

## Chapter 2

### **The General Solution to Present Ineffective Fragmentation**

#### **1. Ineffective Fragmentations**

I do not think it necessary for me to expand on this topic here. I have been doing that illustratively since first I tackled the mess of musicology in 1969, and since then I and others have pointed to the manner in which present fragmentation of particular zones of inquiry hamper progress. The fragmentations are found not only to hamper progress but also to point, despite vast differences in context, to a ferment, a demand for a division of labour. There is no need even to list the various areas in which this has been illustrated, but perhaps there is no harm in drawing attention to one presentation which seeks to bring them all together, especially since that presentation was a first effort at emphasizing the minimalist perspective.

I refer to the third chapter of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A Fresh Pragmatism*.<sup>1</sup> The chapter is worth some modest ingestion if time and energy permits. The focus is certainly not just economics. Indeed, the main illustration of ineffectual fragmentation comes from a commentary on Husserl's reflections on Geometry. Lonergan regularly commented on Euclid as a zone of safe sound comprehension: but now it is becoming increasing evident that Euclid is not a safe zone of interpretation. And if Euclid as pure geometry is not secure, what of the various types of Euclidean Space-time that are presently advocated?<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Axial Publications, 2002.

<sup>2</sup>A useful context here is McShane, "Elevating *Insight*. Space-time as Paradigm Problem", *Method. Journal of Lonergan Studies*, 19 (2001), 203-229. The suggestiveness reaches much further. First, there are pointings regarding the leap that lifts the subject's frame of reference into the data that I hint at below at notes 6 and 7. The concluding section in this chapter and in chapter 8 refine those pointings. In the final chapter, at note 35, I seek to bring these pointings to a focus in relation to the problem hidden in the word *general*, laced into the

But the important thing to note is the manner in which a minimalism is advocated. This can be noted from the previous chapter's consideration of Christology. The same division of labour is suggested by the very structure of present fragmentations in all areas of inquiry. Again, I would draw attention to Alessandra Drage's presentation of the problem of, and the solution to, the fragmentation of feminist studies. Empirical reflection on those studies leads to the view that there is a ferment towards the need for an eight-fold division of labour of the type advocated by Lonergan.

So, I keep this section short. It is for the reader first to pick a zone of personal interest - for instance the zone of say, mountaineering or the realm of cooking - and forage in the literature to find the muddles and the possibilities. Secondly, it is to be noted that that discovery does not pivot on some *a priori* about philosophy. It is almost a result of a spontaneous puzzling about the mess, and a discovery of a technique that would get us out of it. This is an important point to notice, and it will recur below in our reflections on such needs as are manifested by present work in feminist hermeneutics. One notices then, I would presume, that Lonergan's point regarding the basis" is shifted from centre stage, and his call for massive foundations is replaced by that minimal foundational stand, "Let's be sensible about this."<sup>3</sup> "About this", not (about)<sup>3</sup> this: the latter is the topic of the next section.

Before venturing into that topic I would like to draw attention to what might be regarded as the largest context of fragmentation, one to which Lonergan draws attention in a comment on Hegel. It is a comment that I have been quoting regularly for

---

problem of general history.

<sup>3</sup>I have been using that mis-spell to indicated vaguely the senses +, where the + refers to whatever any particular perspective wishes to add to sensibility as belonging to the human above the animal.

a decade but this fresh twist only comes to me as I struggle forward in these days of writing chapters 2, 5, and 8 of this book.<sup>4</sup> First, then, let us recall the comment.

“As the labor of introspection proceeds, one stumbles on Hegel’s insight that the full objectification of the human spirit is the history of the human race. It is in the sum of the products of common sense and common nonsense, of the sciences and the philosophies, of moralities and religions, of social orders and cultural achievements, that there is mediated, set before us in a mirror in which we can behold, the originating principle of human aspiration and human attainment and failure. Still, if that vast panorama is to be explored methodologically, there is the prior need of method .”<sup>5</sup>

This is a comment made by Lonergan when he was 61: how far had he gone in his search when he had this insight that relates to Hegel? Obviously, as he moved forward in the context of his new integral perspective, he recalled Hegel’s point. But it seems to me that Hegel’s point can be lifted forward in a shocking enrichment of the search for the *ousia* of human desire. The more obvious lift here, however, is the lift of the division of labor that shifts the statistics of retrieval and integration of the human race’s scattered insights. Less obvious is the perspective to be reached by slowly ingesting the remote meaning of the curious title of the next section: the ingesting involves two twined layers of sciences and languages, both undeveloped in our time.

