recent
work was dominated by a praxis heuristics of such a genetic systematics. Certainly, he sought such a notion in the late fifties; also, early in his 1982-83 manuscript he takes a stand with Schumpeter: "Scientific analysis is not simply a logically consistent process that starts with some primitive notions and then adds to the stock in a straight-line fashion ... Rather it is an incessant struggle with creations of our own and our predecessors' minds" (Schumpeter, 4). At least one can say that, just as in Insight Lonergan was doing generalized empirical method not in the way he defined that method in Insight (1957b: 72) but in the way he later defined it (see McShane, 1981: 545-56), so in recent years he operated spontaneously towards the transposition of the content of a complex systematics in a way that brings together his pre-functional specialty reflections on systematics and the differentiation of his consciousness into functional specialist operations. Finally, I would suggest that a closer reading of the chapters on the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh specialties in Method in Theology — from the perspective, one might say, of the general categories of pages 286-87 — would reveal a drive of the "universal viewpoint" (see 1957b: 564ff and 1972: 153) towards the present view of systematics.

Let us return to a final clue to the nature of the new systematics, reached by relating it to the eighth specialty which I here presume to call Executive Reflection. For simplicity, consider the new systematics to yield a related genetic sequence of empirically-grounded understandings simply symbolized by $S(U_i e_j)$. The subscripts $i$ and $j$ indicate the looseness of relation: unlike the connectivity of the sequence of 'form and matter' in a plant, the 'form' of an economic theory or policy of one time or place may have its 'proper matter' at another time elsewhere. Executive reflection mediates between this complex ever-growing systematics and the varieties of disciplines, cultures, and media of present and later times and places (see Lonergan, 1972: 132f and McShane, 1984). Clues to the particular praxis-relevance of $U_p$ can come from the $i$ or the $j$ or the position in the sequence: one might reflect on the Rostow school on 'take-offs' for illustrations. So, French agriculture-based theory-policy of an earlier century,
transposed by general functional economic categories, might be found relevant to a culture-sensitive economic transformation of a twenty-first century Indian province.

Theologians may note the manner in which, in their own field, such a "transposition of systematic meaning from a static to an ongoing, dynamic process" (Lonergan, 1972: 304) would meet the challenge of providing "an understanding of the realities affirmed by doctrines (349), of being "at home in modern sciences, modern scholarship, and modern philosophy" (350), and of providing a systematic objectification of religious interiority that is "historical, phenomenological, psychological, sociological" (290), thus becoming adequate to the threefold task of communications. The pressure for such a demanding enlargement of systematic theology will come from the cultural matrix: so, to take an example other than economics, a systematics of anxiety is called for in present psychology, that, contextualized by the transcultural base of general categories, would bring into illuminating genetic coherence such apparently unrelated searchings as the description of anxietas in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations and the definition of anxiety in The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (Horney, 1937).

Returning to economics, I would note that Lonergan's contribution of an invariant component to economic dynamics, within its context of general and special categories, is profoundly discontinuous with present economics and present methodologies and philosophies of economics. Moreover, as Alfred Eichner points out, present economics departments mainly represent not a science but a social system (Eichner, 1982; see also Rosenberg). Eichner, himself, represents a minority group with a different but still deeply limited perspective (see Eichner, 1979).

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13. See, for example, Fred Lawrence on Christian success in "The Human Good and Christian Conversation" (Lawrence, 1984).

A useful strategy in coming to some appreciation of the discontinuity of Lonergan's view with present work is to venture into the history of theories of distribution. Maurice Dobb's *Theories of Value and Distribution Since Adam Smith* (Dobb, 1973) is a convenient initial text. Theories of distribution, right down to current debate, are bogged down in the *priora quoad illos vel hos* (Lonergan, 1964c: 44f) of varieties of prices, and succeed only in generating incoherencies regularly regarding immeasurables (Dobb, 1973: 247ff). Lonergan, in contrast, through a long struggle witnessed to by discarded manuscripts of the thirties, succeeded in thoroughly removing prices, and so on, from the *priora quoad se* through a theory of distribution and redistribution which compares to current theory as does question 27 of the *Summa Theologiae* to Tertullian's Trinity. It is a startling illustration of what Lonergan calls "the displacement towards system" (1964b: 10, nlO). It leaves Lonergan's meaning of prices, profits, and so on incomparable with current confused meanings.

