

Chapter 1

The Need for Functional Specialization: Christology and Paradigmatic

The text here is in fact Cantower 35, [published on the Website, February 1st 2005]

“The Focus on Function”.

[It seemed best to leave that text unmodified. It is difficult reading, and it may well be left till later. At all events the chapter to begin with, as already mentioned in the Introduction, is chapter 5 below.]

Last week - I write in the Autumn of 2003 - I heard that brilliant old soccer player, Pele, speaking about putting together, or in fact about recent efforts at ‘buying together’, a great soccer team. His main point: you can lay out a fortune on collecting really first class players, but you still wont have a team. And, in fact, the focus on function is that simple. So I am lead to abandon my two previous attempts to handle this topic, and stick with simplicity.¹ I am, as you notice, ahead of my schedule with these essays, and this is a necessity of the projected effort. I shall get into that particular personal problem and effort in the next *Cantower*, and it will undoubtedly throw light on the present topic. Here I wish to cling to the simple. So, we get right to the core simplicity in the first section. In the second section we take a ramble through the

¹Those efforts are worth mentioning in relation to a larger contextualization of the present essay, They struggled with the meaning of human forms in a manner that would relate “capacity-for-performance” (the context is B. Lonergan, *Insight*, 464[489]) with *potentia activa*, (Lonergan, *Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas*, University of Toronto Press, 1997, 121-28), in order to throw light on *potentia obedientialis* as a core to the dynamic of material finitude. The lead in to one version was a quotation from p. 149 of Lonergan’s *Verbum*: “Natural potency, though receptive, nonetheless makes a most significant contribution to its act we may ask whether the neglect of natural potency has not some bearing on unsatisfactory conceptions of obediential potency”. The reader will notice an underlying drive in the present essay, especially in the footnotes, towards a redemption of energy and entropy as expressive of our cosmic longing.

volumes of the journal *Theological Studies* since 1995 as a lead to further kindly light. In the third section, I wind round the previous two sections to arrive at some few suggestions about getting the show on the road.

At the end of *Cantower XXXI* I drew a parallel between my slowness in seeing something which to you now will be obvious: that in Joyce's slogan *Deshil Holles Eamus* one can, with a twist of the eye and a shift of an *s*, turn it into advice to James, *sEamus*.² It took me over thirty years to see that twist. So, *Method in Theology* has been round for over thirty years, oddly but obviously identifying and recommending a twist of the eye, the aye, the "I". Are we "already" - by the end of the centennial of Lonergan's birth - amused at how slow we all were?

U-point³

How slow we all were or still are, indeed: and the *we* includes me. I have been talking about doing the functional thing since the late sixties and shall say more about that continuing talk in the next *Cantower*: the point here is that I haven't really tried

²The shift is obvious, is it not?: from Holles Eamus to Holle Seamus? The slogan *Deshil Holles Eamus* begins chapter 14 of Joyce's *Ulysses*, which is a hospital scene (the hospital is on Holles Street in Dublin) of expecting a birth. Joyce in that episode goes round all the styles of English writing over the ages. I take it as symbolic of the genetic layers of metalanguages that could constitute a freshening of theology: a topic *Cantowers LXVI* ff. But, to return to the slogan: *Deshil* means in Gaelic, 'turn round to the right', and 'holles' points to the German for all. So, we get a doctrine: Go right round all James - or Jack or Jill - which comes close, as I hope you will notice, to the minimalist doctrine of this essay.

³My compendious Joycean titles should not be a deterrent to understanding. I do not wish here to enter into the cultural significance of such compacting. (There are clues in notes 75 and 76). Suffice it to notice layered suggestiveness coupled with linguistic feedback of subjectivity. U? U points obviously to you, but less obviously there is the pointing to Vu-point, indeed universal viewpoint, UV, where the minimum character of that UV is a key emergent of this essay. There is also the underlying interest (see note 1, above) in the u-pointing of all forms of energy. I invite you to link the three section-title notes (notes 3, 17 and 62) with the concluding note of the essay.

the functional thing. Nor have I, until recently, persuaded anyone else to try it. The recent effort was the reason for the early writing of *Cantower XXXIV*: a group from an annual West Dublin Conference interested in giving functional interpretation a shot (their efforts appear in *Journal of Macrodynamical Analysis* (4) 2005) pushed me to spell out the task a little better. But the spelling out profited by initiating the effort.

I recall now a conversation I had with Fr. Fred Crowe more than thirty years ago, when I conjured up the slogan, If a thing is worth doing it is worth doing badly. Think, for instance, of the history of soccer football, beginning, if I remember rightly, as a messy struggle between villages. Pele's point and pointing would have gone abegging, even if he wasn't a Spanish speaker interfering with the British Empire! So, yes, we humans are slow and reluctant, and perhaps we need to make a visible mess before we get our act together.⁴ But the mess, it seems, has to really become embarrassingly evident. Meantime, there is the simple point and pointing of Lonergan, a Canadian speaking to the theological empire.

I am obviously writing here mainly to people familiar with his work and his long climb to the discovery of the character of the division of labor that would transform theology. But then maybe this is already a difficulty. There are not too many left who lived with the problem of theology as it was posed by Lonergan throughout the 1940s and the 1950s. For many there is the vision of Lonergan producing *Method* after *Insight*, so much gentler in its demands on the mind, indicating the links between territories in theology in a mild and mildly confused manner. And after *Method* he got on with his usual type of thinking and writing. What, then, was all the fuss about? Even in this year of 2003, that is the impression given by leading lights of the Lonergan tradition: there is the impression that the eight specialties are mainly handy ways of identifying one's own and others' areas of work and expertise. Some few certainly have had a shot at

⁴This is a central thesis of chapter three of my *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism*, Axial Publications, 2003. I indicate the potential for functional collaboration that is the emergence of fragmentation evident in all disciplines.

specialization: I have already drawn attention to such efforts, and shall do so again regularly in these next *Cantowers*.⁵ But there is nothing much to shout about in any of our efforts.

So: it really cannot be that simple. One of the problems here is one just mentioned: that the division is a handy way of knowing what one is at. To counter this perspective I have regularly emphasized the global aspect of the division, the collaboration. Indeed, that was the first aspect that I focused on. It literally stared me in the face in 1969, when I tackled the question of musicology's mess in the Old Bodleian Library in Oxford. I still have a vivid picture of the corner in which I worked, with a dozen or so shelves of books and periodicals relating to music. At that stage I had already been brooding about the division of labor for three years⁶ and its relevance to music bubbled forth in a week or so of puttering. Writing it up, of course, was another matter: my rambling effort was presented at the Florida Conference of Easter 1970.

Since then the Bodleian has shifted gear as regards music: the New Bodleian Building now has goodly space devoted to music. And perhaps that very spaciousness obscures the problem? Indeed, perhaps it is the very spaciousness or diversity of theological studies, or linguistic studies, or whatever, that obscures the relevance of the simple solution to our troubles suggested by Lonergan? How could this ordering of what is already "evident" - specializations - help? That fact that the tired old warrior Lonergan didn't give a lead didn't help either. Not did we of that first generation. I was busy pointing to its relevance in different areas as well as skirmishing on various topics to get on with the job of trying out functional work. Of course I can claim that I was into functional work in that I was concerned about new foundations for culture generally

⁵Functional collaboration is the specific topic in *Cantowers* XXXIV, XXXVI, XXXVII-XLI, LI, LII.