The third section here returns to the obvious lift to indicate strategies of development, cleansing and integration of the sum of common sense and common

---

<sup>4</sup>I expect it to be expressed best at the end of the final section of chapter 8. Expressed efficiently? That is another matter, a matter for chapter 5: a point repeated in the text immediately. Is not repetition the mother of convention? But what we need is a new metalanguage of the global resonances of “The Existential Gap” that darkly incarnates the first stage of meaning in its struggle through the axial muddle towards the critical identification of both hope and quest.

<sup>5</sup>I am quoting from p. 14 of a Lonergan archival file labeled A697. It contains a typescript numbered pp. 8-23. Very plausibly it is a continuation of the sketch of a first chapter of *Method* to be found in a file named Batch V.7. That file contains also a nine-page typescript beginning of the chapter.

nonsense. In the fourth section we begin to track new standards of method, “the possible revision of standards .... The old standards are wrong... a basic revision, then, is a leap. At a stroke, it is a grasp of the insufficiency both of the old laws and of the old standards.”<sup>6</sup> Oddly, I am quoting here from chapter five of *Insight*, and the context is the maturing of the relativistic turn in physics which Einstein muddled towards. The issue is “material operations which yield new data,”<sup>7</sup> energy infolding neurodynamically towards a manifestation of the data that is questing, the intimate ontic reach for the field. But we had best leave further feeble pointings towards the reaching for that reach to the gropings of the last section here and the glimpsings of the end of chapter 8. Why the words gropings, glimpsings? That **Why** is the central topic of chapter 5.

## 2. (about)<sup>3</sup>

Unlike the books *Insight* and *Method*, this book owes some its strangeness to my effort to cope with “the problem of general history, which is the real catch.”<sup>8</sup> What problem? That, indeed, is part of the catch, and it is to be tackled more appropriately in chapter five below, the key chapter that I pointed to at the end of the Introduction. The suggestion there was that chapter 5 be tackled, at least in a preliminary fashion, immediately after the Introduction. Whether you went that way or not is not important; what is important is that you find your way towards a refreshed view of your searchings, and related to that refreshing is the challenge of personal exercising.

What do I mean by that? I am talking about a new type of reading which meshes with a new type of writing and a new type of teaching in a fresh genetic dynamic of


---

<sup>6</sup>*Insight*, 166[190].

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, 236.

human living.<sup>9</sup> We can name that newness, recalling Kuhn, a paradigm shift. But getting beyond the name: there's the catch in history. The symbol of that shift became for me, in the Summer of 2005, the metagram given below, with its complex of supporting metagrams which we do not give or pause over in this book. They are given elsewhere and referred to here and there in our present fragmentary indications of the transformation of Christology. The metagram below has a fresh startling meaning for me from present work, and such freshening of meaning and its communication, both subjectively and inter-subjectively, is a difficult foundational topic. It is the topic of genetic living, becoming a stranger to oneself of yesterday. More on that in chapter 5 on "Communications in General".




---

<sup>9</sup>We will get to the relevant doctrines in Chapter 6.