There are, however, some, of more open perspective, that are not mainstream economists. So, for example, Jane Jacobs, in her new book, insightfully pinpoints the positively significant features of intercity economic activity and the varieties of transactions of decline—military production, welfare programs, transplant investment, advanced-backward trade, VAT ... —in a manner that solidly contributes to a new systematics. She recognizes "patterns in economic history as so repetitious as to suggest that they are almost laws" (Jacobs, 1984: 206). What she puts forward as a "radical intervention or discontinuity other than transactions of decline" (214) is a relevant dismantling of sovereignty and empire (see McShane, 1980: 196). She considers this only as a "theoretic possibility" (Jacobs, 1984: 214). However, if her reflections are sublated into the actual context of functional distinctions in economics (McShane, 1981: 556-71), microautonomy and lucidity of characters of intentionality (McShane, 1978: 53, 93; Rosenberg, 1983), then her theoretic possibility falls within the schedules of probability to be envisaged by the normative science, however inoperative (Lonergan, 1957b: 223) it may be in the present slums of mind (1972: 39f, 99).
Again, J. J. van Duijn's *The Long Wave in Economic Life* points to a large-scale genetic systematics of the life cycles of innovation and infrastructural investment beyond politics: "policy makers are oriented toward directly-observable short-term fluctuations" (1983: 14). But what he remarks of other approaches (28) is true of his own: there is a tendency in him to lump together varieties of industries, remediable only by precisely and spontaneously operative functional distinctions. Like the biologist at the zoo (Lonergan, 1972: 83), the economist must "see another manner" in which goods and money flow.

Causing in the economic community the horizon-shift necessary to see thus in another manner is the massive task of education of which Lonergan has written: "coming to grasp what serious education realizes, and, nonetheless, coining to accept that challenge constitutes the greatest challenge to the modern economy." The genuinely contemporary theologian has the uncomfortable task of becoming educated in the relevant invariant macrodynamic heuristic if he or she, in any functional specialty (1972: 292), is to contribute to the mediation of that transposition of economic culture. He and she "have to take a professional interest in the human sciences and make a positive contribution to their methodology" (1957b: 743).

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16. Lonergan, unpublished manuscript of the late 1970s.

17. I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Nicholas Graham of Toronto, who provided me with his texts of Lonergan's lectures of the past decade, kept me informed on current literature, and put me in touch with Jane Jacobs while she was completing her recent book.
III

For further clues regarding the structure of the enterprize of systematics and communications we turn to the foundations specified by Insight and Method in Theology. It is perhaps necessary to draw attention to the fact that these writings are substantially Lonergan's contribution to the fifth functional specialty, to which may be added certain sections of his Latin works. So, in Insight, there is a drive towards what are later called categories, and while the book was written prior to the differentiation of consciousness which is functional specialization it both provided Lonergan with data of consciousness for that distinction, and is transposable without major change into the oratio recta of the fifth specialty. The changes are minor: so, for example, clarifications by contrast reach a new precision through the operation of counterposition-reversal, implementation as a character of metaphysics becomes distributed over different specialties, and chapter 17 in particular calls for refinements and enlargements in ways that we will touch on presently.

I vividly recall Lonergan expressing a certain frustration, in the mid-sixties, regarding the beginning of Method in Theology; what was he to do? He couldn't repeat all of Insight in the first chapter. As an examination of Method shows, what he eventually did was to build the achievement Insight into the task of Method in a discomfortingly un-subtle fashion. This is perhaps best noted through a careful reading of his sketch of the general categories on pages 286-88. So, one may note a complexification of the basic heuristic resulting from an enlargement of the contribution of chapter 6 of Insight under (2), while (1) and (3) place chapter 1 of Method in that larger context; (4) and (5) point to an inclusion of the heuristics of chapters 2 and 3 of Method: (6) through (9) add the massive post-modern perspective of Insight to the foreground of Method. And at this stage one is normatively in a position to provide "a developed account of" chapters 2 to 4 of Method. What is this developed account? It is the account that, for example, transposes the heuristic diagram of page 48 of Method
into a properly explanatory heuristic, so that the theologian be no longer "arriving on the scene a little breathlessly and a little late" (Lonergan, 1957b: 733), in present times. Two examples may help. One may consider foundationally, in the context of the eighteen terms, the good of order. Since "what is good, always is concrete" (1972: 27), that good has the complexity of an economic order. Again, one may consider, in a theology of hope, the capacity and need for hope. But what does one mean by 'hope'? As there is a physics, chemistry, and biology of aggression, powerfully pushed towards explanation and implementation by the needs of war, so there is an explanatory perspective on hope. Can the theologian rest content with a vague descriptive specification either of the economy or of hope?