⁶Lonergan introduced me to the divisions in a conversation of the summer of 1966.

and I was pushing towards it through what I called “random dialectics”. I was engaging mainly in what I would now call the serious *per se* work of foundations persons: **fantasy**.⁷ But I was not seriously homing in on the tasks in a manner that fostered initial practice. That is the central concern of the present *Cantowers*.

So, I return to Pele and functional divisions of labor on the soccer field. In the game as it developed in the twentieth century those divisions became both more obvious and more refined, and I presume the same can be said for other games like baseball and American football - of which I am grossly ignorant. Only in back-street soccer does one simply get the girls or boys into groups of eleven - with the obvious goal-keeper - and set to. Whatever the group game, there are functional positions. Soccer indeed seems to have a larger flexibility in this matter than other field games: still the functional positions count and, as Pele pointed out, a second-rate team can beat the talented individualists by positional strategies.

Yet I must push further in the line of simplicity. In recent years I have used a parallel with relay-racing to make the simple point made by Pele. Take a world class 10,000-meters runner and put him or her up against ten reasonable 1000-meter runners. Now, my parallel falters: for, how are we to organize the replacement of one runner by another? The faltering is fruitful in that it leads to the introduction of a baton: but then the problem emerges of passing it properly so as not to ruin the advantage. Realistically, this is not a great problem in the long race I envisaged, but shift your imagination to a total distance of 400-meter distance, with one against four. Or change back to some

⁷I got the nudge towards this differentiating characteristic of foundational work in the early 1970s from Herbert Marcuse, *Negations. Essays in Critical Theory*, translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro, Boston, 1968: “Without fantasy, all philosophic knowledge remains in the grip of the present or the past and severed from the future, which is the only link between philosophy and the real history of mankind” (p. 155). See chapter 4 of my *Shaping of the Foundations*, 1976 - available on www.philipmcshane.ca. **Fantasy** has a precise concrete meaning for me related to schedules of probability and to a modern reconfiguration of the *vis cogitativa*. We shall touch on the problem later in reflecting on the problem of doctrines and policy. See note 49, below.

form of football. Whatever. The key focus now is the baton-passing. For anyone familiar with relay-racing and its rules this is a subtle business of pace, positioning, poise. The supposed single runner carries the baton all the way. The team comes at the race from long hours of practice, finding their comfortable placings both in the sequence and in the exchanging.

Brooding over such an analogue points you - in the multitude of the meanings of *point* - towards what is now for me an evident gap in *Method in Theology*. Certainly, Lonergan can talk about "exchanges" - the interpreter, for instance talking to different audiences - but there is not a serious tackling of the problem of the analogue for carrying or passing the baton. I have previously noted how Lonergan, recovering from surgery, surviving Regis College, etc etc patched together the book. One can patch more into the expression of his views from stray published and unpublished statements. I think, for instance, of his view of those really good people who get to the root of a problem of interpretation so that their solution lasts through the generations. But - as we shall notice in the following essays - he is not sharp on the strategy of exchange, nor indeed on, so to speak, the selection of the baton.

By "the selection of the baton" I mean picking the problem functionally. Here I am in a mess of topics that defy simple presentation, so let me stick with the function of interpretation that we tackled in the previous *Cantower*. It is tremendously important to get onto a significant problem, and that "getting onto" is, alas, something that has to emerge in stages of unity, beauty, efficiency, as this whole functional business develops.⁸ It involves a culture, *institutions, roles, tasks* that breath and breed in an

⁸My lead to this thinking of unity etc comes from Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, 160, line 16, where he talks about a science getting its unity from efficiency. Think, then, of the failure of what is called metaphysics from Plato on, clearly a failure of efficiency, of implementation, if nothing else. The functional unity is a shift in the statistics of efficiency and so also of unity and beauty of methodological human culture.

established ethos.⁹ But at least you can note from your own or others' experiences of luck how one can hit on, or be led to, a topic, a zone, whatever, and find gradually that the direction is right on, opening up new angles. Some of the essays in our survey illustrate this admirably.

You notice here that I am talking of community and of a communal bent. Recall the third last sentence of *Cantower XXXI*: "A sighting, after more than thirty years of *Method*, that would stir the treacle of conventional discussion towards the vortex of a global efficiency in the control of meaning". Now, the vortex in question is the vortex diagramed below, where the dominance of UV, the universal viewpoint, is evident.¹⁰ A good deal of the struggle in these *Cantowers* so far has been an effort to bring that UV out of the clouds, into a realism given to it by comparison with successful sciences. So, I

⁹There is the obvious reference here to the structuring of the human good on p. 48 of *Method in Theology*. The minimum shift of collaboration that I write of here is in fact a massive global institutional change meeting a centuries-old crisis of cultural fragmentation. With such a crisis one associates operatively an ethos meshed in imagery, "something essential to human living. It is what an existentialist would call an existential category. It is a constitutive component of the group as human. It is an aesthetic apprehension of the group's origin. The aesthetic apprehension of the groups origin and story becomes operative whenever the group debates, judges, decides, or acts - and especially in a crisis" (*Topics in Education*, 230). I have fostered the central imagery of the *Can Tower* in relation to this ethos. See the following note.

¹⁰I have located this diagram at the beginning of section 3, below. It is taken from *A Brief History of Tongue*, p. 124. The full imagery of the Tower emerges only slowly (e.g. I use the image of Robert Browning's 'Dark Tower' in *Cantower 4* and that of Pound's 'gilded tower' [Canto 4]) in *Cantower 5*). I regularly suggest to students to cut-out the rectangle in the diagram so as to form a tower on the plane of plain meaning, and have found it useful to top off that tower with the circular diagram of functionality given on p.110 of *A Brief History of Tongue*. The tower must rise, a Tower of Able - or of Shem the Penman! The massive challenge is the come to grips with the different planes of meaning, and to thematize a meaning for popularization, or ex-planing. See, *Lack in the Beingstalk. A Giants Causeway*: the conclusion of chapter 3. (the book, completed in 2001, is available on www.philipmcs Shane.ca) On the minimum meaning of UV see note 14, below.

have paralleled UV with the Periodic table in chemistry and, more strangely but perhaps more fruitfully, with the GUTS (Grand Unification Theories) in physics. More fruitfully: because GUTs in physics is a problematic and obscure zone: but let us leave that for the moment. The pointing physics is a community, a U-pointing community that is tuned to the global searching, say, beyond the Standard Model in quantumchromodynamics. That sort of tuning is to be hoped for in the field of theology, thus cutting back on a colossal waste of time and energy due to various types of parochialism or totalitarianism. But again, this is something for later reflection. I want to stick here to one pointing, a point of simplicity: not then the selection of the baton, the topic, but the **passing** of the baton.

I claim that Lonergan is not sharp on the exchange process. Take for instance the place of history in the cyclic process. Lonergan was quite happy to patch in two chapters that talked about history without any serious pausing over the flow from interpretation, the flow to dialectic.