The difficulty I write of now becomes, in a layering of twisted meanings that creep towards naming here, in this second section, “a matter of getting around to it”. It was and is a matter, indeed, of history getting around to it. Recall our concluding reflections in section 1. Here I may seem to be twisting too much, but the twisting is strategic, like the twisting of colours in Neapolitan ice-cream. History does not get around to solving the meaning of my odd title, (about)<sup>3</sup>, by some steady march of progress. And how might you get around to it? Perhaps, just now, by skipping the next paragraph, which talks of Lonergan’s Neapolitan twisting but may be relevant to your own indirection in your searching. The image of Neapolitan twisting captures for me the possible and probable twistings that will go into the Tower formation: some disciplines are ripe for the minimalism that I wrote of in the first section, others are forced, in a deeper manner, to slope towards, converge on, interdisciplinary collaboration. Similarly with you, in the luminous darkness of your circumstances.<sup>10</sup>

The third section has the curious title, “Reducing Slopes and Slops”. The title’s meaning is to be the initial topic of that section, but here it is sufficient to note that, whereas this second section is where Lonergan wished to head when he first discovered the Round Tuit and sketched - and began - a first chapter, he did not venture seriously into the twists of that third section. So I would claim that while the core of (about)<sup>3</sup> is bluntly, if obscurely, presented in his first shot at a chapter 1 of *Method*, was seeded by *Insight*, and edged towards by his attention to “The Ongoing Genesis of Methods,”<sup>11</sup> the dynamic of slopes and slops was scarcely attended to by him. What is that dynamic? Well, we’ll get around to it in section 3, and then you should be able to note how Lonergan was sensitive to it throughout his life. But it was a sick and tired man of 61 that found the Round Tuit, the holy grail of his life. Lack of both energy and

---

<sup>10</sup>A useful context here is the article, published in Spanish (related to the work of Ortega y Gasset), but available on the Website: “Towards a Luminous Darkness of Circumstances. *Insight* after Forty Years”.

<sup>11</sup>A Third Collection, 146-165. But it is a topic throughout *Method*.

encouragement meant that the functional dynamic of the Round, caught by him in the word, “functional”, never became heart-held by him, and the sloping aspect of the dynamic never became a serious topic for him. In this book I bring that point out best in the contrast between my analysis of research in chapter 8 and his analysis of it in chapter 6 of *Method in Theology*. And I would note how his later regret, that he did not spell out a better view of research in *Method* - after all he had done a vast amount of it in his early years - has deep echoes in the heart of the matter.

But let us get on with making sense of the curious title of this section. I have been dealing with it for some time under various aspects, beginning with Lonergan’s introduction to the notion of orders of consciousness in his 1965 effort to begin *Method*. I do not wish to return here either to those efforts or to Lonergan’s compact pointing.<sup>12</sup> I aim here rather at a little elementary pedagogical introduction.

Such elementary presentation is not mistaken for more than it is in a developed science. One can set out on a description of planetary motions in a first year university physics course without the class imagining that they are glimpsing Einstein’s universe of discourse. Such an ethos is not present here. But that is the topic of chapter 5, so let us foolishly rush in without angelic fear.

Method, you will concede, has to do with understanding procedure, where initially the procedure is spontaneous. At a low level such understanding may be just technique: how does one get square roots? One uses a rule of procedure, which may reduce to rules for manipulating an instrument. But one can also push forward toward understanding why the rule or the instrument works, even indeed, when the instrument is oneself. When the instrument is oneself, then speaking of method means speaking of a style of minding, Origin’s minding of scripture, Descartes’ Method, von Ranke’s strategies in producing factual history, Marx’s approach to studying

---

<sup>12</sup>It took me quite a few years to unpack Lonergan’s reflections of three orders of consciousness in his 1965 notes. What follows is, I hope, helpful.

production. Clearly, there are lots of different methods, even in a single field of inquiry. Ranke's is only one in a story of historical methods, and Felix Klein once remarked that mathematical method changes every decade. Do we not have a case here, then, for another level of study? We have methods in the multi-plural: might the study of methods not be considered methodology. This shift would demand a shift of usage. One should speak modestly of one's method, not loftily about one's methodology: unless, of course, one has a variety of scientific interests that warrants a plurality. Then one can see the sense in the parallel that, as botany is to flowers, so methodology is to methods.