The description of the general categories moves on to note the possible models of change, drawing extensively on Insight to lead the reader to the challenge of reaching towards a universal viewpoint. Here I recall an early point, that Method in its entirety is foundational. So, the fundamental models of change remain to be more fully determined by the discussions of contexts that occur further on, especially in chapter 12.

One senses, then, a powerful heuristic basis, "a central nucleus that somehow could retain its identity yet undergo all the modifications and enrichments that could be poured into its capacious frame from specialized investigations" (Lonergan, 1985a: 6), normative of the actual context of future theological enquiry, grounding a genetico-dialectic collaboration within each specialty and between specialties much as the periodic table grounds chemists' painstaking collaboration or an adequate evolutionary hypothesis would unify detailed biological enquiry.

"Changes in the control of meaning mark off the great epochs of human history" (Lonergan, 1967a: 256), and this generalized data-based vortex control of mediating meaning opens towards an encirclement and confinement (1957b: 484, 521f, 570f) in the finality of being that goes beyond the optimism of Insight to a patient reverence for large numbers and long intervals of time. So, the universal viewpoint is to be reached slowly by the larger community of second-, third-, and fourth-rate minds by a liberating
entrapment in the cycles of functional specialization, and general categories can emerge in the minds of regular theologians not by reading *Method* but by the manifestation of the need for the use of such categories in all specialties (1972: 350f). Thus, instead of present attempts to "apply functional specialization" that are analogous to phlogiston enthusiasts dividing the periodic table in eight after Mendeleev, there will emerge the elite homeliness (1972: 14, 350f) of small controlled contributions to a respected science of theology.

In chapter 17 of *Insight* Lonergan remarks: "one may grant readily enough that meanings form a genetically and dialectically related sequence of unknowns and that expressions develop from the undifferentiated to the specialized. The two basic assertions are sound but where do they lead? Though the actual implementation of a method cannot be tucked into the corner of a chapter on a more general topic, still some sketch seems desirable" (1957b: 579).

The structure of an implementation based on a transposition of that sketch and the related canons, into functional specialization, certainly cannot be tucked into a short article. It seems important, however, to share clues that may carry forward Lonergan's foundational enterprize.

I have already spoken of Lonergan's struggle in the sixties, and I would add here three further points preliminary to touching on aspects of the required transposition.

First I would note the relevance of Lonergan's Latin works for an initial reaching towards components of the sixth and seventh functional specialty. Secondly, there are not only sets of unpublished lectures on method such as those referred to in section II above, but also a substantial collection of handwritten notes of the period which remain to be investigated. Thirdly, there are sets of texts of *Method* both from Lonergan's summer courses through the sixties and from his attempts to bring the book to completion. Of these texts, including *Method* itself, I would note first that the full richness of his unpublished searchings and contributions within his Latin treatises did not find their way into them; secondly, that the last two specialties in particular suffer
from late condensed expression.\textsuperscript{18}

So, from struggling with unpublished handwritten notes, I have been led to a notion of the eight specialties as a staircase climb of increasingly enriched contexts and to a conviction that I, and perhaps others, was misled by a more familiar image of oratio recta as a descent from Foundations. In these notes one finds such remarks as "synthesis is a doctrine about history" in relation to doctrinal theology, and in relation to systematic theology, "synthesis is a theory of history."\textsuperscript{19} One gets a sense of the reach towards an adequate basis of pastoral theology from notes like the following: "understanding yields, not just one set of concepts, relations, but any variation for any purpose", "... theology 1) not a Platonic Idea 2) but the many species (not individuals, except as types, as dominating personalities) 3) in a genetically and dialectically differentiated genus."

The increasing complexification parallels, I suspect, that required for economic executive reflection that I noted in section II.

Lonergan's summary indication of general categories ends with the statement, "the problems of interpretation bring to light the notion of a potential universal viewpoint that moves over different levels and sequences of expression" (1957b: 288). One reaches basic clues to the use of this component of general categories in the last three functional specialties by bringing together, in a larger personal actual context, Insight's discussion of pure formulations and Method's later indications of contexts: ongoing, prior, subsequent, derivative, interacting, and so on.

The brief treatment of pure formulations, and related hypothetical expressions,

\textsuperscript{18} I am indebted here to work done by Nicholas Graham on the evolution of Method in Theology through various manuscripts and institutes.