Nor is it easy to pause creatively over the related methodological problems. But what is easy here, I hope, is to notice the difference it might make if an interpreter, picking a significant problem of oversight, would so present - or rather re-present - to the historians the missed pointing, that the pointing would shift this historian or that towards a freshening of history, a freshening that has a statistics of circulating round all the way to communications and thus forward-back to fresh research. So, according to Quinn, Einstein was insightful about special relativity but confused about the Minkowski transformation.¹¹ The enlarged insight promises to lift a century's thinking and practice into a new context. Dialectic specialists can pick up that newness, force or

¹¹T.Quinn, "Interpreting Einstein on the Twin Paradox", *Journal of Macrodynamical Analysis*, 4(2004); <http://mun.ca/jmda> .

cajole¹² some of their community to an enlarged perspective and so give a nudge forward towards fresh foundational fantasy.

Or, nearer the theological home, Lonergan can find a side of Aquinas that did not make it into the weave of history, make that interpretation available to historians, and so give a lift to dialectic and foundational thinking. But, alas, with brutal realism, we are brought back by this very illustration to “the treacle of conventional discourse”. The **pointing** was not, is not, present. The baton is not passed on.

And I choose to take as symbol of that failure the end statement of a single and singular achievement of Lonergan, published in 1943 in *Theological Studies*: “Finality, Love Marriage’. The end statement, included only in notes in the recently published version, is Lonergan’s appeal for a follow-up, a passing on: there was no follow-up, no passing on, either of content or of context.¹³ Thirty years later Lonergan talked to me of this article and his progress at the time: so, he “had” emergent probability, vertical finality, and a great deal more. Do such things happen even still, things that are way out of date as occurrences in zones like zoology and physics? Oh, yes: it can happen to good stuff, perhaps your good stuff, buried in a journal. But we’ll get round to that problem later.

Let me conclude here with at least a brief imaginative pause on possibilities of **U-point**. The pointing, “ideally” would be U-pointing, the pointing of you and me by a

¹²“It proceeds by cajoling or forcing attention” (*Insight*, 398[423]). To that pressure there is added a methodological doctrine that - especially when it becomes a talked-out cultural ethos, embarrasses: “Doctrines that are embarrassing are not mentioned in polite company” (*Method in Theology*, 299).

¹³See note x, p. 263, of the new edition of *Collection* (University of Toronto Press, 1988). Lonergan wished to make the article the start of a discussion. The note goes on to mention the Holy Office closing in on the topic in March 1944, a damper on public exchanges.

shared UV.¹⁴ So, imagine that simple world, a world of efficient cultural re-cycling. The right gaps and problems are discerned in each functional zone; neat little pieces of discovery work are passed onwards and roundwards. The turn to the idea would be systematically efficient, one, and beautiful: it would be the turn to the Idea, the turn in an Idea, of An Idea, the vortex idea of Lonergan, globally molecularized.¹⁵ And one of its images might well be that chosen by the original Vorticist Movement of Wyndam Lewis and Ezra Pound: the way iron filings point if spread on a surface and pointed, patterned, by a magnet.¹⁶

U-Dare¹⁷

¹⁴I feel the need to emphasize the parallel with physics here. Theology, in ways, is younger than physics, so the initial common UV is more like Galileo discovering the significance of precise measurement. Here we have a novel “taking the measure” of what I am doing: Am I ordering, pointing, my work towards circulation? And in that ordering, doing a solid job on my bit of the relaying?

¹⁵See notes 9 and 10 above. In various ways this is a massive challenge for theology. Not only does it require the personal molecularization of an ethos, but it requires a thematization of that molecularization that lifts us beyond the notion that “human explanation” is an intellectual thing, it is concretely meshed with molecules. A useful popular perspective is Rita Carter, *Mapping the Mind*, Phoenix paperback, 2000. I provide a larger context for reflection in “Systematics: A Language of the Heart” chapter 5 of *The Redress of Poise*, 2002, on www.philipmcshane.ca.

¹⁶I discussed the Vorticist movement in *Cantower I*.

¹⁷As with U-Point (see note 9 above) we have here layers of significance. U-Dare is a manner of pronunciation in parts of Ireland for U-There, giving a first basic reference to the “there” of Heidegger and the “out-there” of Lonergan, which, for instance, I circle round in chapter five of *A Brief History of Tongue*. The more evident meaning is the personal daring to which cultural fragmentation invites us, in line with the challenge of fantasy of Marcuse (see the quotation at note 7). In the context represented by note 1, there is the fullest meaning of u-dare the occurs in Christian hope that ties in with hope seeking an understanding of molecularity’s longing. That daring, at its theological finest, occurs luminously in our “Empirical Residence” (the title of *Cantower XXXII*) thus massively denying all “out-there” types of cosmology or

So I invite you to ramble with me through the volumes of *Theological Studies*, beginning in 1995. The ramble will not be logical: rather I will cycle and recycle round a selection of articles in a way that is, I hope, helpful towards a perspective. But first there is the question, Why *Theological Studies*? Why Journals?

In most zones, the current journals manage to put you in the picture with regard to 'where its at'. Furthermore, in my own case, there was the advantage of being a dabbler from the beginning, so finding out 'where its at' across a wide front. My first year of teaching threw me into mathematics, mathematical physics, commerce, engineering. In the 1960s my interests were spread out over the journals of mathematical logic, physics and chemistry, botany and zoology, even though my professed zone was philosophy and theology. I still recall the hours of the late 1960s in Cambridge University's libraries of zoology, when it dawned on me what a telling analogue there was in such work for an up-pacing in theology. 1969 pushed me much further in that direction when the journals of musicology pointed me towards the potential of fragmentation that I was to thematize in its finality thirty years later. The 1970s led me into economics, and I still recall the frustrations of the summer of 1977, when Lonergan was preparing to give his first course in economics and I was trying to find relevant back-up stuff in the journals. Shortly afterwards I found the same mess in literary studies. But perhaps it was the task of editing Volume 18 of Lonergan's *Complete Works: Phenomenology and Logic* that pushed me towards seeing the general mess as a dialectic and foundational ferment, perhaps "something better than was the reality,"¹⁸ an ideal mess of two apparently disparate weeks of Lonergan's dialectical and foundational talking.¹⁹

eschatology.

¹⁸*Method in Theology*, 251.

¹⁹The push that was there right through my editing blossomed as I struggled with the third section of *Cantower XXXIII*. The key issue there became the adequate

But I must go back a bit: to the year 1988-9 when I investigated the dynamics of three theological journals of Rome in the Bodleian Library of Oxford. Some of the results of my puttering, to which I referred at the beginning, found their way into chapter four of the book of that year, *Process: Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minders*.²⁰

I wish now to focus on a single journal of theology, but before I do so I would invite you to pause over whatever parallel you have for my venture into the journals of Rome. You, obviously, can pick your own discipline and area, and your own city - Berlin, Boston, Beijing, wherever it B - so as to see whether our findings match. For me, the decades of the three different journals bore witness to the sad fact that there was little cross-journal conversation.²¹ So, for instance, Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, tunneled along quite merrily.