Let us stay with the lives of flowers for the moment. One can cherish flowers and even move to investigate strategies of cultivating them that push one to understand a little about them. One has thus begun botany. The beginning can soon lead to procedures that demand understanding. If one develops an understanding of those particular procedures then that understanding merits to be titled a botanical method. But the contemporary care of the potato is different from that of the Irish before their Great Hunger, and it - as *patata* - was treated differently in the new World before it reached the old. Might we not use the word *methodology* when talking about the range of methods of potato cultivation?

But let us move into our zone of present interest: the zone of the biblical Christ. In the single note to the Preface we drew attention to Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza's discussion of "Feminist Practices of Biblical Hermeneutics". Certainly she implies that there are at least two genera - or genders? - of biblical hermeneutics. Indeed, her book succeeds in pointing to a range of hermeneutical methods, with different chapters dealing with different biblical women and different perspectives. It would be foolish to venture into her dense suggestiveness here, but certainly we can conclude, as with potato cultivation, that one can be led to think of a higher level of inquiry called hermeneutical methodology. Is it the level at which she is operating? I would be so bold

as to suggest that she is not luminous regarding this. But it seems best to leave my suggestion in that unsatisfactory state, apart from stray hints <sup>13</sup>

But are you getting some impression of the layers of scientific struggle? Perhaps you could benefit, as I did in the late 1970s, by ingesting a key reflection of Lonergan which was for me then the springboard to conceiving properly, and startlingly<sup>14</sup>, the genetic character of the specialty systematics. Let us pause over that extract from one of his best shots at “Method in Theology” prior to his leap of February 1965: I suspect now that the seed of his three levels was a quasi-operator in his writing of the extract.<sup>15</sup>

“The history of any particular discipline is in fact the history of its development. But this development, which would be the theme of a history, is not something simple and straightforward but something which occurred in a long series of various steps, errors, detours, and corrections. Now, as one studies this movement one learns about this developmental process and so one now possesses within oneself an instance of that development which took place perhaps over several centuries. This can happen only if the person understands both his or her subject and the way he or she learned about it. Only then will he or she understand which elements in the historical developmental process had to be understood before the others, which ones made for progress in understanding and which held back, which elements belong to the particular science and which do not, and which elements contain errors. Only then will he or she be able to tell at what point in the history of the subject there emerged new visions of the whole and when the first true system occurred, and when the transition took place from an earlier to a later systematic ordering, which systematization was simply an expansion of

---

<sup>13</sup>The context of reflection is to be chapter 17 of *Insight* transposed into functional specialization: the topic of these lectures, more precisely the topic of the last two chapters here.

<sup>14</sup>This is a startling shift for those brought up on axiomatics as conceived by Aristotle or Thomas.

<sup>15</sup>See Lonergan, *A Third Collection*, 29.

the former and which was radically new; what progressive transformation the whole subject underwent; how everything that was explained by the old systematization is now explained by the new one, along with many other things that the old one did not explain - the advances in physics, for example, by Einstein and Max Planck. Then and only then will he or she be able to understand what factors favored progress, what hindered it, and why, and so forth.

Clearly, therefore, the historian of any discipline has to have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the whole subject. And it is not enough that he or she understand it in anyway at all, but he or she must have a systematic understanding of it. For that precept, when applied in history, means that successive systems which have been progressively developed over a period of time have to be understood. This systematic understanding of a development ought to make use of an analogy with the development that takes place in the mind of the investigator who learns about the subject, and this interior development within the mind of the investigator ought to parallel the historical process by which the science itself developed."<sup>16</sup>

I refrain from commenting on this: it is quite an ingestive challenge, and seeds the break forward that solves the problem of history and system that preoccupied him in those years. We shall have occasion to return to it in other chapters. But let us see whether we have a rough idea now of the title of this section, referring back to this text for help as you think fit. You already have noticed, I presume, the shifting from spontaneous searchings to systems and the further level of systematizing the systems. The systematizing is an achievement of the particular systematizer, and one might well move on to ask whether this third order of consciousness provides data for a fourth

---

<sup>16</sup>I am quoting from Michael G. Shield's translation of 1990, *Understanding and Method*, 130-2. The original Latin text I have of *De Intellectu et Methodo* has the material on page 55.

order investigation: but let us not go there.<sup>17</sup> Let us stick with the modest task of getting a rough idea of (about)<sup>3</sup>.