\textsuperscript{19} The quotations in this paragraph are from unpublished handwritten notes of Lonergan from the early sixties, Batch B, 8, 6, V. The notes were given by Lonergan to Frederick Crowe in June 1972, and catalogued by McShane. They remain In the Toronto Lonergan Center, as yet not publicly available.
emerges from the posing of a problem of interpretation that transposes partly into problems of oratio obliqua but primarily into problems relating directly to Doctrines, Systematics, and Communications.\textsuperscript{20} The transposition of pure formulation would seem to lie within a theory of history, grounded fully in the explanatory context of emergent probability,\textsuperscript{21} in mutual self-mediation both with Doctrines and Communications.\textsuperscript{22} There are the actual expressions, high points of doctrinal development, that mediate the systematic quest. But there is also the genesis of hypothetical expressions within a systematic reach that home in, through probabilities and possibilities, on actual expressions in Doctrines. Further, there is the genetic relation of Systematics to Communications in a reach for hypothetical expression that could become relevantly actual, in tune with the expression of the finality of being in particular cultures.

Finally, the collaborative operation of the mutual self-mediation of theologians of oratio recta has a set of normative controls briefly indicated by Lonergan in the sketch of interpretation and in the related canons. To the powerful threefold controls indicated in the sketch (1957b: 580f) there are added the demands of the canons for a withdrawal in systematics from description into differentiations of the protean notion of being and for the operation of four principles of criticism that would shift positively the statistics of the ongoing process of listening and speaking of theologians. Systematics becomes transcultural, even if still perspectival,\textsuperscript{23} looking back to the Hebrew/Christian expression and meaning in its world context, looking back and forward to the benign

\textsuperscript{20}20. The reference is to Insight, 580, but one should add the context of Insight, 738-42.

\textsuperscript{21}21. See Kenneth Melchin, "History, Ethics and Emergent Probability," a doctoral thesis for Concordia University, to be published shortly.

\textsuperscript{22}22. On mutual self-mediation, see Lonergan, 1984: 12-14. I am indebted throughout this section to discussions with Sinead Breathnach, who is writing a thesis on "Communication and Communications" at Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland.

\textsuperscript{23}23. On perspectivism see Lonergan, 1972: 216-18, 224, 246.
communication of the saving message to all people of all times.\textsuperscript{24}

In the final section, some indications will be given of natural analogies for this quest from such fields as biology and medicine. It is useful to conclude the present section, however, with familiar illustrations.

Consider the first five theses of Lonergan's \textit{De Verbo Incarnato} (1961).\textsuperscript{25} A close analysis of these theses would yield illuminating contributions to the specialties of \textit{oratio recta}. So, for example, the discussion of schemata in thesis one not only relates back to New Testament interpretation but relates forward through the analytik\textsuperscript{26} of immanent sources of meaning (1957b: 580) to pastorally relevant differentiations under the canon of relevance (587). Again, reflections on deviant viewpoints have the colour of counterposition-reversal: thus, attention is drawn not just to the error but to the significance of Apollinaris (1961: 109f). But, above all, there is a recurrent reaching for pure formulations not just for themselves but for controlled mutual self-mediation of doctrines and systematics: "\textit{ex reali difficultate ad difficultatem terminologicam fere a priori concluditur}" (108), and indeed \textit{vice versa}.

Right through these theses there is a the general categorial use of "the integral heuristic structure which is what I mean by a metaphysics" (1972: 287), qualified by a

\textsuperscript{24}One aspect of this, with emphasis on China, is treated in my "Middle Kingdom, Middle Man" (McShane, 1984: 1-43).

\textsuperscript{25}References will be to the 1961 edition (Rome: Gregorian University Press) which differs substantially from the 1964 edition only in later pages, due to changes in the thesis on the knowledge of Christ. The 1960 edition has differences in pagination due to changes of print size.