Now I find myself in sweet isolation, a hundred miles from libraries: so I answer my question above, *Why Theological Studies?* Because it is the only theological journal that I receive regularly and so have to hand the volumes since 1995. I intend to be critical of the journal in a rambling dialectic sense that emphasizes the positive drive gasping for a pointing: my criticism is, if you like, by way of foundational fantasy.

Clearly, I cannot but be selective in my venture, so I settle for my perspective on

education-oriented expression of the growth of the existential foundational subject in a series of metalanguages.

²⁰I also found it very illuminating to examine the nineteenth century journals of chemistry before and after the break-through of Mendeleev and Meyer, paralleling this with twentieth century journals in theology. The book *Process* was written in Oxford in 1988-89, published in Mt.St.Vincent University, and recently placed on the usual website, www.philipmcshane.ca.

²¹The same failure is common in different disciplines to different degrees: think of schools of economics or philosophy. The full structure of the cycling that I am advocating grounds the emergence of a structure of merging dialectic and foundations, and so the emergence of embarrassing dialogue, but that refinement is beyond the present essay. [see the next chapter here].

searchings in Christology in the selected years.²² Immediately, in 1965, one notices continuity of debate: the problem pivots on “The Axiom *In Persona Christi* in St. Thomas and the Magisterium”²³ and Sara Butler takes issue with Dennis Michael Ferrara. “It seems to me most worthwhile to engage Dennis Michael Ferrare in debate. Serious theological dialogue within the Church cannot be advanced without a careful consideration of the teaching of the contemporary Magisterium.”²⁴ As is seems to me also, but in what sort of progressive or lined-up context? A complex of issues are involved: the reliability of Thomas and the Magisterium; the sexuality of priesthood; the meshing of doctrine and theological understanding. Ferrara, in a first reply, notes “a fundamental difference in theological mentality”²⁵ and differences “best explained, I think, by radical differences in theological methods and aims.”²⁶ Ferrara returns with a more contextualized reply, “a more nuanced retrieval”²⁷ in the following year: “In

²²My other option was to consider the series of creative feminist essays in the decade, but that would best be done by someone seriously at home in the area. Ilia Delio (see below, at note 56) is an obvious overlap, as is the subtle mix of reflections on both foundations and ritual that is given by Mary Nyangweso, “Christ’s Salvific Message and the Nandi Ritual of Female Circumcision”, TS 2002(63), 579-600. Nyangweso effectively raises deep problems of “affirming Christ’s identity with Nandi culture” (p. 600). On the division of labor in feminist studies see the final chapter of Sandy Gillis-Drage, *Beyond Present Feminism. ?Woman What Gives*, Axial Press, Halifax, 2005. See also below, note 56.

²³Part of the title of and article by Dennis Michael Ferrara in the June TS 55(1994), 195-224: “Representation of Self-Effacement? The Axiom *In Persona Christi* in St. Thomas and the Magisterium”.

²⁴Sara Butler M.S.B.T. “Quaestio Disputata: ‘In Persona Christi’”, TS, March 1995(56), 61-80; 62.

²⁵Dennis M. Ferrara, “‘In Persona Christi’. A Reply to Sara Butler” *Ibid.*, 81-91; 81.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 88.

²⁷See *Op. Cit.* next note, p. 66.

Persona Christi; Towards a Second Naivete,"²⁸ a second naivete which, among other things, "involves a shift from a baroque to a more evangelical understanding of the Church's hierarchical structure."²⁹ There are extremely rich elements in the debate, but they do not carry forward, are not pointed creatively on, at least not in this journal. But I shall return to that crisis of efficient context shortly.

Back then to TS(1995), in which William C. Spohn writes of "Jesus and Christian Ethics" and, perhaps inadvertently, adds another context to the previous debate: "Jesus Christ is the prototype of liberation not because he is male but despite it. Allowing the multiple images from the story of Jesus to be mutually corrective restores Jesus as a paradigmatic rather than an iconic norm."³⁰ And swinging forward to TS(1996) again we find a contribution from Pamela Dickey Young, who is concerned with method³¹ and with relational Christology: "If Christology arises from responses to Jesus, then Jesus' maleness is in no way central to Christology nor essential to his work, and no claims based on that maleness can be sustained."³²

In the same September issue of TS, two other authors come at problems of the divinity and the humanity of Jesus from very different contexts, yet both involving historical studies of views on Jesus. There is Peter C. Phan, "Jesus the Christ with an Asian Face"³³; there is F. LeRon Shults, "A Dubious Christological Formula: From

²⁸TS 1996(57), 65-88.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 88.

³⁰TS 1995(56), 106. The article runs from 92-107.

³¹See her *Feminist Theology / Christian Theology: In Search of Method*, Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1990.

³²Pamela Dickey Young, "Encountering Jesus through the Earliest Witnesses", TS1996(57), 513-521; 516.

³³TS 1996(57), 399-430.

Leontius of Byzantium to Karl Barth."³⁴ Is there a *Tao*, a way, in which these two reachings and traditions, East and West, might be pointed forward towards a meshing in larger light, in patterns of pastoral caring, "recognizing how powerfully theological anthropology shapes Christology",³⁵ contextualizing and transposing the struggles of "third world theologians who paint different portraits of Jesus: the liberator, the elder brother, the ancestor, the chief, the 'witch doctor', the *christa*, the black Messiah, the guru, and so on"³⁶?

There is a shift of interest to the tense mix of the transcendent and the Pauline local in Brendan Byrne, "Christ's Pre-Existence in Pauline Soteriology."³⁷ I find his conclusion quite acceptable on two levels. There is the level of a commonsense Christian perspective that would see a Jesus who did not "come from heaven" but "just started" as just not with the program: so, somehow "pre-existing". However, Byrne's resources of clarification of pre-existing really do not lift us much beyond that vagueness.³⁸ But there is the other level of acceptability: that associated with the specialized journeying that would locate Paul's effort as muddled but on the way: Paul could not, no more than Augustine, figure out the puzzle of "pre". It was early days in theology. It still is. And one can find that mood, a ground for optimism, in David Coffey's "The Theandric Nature of God",³⁹ which sweeps through views of the nature of Christ from the Synoptics to Rahner in a manner that opens towards fresh reachings.

³⁴TS 1996(57), 431-446.

³⁵Shults, 446.

³⁶Phan, 430.

³⁷TS 1997(58), 308-30.

³⁸Raymond Moloney draw attention to more fundamental categories. See pp. 59-70 of the reference at note 43.

³⁹TS 1999(60), 405-431.

At this stage, a little compacting is warranted, so that a half-dozen more paragraphs would bring us to the end of our nine-volume adventure. The compacting has to do with the set of articles that deal with Christ and the sacramental world. In 1998 there are "Irenaeus on the Baptism of Jesus"⁴⁰ and "The Manifold Presence of Christ in the Liturgy."⁴¹ The latter article can be linked both to "Eucharistic Presence: An Invitation to Dialogue"⁴² in 1999 and to "Lonergan on Eucharistic Sacrifice" in 2001.⁴³ In that same March issue of 2001 there is "Divine Impassibility and Christology in the Christmas Homilies of Leo the Great."⁴⁴ How does this variety of sound articles fare in our searching for linkages, pointings? How might you dare to link them?