First, what are we about? That question places us already on the edge of the second order of consciousness. In the first order of consciousness one simply and spontaneously goes about one's business. The about is what, when brooded over seriously, yields Thomas Aquinas' grip on human goings-about that is summarily hinted at in those two articles of the first part of the *Summa*: q. 84, a.7; q. 87, a. 4. Further I would note that the focus of *Insight* is on the first of those articles which echoes the book's frontispiece quotation from Aristotle's *De Anima*, III, 7. What of the second article? Thomas handles its elaboration in brilliantly introspective style in the series of questions, 6-17, of the *Prima Secundae*. Lonergan, for different reasons in each case, had to hurry past any equivalent elaboration either in his doctorate thesis or in chapter 18 of *Insight*.

But it is important to note how one can remain in the first order of consciousness and talk about this about: witness phenomenology, analytic philosophy, modern logics.<sup>18</sup> Most sad, however, is the witness of sophisticated nominalist versions of Lonergan's pointers towards this second order of consciousness. Not many advert to the fact that what is at issue is a complex empirical scientific investigation. It is useful to bring in, or out, here, an analogy with Euclidean geometry. What is a circle? Well, one quite easily gets, or even gives without getting, the usual definition. But answering the question, What is a circle, is a matter of controlling the meaning of Euclidean plane

---

<sup>17</sup>There is a question here of layers of metalanguages such as those suggested by Hao Wang( see the index on Wang in *Phenomenology and Logic*), except that interiority is intrinsically involved now.

<sup>18</sup>There is no serious equivalent to Appendix A of *Phenomenology and Logic* in these other traditions, and there is an established obscurity regarding the meaning of truth. .

geometry, its axioms, its strategies.<sup>19</sup> Similarly with the question, What is an insight? And there is no harm in mentioning in this context the question, What is Jesus?

So, any one zone of the practicing of “abouting” provides data for a serious scientific endeavor, “about about”. That one zone grounds a scientific achievement to be named *method*. It is “method of ....”. Such methods - like the flowers we talked about - vary in history and geography: we have then phyla and genera and species and varieties of methods. One can think out their relations, genetic or otherwise. But that thinking out is a fresh and novel zone of inquiry: one is doing method-ology, reaching for a coherent and complete *logos* of methods. One is operating in the remote psychological zone, possessing and being possessed by the mind-set that I have named (about)<sup>3</sup>.

### 3. Reducing Slopes and Slops

If a big book like *Insight* can fail to inaugurate a serious shift towards the second order of consciousness of which Lonergan wrote, then a section of a chapter of a small book can surely not be expected to initiate “The Great Leap Forward” into the global flowering of the third order of consciousness. There is a sense then in which brevity should be the soul of my wit here: a giving of obscure hints of the scar-trek to the Dark Tower would seem better than plain speech. Indeed what we need is something equivalent to the symbolisms of contemporary geometries that remove physics from simple imaginings of the push and pull of elementary things.

But we must lean, in beginnings, on metaphors and initial meanings. I have written on the topic *Slopes* previously but I have done considerable leaping since then. By sloping I meant, in the first of those previous treatments, the manner in which the community of investigators in various disciplines will find, in applying functional specialization in their own zones, that, while their researchings seem vastly different,

---

<sup>19</sup>See *Phenomenology and Logic*, 357.

their sciences converge in the move up through interpretation and history towards dialectic. A Dead Sea stroll is miles away from trudging through the output of a cyclotron, but when one moves to the level of story there occur inevitable meshings of meaning. Lower sciences date manuscripts, and higher sciences flesh out the limitations of bubble chambers. And when one comes to issues of human progress, the doctrines of manuscripts twine into debates about the potentials of energy sources.