\textsuperscript{26}The proposed title of chapter one of the book referred to earlier (McShane, 1989) was "Procedural Analytiks," an attempt to twist words towards subjects in line with \textit{Method in Theology}, 88, n34: "At a higher level of linguistic development, the possibility of insight is achieved by linguistic feed-back, by expressing the subjective experience in words and as subjective." An Analytik is a person just as an Actual Context is a person or group of persons. But one must, in fact, envisage a much more radical linguistic shift in the third stage of meaning.
perspective on mystery,\textsuperscript{27} on contingent truths about God (see 1964a: 49-53), on the non-reducibility to the metaphysical elements of the reality of such truths (1957b: 734). As Lonergan pointed out in his reply to the second Florida volume, he can take his stand on such metaphysics (in McShane, 1972: 310-312). What was needed was the enterprise of \textit{Insight} to ground it adequately, to sublate and extend it. The following five theses of \textit{De Verbo Incarnato} move vigorously and comfortably in that actual context. Only then do issues of subjectivity emerge. There is a strategy here worth noting. I see no point in discussing God with Anthony Flew if he doesn't know what a dog is; I see little value in discussions about subjects with theologians like Schoonenberg (Lonergan, 1985b: 74-95) and Hamilton (Crowe, 1968) if they do not know what objects are.

My main wish here, however, was to draw attention to Lonergan's Latin works for light on \textit{oratio recta}. I chose to emphasize \textit{De Verbo Incarnato} over the more complex \textit{De Deo Trino} because it more evidently leans on pure formulations within proportionate metaphysics, such as minor real distinctions that are culturally invariant in humans (Lonergan, 1957b: 490), that fruitfully illumine mysteries of an incarnate divinity, that provide a bridge to expressions of those mysteries suited to persons for whom Greek expressions of minimal\textsuperscript{28} systematic religious meaning may sound like alien profundities.

The bridge slowly to be provided is part of a complex network of salvific mediations finalized in a gentle providence (1957b: 665).\textsuperscript{29} Within that network it will

\textsuperscript{27}27. See Lonergan, 1964a, thesis 5, particularly 274; see also \textit{Method in Theology}, index under "Mystery."

\textsuperscript{28}28. "Slight tincture" (1972: 279), "slight dose" (309).

\textsuperscript{29}29. For a complementing component see McShane, 1976, where Whitson's \textit{The Coming Convergence of World Religions} (New York: Newman Press, 1971) is linked with the progress of science.
invite, cajole, the monocultural mind, locked in some translation of Greek expressions and Hebrew morality, to a larger patience and tolerance. One may recall at this stage Lonergan's comments on the Kimbanguist Church (1985b: 69f, 73) and perhaps find here a fuller context for those comments.

There are some six thousand independent African Christian churches (Barrett, 1968), not all, indeed, of the high religious tone of "The Church of Jesus Christ on Earth through the Prophet Simon Kimbangu." How is one to envisage the dynamic of their origin and growth through the mediation of functional specialization?

The integral pure formulation, a psychological presence of a contemporarily full theory of history, is crowned by the reach of Communications for historico-geographic sets of hypothetical expressions. The specialists in Communications must envisage, through the complex genetic perspective of the fuller actual context of systematics mediated by scholarly sensitivity to local cultures, the dynamics of nations, tribes, villages, to move towards reflective conditions of the cultivation of a symbiosis of faith and locally-grounded actual, probable, possible expressions.

One may view the crowning task of functional specialization in terms of a full notion of actual contexts.

There is the actual context that is the community of subjects having questions and answers within functional specialization, the community of those who have suffered "displacement towards system" (Lonergan, 1964b: 10, n10) for the sake of the

30 The cajoling of Insight (1957b: 398) is transposed by the slow rounding of the vortex of Method in Theology

31 The basic text here is Method in Theology (1972: 177). For a fuller perspective see McShane, 1984: 147, n85.

32 Expressions are not limited to linguistic expressions. See Method in Theology, index under "Expression."
salvation of history. Then there are the actual contexts that are the communities (1972: 78-81) of the globe in the actuality of their strange symbiotic quests. These latter contexts are overlapping, derivative, prior, and so on: one may think concretely of the role of Irish and English Jesuit communities in the Christianization of the complex set of communities of the two Rhodesias, remembering always that the eighth functional specialty involves a transposition of history carrying forward error, and indeed malice, salvifically (1972: 251; 1961: theses 15-17).

One can thus come to see the crowning task of theology as the mutual self-mediation of actual theological contexts and actual cultural contexts. So, we arrive, like Finnegans Wake, "by a commodius vicus of recirculation," back at the first sentence of Method in Theology: "A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of religion in that matrix."

The task envisaged is far from present possibilities: theologians scarcely glimpse, much less share, the actual context of the general categories; studies of religion are solidly truncated and regularly abstractive; actual evangelization remains substantially in the mode and haste of classical culture.