So, we find ourselves in TS 2000 with William Lowe's massive and enlightening venture: "From the Humanity of Christ to the Historical Jesus".⁴⁵ The focus is the paradigm shift discussed in **Galvin**. As with Coffey above, summary of the twenty page climb to Lowe's position would be futile, but I would use Lowe as a stepping-off ground for enlarging our reflection. Lowe brings us through the various stages and facets of the Quest for the historical Jesus, paying particular attention to the debate between David Tracy and Elizabeth Johnson, arriving at a view of the limits of the paradigm and of possible sophistications of it. Dodging summary, I hang my few

⁴⁰Kilian McDonnell O.S.B. and Daniel A.Smith, TS 1998(59) 317-321: this was an on-going debate about Irenaeus' view of the status of Jesus prior to His baptism.

⁴¹Michael G.Witczak, TS1998(59), 680-702.

⁴²John H.McKenna, C.M., TS 1999(60), 294-317.

⁴³Raymond Moloney, TS 2001(62), 53-70.

⁴⁴Geoffrey D. Dunn, TS 2001(62) 71-85.

⁴⁵TS 2000(61), June: 314-331.I refer to this article throughout as **Lowe**. It is important to note that the title echoes that of an article of a volume earlier than my nine: John P.Galvin, "From the Humanity of Christ to the Jesus of History: A Paradigm Shift in Catholic Theology", TS 1994 (55) 252-73. I shall refer to this article henceforth as **Galvin**.

comments on two quotations from Lowe, one from the second page, one from the last.

“Thus the paradigm shift: Christology is no longer simply commentary on Chalcedon. Rather, the newer Christologies seek to recapitulate the entire tradition, beginning from Jesus’ ministry, with a view finally toward mediating the significance of that tradition in the contemporary context, one often characterized as postmodern and distinguished by such concerns as race and gender, social and economic justice, ecology, cosmology, and the relationship of Christianity to Judaism and to other living faiths”.⁴⁶

“With this shift, Christology has moved from an a historical, metaphysical approach to questions generated by and answered within the framework of the dogma of Chalcedon to a historical, genetic, and dialectical account of the entire Christological tradition in the service of a constructive statement of its contemporary significance. Within that genetic account the question of the historical Jesus, a determination of its theological significance, and some account of the current results of research on the historical Jesus have a legitimate place, but ‘the historical Jesus’ is neither the foundation of Christology nor its primary norm”.⁴⁷

If I avoid summary, I must also avoid complex summary comment. I can take my stand with Lowe here, and I suspect that on a larger canvas he would move on with me. I shall shortly talk of my context and lead into a new section that will gently mesh these two first sections. But perhaps a hint of my twist on things is useful here. Lowe writes of a shift from the Chalcedon framework “to a historical, genetic, and dialectical account” in the service of the contemporary scene. I would change the listing and write of “a historical, dialectical and genetic account”. The change points to a deep problem of

⁴⁶Lowe, 314.

⁴⁷Lowe, 331.

methodical organization, of **pointing**.⁴⁸ It especially involves a precision regarding a new genetic systematics, a precision that seems very difficult to communicate much less to implement.⁴⁹ That precision falls within a structuring of inquiry quite beyond the “‘third quest’ for the historical Jesus.”⁵⁰ But before I enlarge on this let me conclude our nine-volume trip.

TS 2001(62) gives us Martin F. Connell, “*Descensus Christi ad Inferos: Christ’s Descent to the Dead*”.⁵¹ Is this a fringe topic? By no means. As for myself, I have struggled long with the Easter Saturday reality that Thomas puzzles over: the body, the

⁴⁸Fr. Robert Doran’s patient work of the last decade symbolizes the difficulty of the problem: see, for instance, the two articles in the volumes that concern us: “Bernard Lonergan and the Functions of Systematic Theology”, TS 1998(59), 569-607; “System and History: The Challenge to Catholic Systematic Theology” TS 1999(60). The problem is the relation of system to history. A book is to be expected from Fr. Doran, *What is Systematic Theology?*, University of Toronto Press, in the Autumn of 2005.

⁴⁹I return to the genetic aspect in note 64 below. Here I limit myself to a comment on my change from Lowe’s listing. Why the interchange of system and dialectic? Doran’s work bears witness to a first answer: somehow history, through dialectic, generates system: that somehow attends to the order of collaboration suggested by Lonergan. But there are further complications, and I hesitate to enter into them in my minimalism. So, for instance, even my minimalism is a system, so system holds the whole enterprise together. Secondly, as the cycle re-cycles the heuristics improve (*per se*), become more systematic. So, a developed genetic systematics - I touch on it later, in note 64 - become a heuristics for later research, interpretation, history, etc. A larger problem appears when one pushes for Lonergan’s meaning in chapter 13 of *Method in Theology*. The focus of his attention there seems to be the application of a fuller foundations to the task of history which would lead to larger precisions of old doctrines. But there is a hidden subtlety. Doctrines in the new context are to be policies, and in the context of this sixth speciality their meaning is remote from street or conciliar meanings. How, then, would these remote determinations relate forward to pastoral communications and backwards to the Councils?

⁵⁰Lowe, 326.

⁵¹June 2001, 262-82. Referred to below as **Connell**. I would draw attention to the manner in which Connell’s discussion is contextualized by Prusak’s article referenced in note 72.

Person, the personal relief, the Company and company. But, more broadly, we are destined to be dead shortly: ‘where’ did Christ go before us, and what twist did He begin to bring to the billennial rhythms of molecules and malice? Origin reaches for a restoration of all,⁵² Augustine puzzles over an empty hell,⁵³ and von Balthasar stands with E.E.CUMMINGS against American jollity.⁵⁴

So I twist forward to the final 2003 selection, a delightful “Revisiting the Franciscan Doctrine of Christ,”⁵⁵ and I find myself cycled round in the full title of the *Cantower* Project, “Roun Doll, Homes James”⁵⁶ and the context of the Cantower-poem, “Sun, flowers, Son-flowered, / Speak to us of growth.”⁵⁷ Ilia Delio lifts us towards a new contextualization of a piece of Bonaventure’s systematics, but I receive it in my own context of a genetic systematics with its “lift and twist”⁵⁸ of past achievements. I

⁵² “*Apokatasasis*”. **Connell**, 269.

⁵³**Connell**, 270.

⁵⁴**Connell**, 275-82.

⁵⁵Ilia Delio O.S.F, “Revisiting the Franciscan Doctrine of Christ”, *TS* 2003(64), 3-23.

⁵⁶The title twists forward from the topic discussed at note 8 above. The ‘home’ is pretty obvious, especially in the context given by note 69. ‘Roun’ is middle English for the modern English ‘rune’ and the old English ‘run’. The Gaelic for secret is ‘run’, pronounced rue-n. Thus are mixed the tone of mystery with all the meanings of ‘run’ and ‘round’. ‘Doll’? One meaning is the obvious slang for a young woman: no offence meant, but rather a recall of the hope of *Cantowers IV* (dealing with Candace Pert’s searchings) and *XXVI* (“Refined Woman and Feynman”) for a feminist lift out of the present period. Again, a range of overtones: think of Dolling up, dressing up in a new mode: think of ‘dolly’, the transport structure for heavy objects, an image that supplements the image of hod in my notion of hodics as method. Of course, ‘rune’ is also the Finnish for canto, so we get back round to Pound’s Canto effort.