But what of slop and slops? The parallels and references here are more complex, more subtle. *Slop* refers to forms of liquid waste: perhaps it is enough here to think of the over-reach of common sense, from street talk to the highest echelons of world government, “papmongers or propagandists of whatever stripe .... power’s windowdressers everywhere”.<sup>20</sup> But such waste can be beautifully disguised: one then has the truncated reach of political and sociological theory, phenomenology and analytic philosophy, promising clarities from their core darkness. But behind the over-reaching and the disguises there is the deeper problem that lurks in the **slops** of Aristotle’s best efforts. The plural here is not just more of the same: that would be offensive. *Slops* is a word that roots back to the Indo-European base *sleub*, to glide, slip, so **sleeve**. One might think of the Old English, *oferslop*, a loose outer garment.<sup>21</sup> One may think of clothing issued to sailors.

The issue conveniently raised by the use of the word Slops is the question. What is philosophy or metaphysics? And I would have you muse further over that problem as we move through the book, the lectures, and circle round the question, What might we mean by *general*?<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup>Seamus Heaney, *The Government of the Tongue*, Faber and Faber, London, 1988, 61.

<sup>21</sup> This needs development in terms of Lonergan’s late definition of generalized empirical method (*A Third Collection*, 141, top lines) and Aristotle’s restricted view of metaphysics. See Lonergan’s comment on this in *Method in Theology*: page 95 and the attached note 48 there.

<sup>22</sup>This is the central topic of sections 2.4; 5.5; 8.4.

Is philosophy somehow a general view of life, of reality? Is it like a sleeve, a loose coat? A loose “genus awaiting division by the addition of difference.”<sup>23</sup> That quotation adds a context that, I hope, is not just an addition of a difference but rather a disturbance of the added context.

But I leave the beginning of a reflection on that topic to the first of the three sections that turn round the word *general*.

I have written made a few suggestions above, and elsewhere, about the problem of sloping downwords. I would like to conclude this short section by drawing your attention to the problem of sloping downwards. Is sloping a good image here? Curiously, it is, if we watch for the manner in which the problem of “general view” is developed as we move through the book.<sup>24</sup> Think, for a start, of the cyclic refinement of foundations persons and of their dual task of foundational fantasy and of fostering the implementation of that fantasy. The foundational person is, so to speak, a point of pragmatic meaning, of light, in history and geography. The herenow point is dynamically oriented - this is the meaning of the word *implementation* in that old definition of metaphysics<sup>25</sup> - towards future geographic locations. There is to be a radiation of the foundational meaning through the specialties symbolized by the set of conversations  $C_{5i}$ , where  $i$  ranges from 1 to 8.<sup>26</sup> The strict set of per se functional conversations is the series of group interchanges  $C_{56}$ ,  $C_{67}$ ,  $C_{78}$ . This is all quite difficult to fantasize about - worse, (about)<sup>3</sup> - in that the division of labor thus expressed is novel and perhaps the symbolism is discouraging. my previous effort, in Cantower

---

<sup>23</sup>Insight 362[386]. This adds a context to that of note 21.

<sup>24</sup>The control of meaning of this looks forwards to the development of complexities analogous to the developments to be expected in controlling the meaning of physics in its references to the particular. See note xx of chapter 10.

<sup>25</sup>*Insight*, 391[416].

<sup>26</sup>More on this in chapter 5.

14, to open up the topic of communications and Founding Persons is a helpful place to start. Cantower 14 parallels Insight chapter 14, where Lonergan talks in a rather remote manner of the implementation of metaphysics in terms of major and minor premises. In Cantower 14 I switch to a more concrete presentation and illustrate it by sharing reflections on the single area of New York.

This is a major challenge to functional specialization and the future of a metaphysics of the streets, the burroughs, local government, etc etc. It involves at its core a massive shift in educational patterns. It is a challenge which initially is just the fantasy of the emergence of the Tower of Able. That Tower of Able is a creative community willing to spiral towards a remote yet totally concrete meaning by “asking in general” in a new way (about)<sup>3</sup> the dynamics of the becoming of history.

Sloping in theology involves the complex topic of coming out of a Tridentine isolation: some clues to it are given in later chapters, especially chapter 8.