No doubt evangelization has come some distance from the arrogant colonialism
recounted and expressed by Sir Harry Johnston, who concluded his classic history with the forecast that "the eventual outcome of the colonization of Africa by alien peoples will be a compromise—a dark-skinned race with a white man's features and a white man's brain."35

But essays such as "The Resistance of the Nyau Societies to the Roman Catholic Missions in Colonial Malawi" (Schoeffeleers and Linden, 1972) bear witness to a continuity of mentality through this century.36 So, "the struggle at village level to maintain a socio-cultural identity against pressures from planter, administration and mission" (Schoeffeleers and Linden, 252) continues. An evangelization mediated by a third-stage meaning scholarly differentiation of consciousness, "a sympathetic openness to the village strangeness of a universe of differentiated persons" (McShane, 1984: vi), sharing God's patience with history, remains remote.

Again, modern studies in the sociology and the history of religions are increasingly empirical and complex. But they have no basis in generalized empirical method. They may claim freedom from paradigm: "while there is no unified theoretical paradigm imposed upon each of these essays, they all employ original field research and a data-driven model for the development of theories of symbolism and collective behaviour" (Jules-Rosetta, 1). Yet throughout there is a massive, blind commitment to the paradigm of truncation. Furthermore, elements of the cultural matrix that are symbiotic with religious tradition and expression can be regularly bypassed. So, the editors of a book related to the Dar es Salaam conference of 1970 concede in their introduction that "[t]he Dar es Salaam Conference on the historical study of African


36. The first Roman Catholic black bishop, in the sixteenth century, was educated at Lisbon and Rome. The first Protestant black bishop, in the nineteenth century, Samuel Crowther, "was an Egba slave-boy from Lagos, who by education acquired the intellect and outlook of a European" (Johnston, 243). Rome and cricket still remain significant.
religion was consciously taking part in an artificial, even a distorting enterprise. It separated the topic of African religion from the topics of African politics, economics and social institutions. And it separated the topic of African 'traditional' religion from those of African Islam and Christianity" (Ranger and Kimambo, 1). What is not only absent in the body of modern studies, but systematically excluded, is the open metaphysics of the actual context, deeply grounded in a subjectivity isomorphic with history and Mystery.

Finally, that actual context in its functional specialist perspective is not remotely constitutive of any present theological community. What, then, are the probabilities and possibilities of adequate theology in the twenty-first century?
This final short section parallels the first section in pointing up the need to overcome terror, or the inner monster,\textsuperscript{37} and where the first section focused on odyssey as against ontogenetic immaturity, this last touches on Iliad as against phylogenetic immaturity. The issue is a terror of history excluding a procedural revelation of finitude's evolution in triple darkness.

It seems that theology has something to learn from the analogy of nature that is the emergence, development and growing humility of natural science. The optimism of the nineteenth century is gone.\textsuperscript{38} Physics, dealing with a cluster of curiously named particles, is in its search for coherence, subtly trapped by a Euclidean Imagination. Chemistry, despite Mendeleev and the emergence of quantum chemistry, still lacks a clear identity.\textsuperscript{39} The genetic and evolutionary sciences, to which we will return presently, are bogged down in a reductionist lack of aggreformic perspective yielding to the demands of their empirical object.

But yield they will under the pedagogic dynamics of history, with the slowness that is the character of history.

This is no place to attempt a procedural analysis of the history of sciences. What I wish to do is to focus briefly on one key and illuminating instance of the struggle of science, the area of the middle sciences that can be brought into isomorphism with Lonergan's analysis of genetic method.

\textsuperscript{37}37. "If a man is a hero, he Is a hero because, in the first reckoning, he did not let the monster devour him, but subdued it not once but many times" (Jung, 173). There is a need for a heuristic transposition of metaphorical talk of terror and monsters into an explanatory perspective on adult repentance.

\textsuperscript{38}38. Science Is not, of course, "pure knowledge"; nor is it only in supporting war that "scientists have known sin" (Oppenheimer, 88).

\textsuperscript{39}39. On the topic, see Danaher, 1985.
The reason for this focus is perhaps already obvious. Attention was drawn at the beginning of section II to genetic method as a basic natural procedural analogue in searching for the methodology of an adequate systematic theology, and section III moved towards the notion that what the theological community must reach for in Communications is the integrated proximate grounds of the mediation of "the cumulative, historical process of development in a multiplicity and succession of individuals" (Lonergan, 1957b: 741), that successive multiplicity being normatively conceived explanatory: "while common sense relates things to us, our account of common sense relates it to its neural basis and relates aggregates and successions of instances of common sense to one another" (244).