⁵⁷The poem first occurs at the beginning and the end of *Cantower II*.

⁵⁸See note 64 below.

join with Delio in the “14 billion year old”⁵⁹ cosmos searching for the heart-yearnings of molecules, seeing “in the stars the glory of His eyes”.⁶⁰


In my own context? All along here I have been speaking thus of my reading of *Theological Studies*, but now I wish us to focus on a reading in a minimal context that is an elementary demand for theologians of “a) let’s accept a human bent of a few million years towards “being sensible”; b) let’s organize our fragmented effort of reaching a sensible view of that sensibility along lines demanded by the fragments”.⁶¹ And at a maximum? That is a question best left for the next *Cantower*. Here I wish to stick with the minimum context.

⁵⁹Delio, 16, 17.

⁶⁰I am quoting from a poem of the Irish poet, Joseph Mary Plunkett, “I See His Blood Upon the Rose”. He was executed in 1916 for his part in the revolution.

⁶¹The first principle is easily skipped and should not distract. The point of the neologistic a) is to get over debates on human orientation (see further note 70). So the only “categorical demand” I make is the we have a shot at doing a definite piece of eight pieces of “the turn to the idea”. The eight pieces are to be thought of minimally: e.g. you need a document before you interpret it; best interpret it properly before seeing how it drives history; etc. Obviously, though, I stick with the ordering of the eight and the number eight suggested by Lonergan, but that too is flexible. But what we cannot afford to continue to do, without manifest and avoidable inefficiency, is “the compact thing”, a lone ranging round from Paul to pastoral message.

U-Hall⁶²



⁶²See notes 3 and 17, regarding the other two section titles. "Hall" refers both to 'haul' and 'hall', and 'hall' points both to hall-as-home in the sense of method-home (*Method in Theology*, 14, 350-1) and "Epilogue" (*CantowerXXI*). But Hall also refers to the full title of the million word project, *Roun Doll, Home James* (see note 56), to the "Oll", to "Home". For a fuller perspective on this push of *anastomosis*, (*ana-* again, *stomein*, to provide with a mouth) see the conclusion to chapter 2 of *Lack in the Beingstalk. A Giants Causeway*.

My ramblings in the previous section were an obvious invitation to, or initiation into, a sharing of my adventure in journal-browsing in some area. The hope is that you might begin to suspect that there could be a better way within theology of moving forward together. By that I do not mean an ideal way: I mean something of the character of a claim that might be made at the end of this century “less than 2% of adults grow”: which would be a 100% improvement on Maslow’s view of the twentieth century, “less than 1% of adults grow”. I would hope to help forward that reach, and a glimpse of that reach, by twisting round my ramblings through those years and those articles. What I am pushing for is a glimpse of the possibility of a better functioning through a vague agreement about **circulation**.

So, providing documents leads to - points towards - interpreting them, and their interpretation in their own or our time relates to their being somehow put into practice, becoming history, being moved into a fuller presence that requires critical sifting, that yields larger guidelines etc etc and round again. Recall my minimalism here, before you get antsy about the diagram that I have added at the beginning of the section. Minimally, it represents a rather obvious sequence, obvious indeed in all areas of inquiry. A good parallel is to think of the periodic table regularly printed inside the cover of a grade 12 chemistry textbook. In grade 12 it simply means some vague division of chemicals into groups.

The diagram originated during my effort to present a perspective on hermeneutics in the late 1980s,⁶³ and perhaps that gives us the initial link-up with Lowe’s survey and with his final statement. It represents a cycle “in the service of constructing” relevant statements, a cycle of collaboration, of pointing forward. Might we envisage where the different articles primarily fit as pointers? Certainly, there is a dialectic effort in Lowe’s work that leads to his final conclusion, which may then be

⁶³See *Lonergan’s Hermeneutics. Its Development and Applications*, edited by Sean E. McEvenue and Ben F. Meyer, The Catholic University Press of America, 1989. I manufactured the diagram for the presentation of my response to Fr. Doran’s paper.

seen as a swing from the final 'box' to the first foundational 'box'. What of Connell's work? It is a patchwork of interpretations pointing to a story of attention and neglect; and the same might be said of Delio's fuller sweep. But Delio's work raises the larger question that I touched on above in talking of genetic systematics. The medieval perspectives of, say, Bonaventure and Aquinas need the laundering recycling that goes from interpretation through history, dialectic, foundational minimalization and doctrinal sifting if either's system is to be trimmed and freshened into a slice of a progressive genetics of redemptive meaning.⁶⁴

Delio's fuller sweep is complimented by Connell's reflections on Christ's presence with the dead and our own anticipations of a beyond. One might say that, while Delio raises questions related to *The First Three Minutes*,⁶⁵ Connell and Origin nudge us to think further of *The Last Three Minutes*.⁶⁶

⁶⁴I touch here in the great difficulty that contemporary theology has in thinking its way into a genetically-structured systematics. The problem pre-occupied Lonergan through his Roman years (see note 48, above, on the work of Fr. Doran on this complex issue), but he had no doubt about the basic analogue to be had in the layers of integrations that go, for instance, from embryo to tadpole to frog. So, revised versions of Ireneaus' system, Damascene's system, Bonaventure's system, etc etc are to fall into the richer context of a massive genetic systematics. I have dealt with the issue in an initial fashion in "Systematics, Communications, Actual Contexts", *Lonergan Workshop*, Vol. 7, ed. F. Lawrence, Scholars Press, 1987; a broader discussion is "Systematics and General Systems Theory", *Cantower VII*. [Chapter 7 in this book].

⁶⁵Stephen Weinberg, *The First Three Minutes A Modern View of the Origin of the Universe*, New York, Basic Books, 1988.

⁶⁶ Paul Davies, *The Last Three Minutes*, Phoenix pb, 2000. One the scandals of contemporary Christian theology is the failure to tackle the problem of eschatology in the context of modern science. So, for instance, a plausible theology of resurrection has to take account of the fact that our Milky Way and the Andromeda Galaxy are heading for a collision in a few billion years time. It does not do to slide into vague discussion of some pan-cosmic state here. As it happens, there is an excellent article that provides a context for reflection on this problem in the volumes to which we are attending: Bernard P. Prusak, "Bodily Resurrection in Catholic Perspective", *TS* 2000(61). 64-105. The range of opinions dealt with there need critical attention, but what is needed on the

And so we return to that collection of articles that might be said to home us in on the presence and status of Christ in the between-time, while Byrne throws us “further back” to what naive consciousness can name a before-time. I make no attempt for the present to locate the potential pointing or cycle-function of these articles but it seems worthwhile to note that they all raise very subtle questions about the historical Jesus, questions that call for a context of precision not normally associated with liturgy and sacramentality. They bring to mind the claim of Lonergan that “use of the general theological categories occurs in any of the eight functional specialties.”⁶⁷

We are in a zone where there is a desperate need for clearheadedness regarding the efficiency of the incarnate, conveniently⁶⁸ male, Person in the total and detailed

level of methodology is precision regarding particle and molecular finality (that Lonergan article of 1943 again!) and an enlarged heuristics of energy, entropy and negentropy (see Schroedinger’s book, *What is Life?*) that would mesh with a fresh view of obediential potency. Recall note 1, above. In Thomist terms, what is at issue is the concrete finality of prime matter. In terms of my ramblings here I might reverently twist the slogan of note 2 and the title discussed at note 56 into a doctrine, a demand, a yearning: “Round All, Jesus”.