#### 4. AsKing in General

Three related sections of this book turn on the search for fresh meaning of the word *general*.: this section, section 5 of chapter 5 and section 4 of chapter 8. In chapter 5, section 2, I invite a pause over the problem of growth in meaning, especially growth in *theoria*, which involves that twisted meaning of (about)<sup>3</sup> that I have introduced to you in section 2 above. The reflection on growth, and indeed the whole of chapter 5, puts the meaning introduced into the perspective of slow growth, of serious scientific learning. Reading the three sections together for a start might be helpful towards a larger first impression of this book’s struggle, my on-going struggle to reveal **the primary data of research** to myself and others. One way of viewing the effort in the book is that it is a reflection on Matthew 16:15-17, and the three sections I write of now can be viewed as each focused on one of those verses: verse 15 in this section; verse 17 in the section of chapter 5, verse 16 in the final section of chapter 8. Is it possible to fantasize forward

towards a community that takes to metaphysical-equivalent-tuned heart their own replacement of Peter in this dialogue with Jesus?

The fantasy has become altogether more vital and hopeful for me as I pushed forward, or was pushed forward, in the heuristics of the meaning of functional specialist Christology, for instance meeting freshly the men and women of the fourth century. The issue can have the same name as the title of Cantower 24, "Infesting History with Hodology", written two years ago, but the meaning has shifted considerably. And the mention of that Cantower leads me to a larger context of reading for these three sections. Chapter 1 here called in Cantower 35: but the Cantowers before are an expression of my climb, and one might well start at the beginning, or search through to find where you are in your own climb. That finding is especially helped by Cantower 9, which points to a biographic ingesting of one's own climb.

However, such a large enterprise may not be realistic at present. Then there is the shorter enterprise of the climb through Cantower 27-31: these five Cantowers correspond to the first five chapters of *Insight*. Or, mercifully much shorter as an adventure, one might view section 5 of Cantower 28 with its odd title, "'Feynman Diagrams for the As King". There one meets the Little Flower asking (As Queen, where I think of both Little Flowers) the little Prince, "whom do men say that I am?". I weave round the conversation of 'Littles' there, weaving in also Dogen's dewdrop and Tennyson's little flower, Henry Moore's little amulet all towards opening up the asking about asking, (about)<sup>3</sup> asking, about asking **in general**. Is metaphysics a genus to which one adds, and general metaphysics a sort of highest genus?<sup>27</sup> Or is asking in general to be the asking in the human genus that reaches for all always? Who is the asking I in verse 15 of Matthew, or in the Little Flowers speech? And who is it that is addressed? "

---

<sup>27</sup>See notes 21 and 23 above.

...‘Oh, How beautiful you are!’ ‘Am I not’, the Little Flower responded sweetly. ‘And I was born at the same moment as the sun’.”<sup>28</sup>

I am asking you to turn to, and round about, the same question that Lonergan raised in his effort to related mathematical logic to scholasticism. “We turn to the question of the logical structure of the third type of inquiry, the type that is comprehensive, that deals with the totality of reality as it may be known naturally as in philosophy, or in the light of faith as in theology. What we have to consider is this. If philosophy is to include a philosophy of science, if it is to be in some sense a *regina scientiarum* ....”<sup>29</sup> I am asking for an effort of identification that will bring forth an increasingly refined heuristic word. I am asking for an effort to read, within your own lonely as-king, what Lonergan wrote in a letter at the age of fifty. “The Method in Theology is coming into perspective. For the Trinity: Imago Dei in homine and proceed to the limit as in evaluating  $[ 1 + 1/n ]^{nx}$  as  $n$  approaches infinity. For the rest: ordo universi. From the viewpoint of theology, it is a manifold of unities developing in relation to one another and in relation to God .”<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup>Antoine de Saint Exupery, *The Little Prince*, Harbrace Paperback 1973. 32-3.

<sup>29</sup>*Phenomenology and Logic*, 126.

<sup>30</sup>I quote from a letter of Lonergan to Fr.Fred Crowe in May 1954, which he kindly made available to me.