A central communal unknown of the total heuristic is clearly the meaning of development both in relation to a historic totality and to individual plants, animals, men. That development is thus an unknown may be glimpsed by reflecting on the section of Insight which starts with the words "study of an organism begins from the thing-for-us" (464). The organism is evidently developmental, and its study is presently trapped in various ways at this beginning. Newman's "common-sense contributions" (1972: 261) include a notion of development that is also opaquely present in the mind of the modern botanist or zoologist, and the situation is honestly summed up in the words of the biologist Paul Weiss: "Does not everybody have some notion of what development implies? Undoubtedly most of us have. But when it comes to formulating these notions they usually turn out to be vague" (Weiss, 1).

Moreover, this vague spontaneous notion is ground into irrelevance by a present reductionist culture in the middle sciences. This is massively evidenced, for instance, by the volumes of the Society for Developmental Biology, where the predominant tone through thirty years of work is that of a cybernetic mythmaking regarding

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40. There are twenty-five volumes and several supplements running through the years 1939-1968, brought out by the Society for Developmental Biology as the fruit of twenty-seven symposia, published under the general title Developmental Biology.
information storage and sharing in and between molecules, cells, stages, and so on. Furthermore, this cybernetic tone regularly warps the reductionism into a microvitalism: truncated subjects are just as likely to overrate the cognitive performance of macromolecules as they are to exaggerate the intelligence embedded in a microchip. But what is fundamentally excluded is that transposition of Aristotle's view of potency to be found both in Lonergan's heuristics of finality and development (Lonergan, 1957b: 444ff) and in the objective correlative, the organism.

Nor are there saving features in the broader ecological context of such studies. Whether one looks to studies internal to the field, or to broader works such as those originating from Bertalanffy (1968, 1973), one finds no grounding perspective for a coherent theory of the hierarchic structure of the object of the middle sciences that would contextualize developmental studies. "Whereas the inverse problem of analytic resolution of a system into subsystems is readily treated by such top-down approaches as deduction, and single level systems are amenable through induction or statistical procedures, there is no corresponding technique for vertical bottom-up organization. This lacuna is a task for a new epistemology" (Wilson, 125f). Lonergan's filling of the lacuna through aggreformic third-stage comprehension of the world of science, available for more than forty years, has had no impact on twentieth century science.

Now such a situation in that part of the Cosmic Word which is man's

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41 Such features are treated in McShane, 1971. On botany and zoology, see, respectively chapters 1 and 3 of McShane, 1976.

42 A recent effort is Alien and Starr, 1982. The book is of value, not for any positive advance, but for its explicitness regarding epistemological confusion (see 5-11; 37-46; 129-31), and in bringing the reader into the middle of the erudite muddle.

43 Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage," Theological Studies 4 (1943): 477-510; reprinted in Lonergan, 1967a: 16-53. While Insight greatly enriches the perspective, both emergent probability and the underpinning aggreformism are already there: "A concrete plurality of lower entities may be the material cause from which a higher form is educed or into which a subsistent form is Infused" (1967: 20).
understanding of the genetic realities of the middle sciences is itself a revelation to the theologian.

In its broadest sense, the situation is continuous with, and contributory to, the complex providential warping of the fundamental questing that is human subjectivity. Meshing with the massive folly and malice of the drive of modernity towards empire and state, which blossoms in the neurotic control structures of modern government and business, is a pseudo-theoretic of microcontrol which seeds patterns of experimentation and implementation, of mindset and lifestyle, of research and relaxation, of farming and food processing, that cuts man out of the genetic throbbing of history.

Generically, what is revealed is a phylogenetic immaturity of such pre-adolescent proportions that I am tempted to characterize modernity in its full sense as the Age of the Tadpole.

Present theology is part of this age. If the dreams of children can be warped by a brutalized culture (see Schachtel, 1947), the visions of theologians cannot be considered secure. Certainly, there is nothing mature about present erroneous and monocultural papal pronouncements on sexuality, no more than there is anything mature about present preaching of the Christian Trinity. Perhaps, as Joan Robinson said with regard to economics, "[i]t is time to go back to the beginning and start again" (Robinson and Eatwell, 51).

That beginning, I am convinced, lies in the discovery and expression by Lonergan of the eightfold empirical way, in so far as that discovery is operatively accepted in some suspicion of the lack of three basic differentiations in the theological community, all three being "quite beyond the horizon of ancient Greece and medieval

44. A main issue, of course, is that raised by the encyclical Humanae Vitae. Very simply, "the ordination of intercourse to conception is not a natural law" (Lonergan, 1967: 47, n79).