⁶⁷*Method in Theology*, 292. It is important in the present context to read this statement minimally. Even a first year student of chemistry uses the Mendeleev divisions. So, the only general categories I have in mind is the usefulness of the divisions. What of other categories? Each of us has our own whether we think them out or not. But to use the divisions as minimal categories is simply to try to hold to one’s task e.g. finding out what some author means (interpretation), etc etc, searching out in a sequence, as a group but each with their own baton-run in history, dialectic, etc etc, what would be significant lifts of human living. Recall note 61 above regarding the minimal suppositions.

⁶⁸I am thinking here of Thomas’ view of convenience (see *Summa Theologica*, IIIa, q.1). In this context I would like to recall his broad reflection on possible incarnations in the *Summa Theologica*, IIIa q.3. In line with this perspective I sometimes - as I do now - pose the question of the second coming in a female nature: what problems do you see there? On the issue of *In Persona Christi* raised by Elsbernd and Ferrara I would note that Thomas’ thinking was not transcultural: see, for instance, his gallant failed shot at thinking out the end-state of the cosmos.

dynamic of history and in the single and singular loneliness that is each of us. So we get back to where our journey began, with a larger sense of the problem of the meaning of “In Persona Christi”, and with a richer suspicion of what might be meant by “a more nuanced retrieval.”⁶⁹

But I do not wish to bring you to pause now over possible richer senses: my hope is to nudge some readers towards a real assent to a minimal shift. I do not even wish for concern about what I said in the lengthy note within the previous paragraph about making luminous our presuppositions. That is a task that will be catered for slowly if we can get the show on the road. So my invitation, my focus, centers on the minimal switch: apart from the implicit assumption that “we are trying to make sense”⁷⁰ that

⁶⁹Denis Ferrara, “In Persona Christi: Towards a Second Naivete”, TS 19996(57), 66. My reader may notice that I have avoided nuance here. Indeed, some may think that I have also avoided clarity. Certainly I could have shared details of my analysis of various of the articles with you, and put them in definite collections of eight specialties etc etc. But, apart from the impossible length, there is a matter of false clarity, a matter close to some of the suggestions of Lucretia B. Yaghjian, “Flannery O’Connor’s Use of Symbol, Roger Haight’s Christology, and the Religious Writer”, TS 2002(63), 268-301. There is a “writing from below” (298) “in the fragility and the mystery of our humanness” (299) that stirs the molecules of mind by obscurity, that “recognizes the intrinsic connection between the exercise of the imagination and prophetic vision” (300), and thus troubles the imagination into exercise through tensions of unclarity, a process of print stirring each round all amygdalaically, so that there is a paradoxical increased probability of there being ‘constituted a communal, comic, and cosmic vision, not merely a process of individual redemption” (294). And, as Joyce wrote once to a friend at the end of an explanatory letter, “if I can throw any further obscurity on the matter, let me know”. And perhaps there is some connection with the note to follow?

⁷⁰In my earlier noting of minimal presuppositions I used the word *sensible* to cover this. What I intend is some meaning that is pragmatically acceptable to the talking community, one that “makes sense” to post-moderns, radical sceptics, etc. Peter C. Phan draws attention to various ways of battling post-modernism in “The Wisdom of Holy Fools in Postmodernism”, TS2001(62), 730-52) and its “deconstruction of mimetic imagination” (731). I would consider my minimalism to be a component in such a battle, or non-battle: post-modernists write and talk, thus they have some minimal meaning for *making sense*. But there is the other feature of the present contribution: a dodging of

focus is summed up in the “pointing round” suggestion. I might well point round the 9 volumes again, symbolizing a larger cycling strategy, but I shall limit myself to commenting on one article, that of Ilia Delio, and I give an existential twist to my pointing.

When **you** are writing an article for *Theological Studies* you are pointing; when you are reading one you are being pointed. **How** are you pointing, being pointed? Let us think of Jack and Jill in this Beingstalk.⁷¹ If Jack and Jill are in basic agreement while reading each other’s work, have then a “standard model”, then, with luck, the community of agreement grows richer.⁷² My minimalism concerns the slight change of luck that is symbolized in the relay- race image with its baton-exchange. Jill - or in our case Ilia - finds something significant in Bonaventure, something neglected by the Dominicans. She points, points it out or up or on. But does she? She might well have added the sort of note that Lonergan added in 1943, “please let’s air this: this is important stuff”. And some lady-follower of hers in sixty years time - paralleling my

what I call mimetic rationalism such as I write of in the previous footnote, meshing with irony and fantasy(747-9). One seeks to “hold tensions together” (746) through “the ability to live between jest and earnest”(746) that helps towards the avoidance of “the Way to Wisdom through Printed Texts” (735) that in fact can often be a skinflint mimetics. But the fuller battle against such a mimetics is the emergence of layered metalanguages, barriers to pretense (that is the topic of *Cantower XXXIII*). What of the opposition to meta-narrative? The minimalist cycling can be regarded as a non-foundational cycling round the present, one that post-modernism cannot avoid sharing.

⁷¹I am recalling here the book, *Lack in the Beingstalk. A Giants Causeway*, Axial Press, Halifax, 2005. The focus of the book is on the fuller context of the minimal structuring suggested here. In particular chapter four, “The Calculus of Variations” involves a prolonged analogy between the topic of that title, the story of which is discussed by Husserl in his doctorate work under Weierstrass in 1881, and the story of future shifts in “The Calculus of Variations” that would be the “Tower Operation” symbolized by the modification of the diagram given at the beginning of this section.

⁷²So, for example, Smith and McDonnell move forward (see note 40 above). The question is, whether the move forward moves cyclically on and round.

comments here on Lonergan in this male-ridden age - could note that there was a significant article on Finality, Love, Cosmos by Delio in 2003 that would be worth reading, worth heiring.

But suppose that theology had a re-cycling and divided being? And suppose that was part of its ethos, its standard model? If Jill or Ilia were working within that model than Jill would not have to “do everything”: rediscover the theological dimensions of the Franciscan magnificence, note its historical neglect, try to reverse that by lifting it into some sort of general categorial expression, point to its policy-relevance in the twenty-first century, show how it fits into a genetic reaching for the meaning of the full historical Christ, hope that it will end up - as oddly, it does these days’ in my wife, Sally’s, pulpit - heard in the lonely pews, a candle lit in the world’s winds. Jill would be in a community that sees and seizes the obviousness of dividing up the job of getting from the past to the future, that witnesses the blossoming of a commitment to that obviousness in some shift in the statistics of concrete implementation.

No need, then, to go round again: rather it is a matter of you going round your own work, your hopes for its significance, the manner in which a functional orientation would twirl forward what is worthwhile in it. I have only hinted at that manner here: its spelling out is the large task of trying it, recycling the effort, etc. Gradually the function of functional collaboration would be revealed in its beauty and efficiency. Lonergan wrote *Method in Theology* in a tired hurry, patching together old work. There is no clear handling of the topic **function**, nor of the collaborative strategies of cycling forward “the right stuff.” A more elaborate account, emerging *a posteriori*, will be a foundational **pointing**, a **U-pointing**, to a standard model of global collaboration. Will that standard model be fixed? By no means. A Rolling Stone Gathers *Nomos*, and gathers no *mos*.⁷³

⁷³“A Rolling Stone Gathers *Nomos*” is the title both of chapter 5 of my *Economics for Everyone* and chapter 3 of *A Brief History of Tongue. From Big Bang to Colored Wholes*. Chapter 4 of the latter deals with *mos* and *nomos* in section 3.

Among the “cumulative and progressive results”⁷⁴ that it - a global we of culture - would offer, would be its own continual cosmopolitan revision.⁷⁵

And should I not conclude now as Lonergan did in 1943, with a hope of further discussion? I would certainly like the division of labour and an efficient focusing of effort, of collaboration, to become a topic. But I would like even more to see some younger theologians having a shot at functional work. Such work requires a strenuous effort at creative control, sentence by sentence, on a topic strategically selected. In this regard I have three suggestions. First, one can certainly jump in anywhere - as, say, Fr. Crowe did in history - but it seems that the easiest entry point - pointing - is in the field of interpretation.⁷⁶ So, one can, for instance, take a soundly established text of John Damascene’s work on “Orthodox Faith” and tease out precisely what he meant by **deliberation**: a piece of work waiting to be done, stuff ripe for re-cycling.⁷⁷ This brings me to my second point. Eventually there should emerge, as in physics or chemistry, zones ripe for forwarding that are recognized globally as such. These zones become the stuff of theses, collaborations, conferences. Initial efforts will at least show less drifting: so, an interpretation is simply that, and does not involve a leap to either categories or street-relevance, but it will be hard not to so leap.⁷⁸ Thirdly, there is another way of

⁷⁴Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 4.

⁷⁵Insight chapter 7 concludes to the need for a cosmopolis. While this need relates to the supernatural solution to the problem of evil my focus here is on the simplest methodological component of that solution.

⁷⁶I deal with functional interpretation in *Cantowers* 34 and 37. Fr. Crowe’s *Theology of the Christian Word. A study in History* (Paulist Press, New York, 1978) is discussed in *Cantower* 38, “Functional History”.

⁷⁷I have written of this in some detail in *Lack in the Beingstalk. A Giants Causeway*, chapter 1 section 3.

⁷⁸There is nothing fixed about this. In the 1970s, and since, I have written of an “8 by 8” conversational matrix, C_{ij} , where i and j run from 1 to 8. The formal collaborative

plunging into the effort, or the experiment, immediately. One simply picks a previous effort of one's own or of someone else and takes a shot at sorting it out, even perhaps rewriting it functionally.⁷⁹

So we come to my final twist. An obvious sorting out is one that would divide methodological gropings from direct searchings. The sorting out would be doing something worthwhile badly: somewhat as I am doing here, but improved, more focused. It would, minimally and roughly, separate out methodological concerns and positionings from what might be called the positive content of the writings. Instances abound in the articles we have been perusing. Regularly the essayists turn to the question of hermeneutic models, presuppositions, concern for perspective, attention to broader needs, commitment to relevance.

Now wouldn't it be nice if the separation and identification of such issues were done by some subgroup, who would then provided us with a decent selection of concerns and positionings? What **they** think is decent, of course: but we would expect the group to be self-corrective so that their end-product would not leave any perspective out of our sight. The sorting out would be a dialectic effort to make luminous and personal the foundational options. At all events, such notional or operative efforts would bring an appreciation of at least one division of labor: the loose division of content from methodological presuppositions. Add to this appreciation the division of workers focused on the past from those focused on the future, and that gives you a four-way split. Then you only have to notice that the people attending to content

structure, the *per se* operation, is the sub-set given by $j = i + 1$. I would note here that this is quite a tricky thing to think out. Why, for instance, is an interpreter's achievement of more significant interest to the historian than to colleagues in interpretation? A clue here is to advert to the fact that the normal listening of such colleagues at conferences etc is in fact a historical listening.

⁷⁹Students of Lonergan may recognize a pointer here to the need for a functional sublation of the first principle of criticism in the third canon of hermeneutics of *Insight* 17.3.8.

talk about the future in terms of policy, planning and executive reflection, and those attending to the past talk about it in terms of historical expressions, their initial meaning, their accumulated historical meaning. So, an eight-way split. Such an obvious and simple thing. What is the fuss about? It is about academic and cultural reflection being in a rut. Fuss or fun is needed to get us out of that cultural rut, one clear aspect of which is a sort of lone-ranger mentality.

Further, part of the cultural rut is the failure to acknowledge that type of specialization, so evident in industry, that is functional. Moving out of this ooze will not be easy. I have myself failed to make the move in these past decades. Still, from my forty years of methodological messing I have come up with the offer of a minimal foundational option, one that I have slowly recognized as fermenting forward in the past few centuries in all disciplines from mathematics to theology. In all these zones there is an identifiable set of eight tasks. I would say that all of us, globally and in all areas, need to face that option of dividing up the job of getting from the past to a larger future, of relaying the past to the future, within a structuring of those tasks. At present, in our different zones, we seem to regard as the best 'relayers' those who can run the marathon, swivelling their heads around regularly but in a way that inevitably leaves their focus on the future confused and their suggestions effectly ineffective.

So, Thomas Kuhn speaks about paradigm-shifts in science without speaking about shift-paradigms, my fellow Ulsterman, Seamus Heaney, writes of *The Redress of Poetry*, with a sad tunnel-vision, and Bernard Lonergan writes of the restructuring of theology with only slim advertence to history's groaning for a massive sophistication of cultural self-digestion. We need the simple shift to a normal twirling-batoned science living in an ethos of redress that would indeed be poetic but would cycle poetry and science through a foundational perspective redemptive of theology.

But obviously I am twirling here quite beyond my theological minimalism into the huge challenge of a global cultural collaboration that would certainly change the pace and objectives of academic adult growth. This twirling, however, has to do with

motivation: identifying one's small place in the groaning of history and the grace of functional collaboration needs the lift of vision if it is to be a daily drive. The piccolo player is heartened by the soaring of the symphony.⁸⁰

⁸⁰I draw attention again (see the end of note 66, above) to the u-pointing, u-daring, u-hauling, that is our gracing towards our primary human interest as represented by Prusak's article (mentioned in that note 66) on "Bodily Resurrection" so that, despite the failings of contemporary eschatology, I can make my own his conclusion: "All the notes of our individual melodies will have been composed within an embodied history, like molecules of ink on a material score, but in the completed cosmic symphony echoing in eternity in union with God each individual, personal melody will resonate, together with all the others, the whole identity of our embodied history with a deeper reality than the molecules of the body in which the identity of our life was originally composed" (105).