Europe" (Lonergan, 1972: 317). Nineteenth-century theologians may be partly forgiven for not noticing that the self-energy of God is more complex than the self-energy of the electron, that the development of daisies is simpler than the development of doctrines. Present times relentlessly reveal the density of the forms of electrons and daisies: do they not also reveal the remoteness of adequate theological meaning?

To the negative side, then, of present sciences' struggle with such realities as plant and animal growth, one must add a positive side. Whatever the muddles regarding the objects of inquiry, subjects in science are forced to humble, open particularity in their searchings. When one asks in that context, 'What is development?' one must answer in terms of this or that particular development. One struggles as best one can, in the absence of an adequate biological context, towards a verifiable perspective on such realities as "Nuclear and Cytoplasmic Control of Morphology in Neurospora," "Development and Control Processes in the Basal Bodies and Flagella of Chlamydomonas reinhardii." So, in functional specialist theology, totalitarianism has to yield to a particular empiricism that still strives to remain open to the heuristics of subject and object. "What formerly was supposed to lie within the competence of a single dogmatic theologian, now can be undertaken only by a very large team" (1972: 315). The systematic theologian would aim, not at a total organism, but at the genesis of some relevant cell. And, as Galileo's seeding of empirical method brings forth in this century a shaky sapling, so generalized empirical method is now an acorn in search of air.

A more basic positive aspect of the evolution of science is that associated with the first Vatican council's pointing to the significance of analogies of nature (DS 3016), and indeed with Aquinas's frequent use of the word "sicut." That aspect is laced through the present paper, but I would make two brief final points.

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46. Both these papers are in Developmenal Biology 26 (1967). The first is the work of E. L. Tatum and D. J. L. Luck; the second involved a team: Sir John Randall, R. Cavalier-Smith, Anne McVittie, J. R. Warr, and J. M. Hopkins.
First, if it is to be an analogy relevant to an explanatory systematics, then it must be cast within an explanatory heuristic. So, one may draw analogies from studies of the foetal and infant eye, and from study of such studies, to further one's understanding of development of dogma, genetic systematics, growth-communications. But such analogies must sublate contemporary studies of the stages of normal and abnormal foetal and infant eye development so that, for example, strabismus is not just a described squint but a heuristically contextualized abnormality related both to the present lower molecularity of chromosome and muscle and to later higher patterns of the flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence of adult life. From such a perspective one can view specializations with regard to the developing eye in a manner that throws light from the middle sciences on the last three functional specialties. A developing eye can be studied to discover just what is there, in a manner that is not unrelated to finding "the meaning of the dogma in the context in which it was defined" (Lonergan, 1972: 325). The growing eye can be viewed from the fullest contemporary explanatory perspective to arrive at a transcultural understanding of its place in the actual, probable, possible schemes of biography and history. The (abnormally) growing eye can be envisaged in the cultural context of parents and kin in a sensitive therapeutic fashion: an envisagement analogous to that of Communications. Finally, I would note that this searching for the fullness of natural analogies not only is an internal fidelity in theology but also leads to the real possibility of cultivating in scientists "the high office of the scientific spirit" (1957b: 746).

Secondly, I would note that the analogies centrally relevant in the third stage of meaning are the procedural or methodological analogies, analogies that focus on the evolution of mind. Nor should this be surprising. The whole drive of Insight and Method is towards procedural lucidity, and this would seem to dovetail with a fundamental orientation of history to reveal, not content, but process.

In conclusion, I would note that an evident, highly visible, aspect of modern science is its tradition of journals and conferences remote from public discourse. A visit
to a zoological library with adequate journal holdings would, I suspect, be a sobering experience for a theologian with the standard literary education. He or she is faced with a massive array of incomprehensible specialized efforts. In contrast, many theological journals offer general eclectic sweeps, regularly eminently readable for the wrong reasons. Again, one may contrast conferences of chemists—indeed, they are usually already specialists within the science—with conferences of theologians.

Whatever the deficiencies of present chemical perspective, participants are expected to be comfortable in a contemporary actual context of Mendeleev’s advance.

What will the actual context of theologians be, in a hundred years or so?

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47. The genesis of an adequate actual context requires massive changes in the schemes of recurrence of present education. One may think, for instance, of the non-overlapping contexts of, on the one hand, a literate theological community talking vaguely of alienation, and, on the other, a business community hastening down blind alleys of high technology.